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Executive Summary
Profit sharing with employees is a longstanding practice that has
recently received increased attention, both in the United States and
internationally. Between one-sixth and one-fourth of U.S. firms and
employees participate in profit sharing.
There are two major theories on the economic effects of profit shar
ing. First, profit sharing has long been advocated on the grounds that it
can improve company performance by encouraging worker effort,
cooperation, and sharing of ideas and information (the "productivity
theory"). A second, more recent theory is that profit sharing can lead to
fewer layoffs and greater employment and output stability, for firms
and for the economy as a whole, by changing employer incentives to
hire and retain employees (the "stability theory").
This study reports on a new database on profit sharing in U.S. com
panies with public stock. A telephone survey was conducted of 500
public companies half with profit sharing for employees other than
top management, and half without. To maximize comparability, an
attempt was made to match profit-sharers with non-profit-sharers
within the same industry. Data were collected on profit-sharing cover
age, types, and formulas, as well as on company unionization and per
sonnel policies that may compete or interact with profit sharing in
affecting firm behavior (summarized in table 1.3). To provide evidence
on the productivity and stability theories of profit sharing, the survey
data were matched with publicly available data from public companies
on financial characteristics and performance over the 1970-91 period.
What predicts the adoption of profit sharing? Eleven prior studies
comparing profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing companies have not
produced consistent findings on the relationship of profit sharing to
factors such as unionization, firm size, employee composition, firm
growth, capital intensity, and industry variability. Focusing on the
adoption decision, this study found few variables that could help pre
dict a company's adoption of profit sharing; among a wide range of
variables examined, only unionization and increases in profit margins
and stock prices were found to increase the probability of profit-shar
ing adoption in this period. This calls into question the studies that only

use cross-sectional comparisons of performance, since profit sharing
may in part be an effect, rather than a cause, of better company perfor
mance. Among firms that have adopted profit sharing, greater coverage
of employees is predicted where the profit sharing is older and there is
a higher proportion of nonunion and professional/administrative
employees.
Does profit sharing affect productivity? A wide range of past evi
dence is surveyed in chapter 3, focusing on 26 statistical studies that
attempted to estimate the effect of profit sharing after accounting for
other influences on firm performance. A substantial amount of the
prior evidence indicates that employee profit-sharing plans are associ
ated with higher company performance, although the causality and
mechanisms are unclear. Accounting for past performance and a vari
ety of influences on productivity, this study found that profit-sharing
adoption is associated with productivity increases of 3.5 to 5 percent,
which are maintained with no subsequent positive or negative trend.
The average productivity increases are found to be larger for small
companies and for companies adopting cash plans, and are unaffected
when accounting for personnel policies that may affect productivity.
There is, however, substantial dispersion in the outcomes, and very lit
tle evidence on the mechanisms through which profit sharing may
affect productivity, since it does not strongly interact with measures of
information-sharing or other policies in affecting productivity.
Does profit sharing lead to greater employment stability? Fifteen
prior studies are surveyed in chapter 4; most of the studies that directly
measured stability found some association between profit sharing and
greater stability, though the studies on how the profit share is treated in
employment decisions had more mixed results. The stability theory
requires that profit shares not simply be "gravy" on top of regular com
pensation for a given level of output; they should, instead, substitute at
least in part for fixed pay. Such substitution was found to be unlikely
for old profit-sharing firms, since average compensation levels were
generally substantially above industry averages. For firms that adopted
profit sharing within the sample period, the average small increase in
total compensation was exceeded by the typical profit share, indicating
that profit sharing is more likely to be substituting in part for regular
compensation in these firms. After firms adopted profit sharing, the
employment cutbacks accompanying decreases in product demand
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tended to be smaller than in the preadoption period, particularly where
profit sharing appeared to partially substitute for regular compensation.
For most of the estimates, however, sampling error could not be
rejected as an explanation for the apparent differences in behavior. The
relation of employment stability to profit-sharing plan types and for
mulas, and to profit-sharing participation by unionized employees and
different occupational groups, gave several indications of mild support
for the theory, but the evidence is not strong. The often favorable but
not strong results may in part be explained by several difficult empiri
cal issues in testing the theory, and by the broad definition of profit
sharing used in this study, which includes a number of so-called profitsharing plans that do not fit the requirements of the stability theory.
What are the implications for companies, unions, public policy, and
future research? Chapter 5 relates the results to practitioner literature
on group incentives and discusses union concerns, public policy
options, and rationales. Given that the issues addressed by the profitsharing theories productivity, unemployment, and macroeconomic
stability are central to economic performance and security, further
attention and research on profit sharing are strongly encouraged.
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PROFIT
SHARING
Does It Make
A Difference?

Introduction, Trends,
and Data Description
The idea of tying worker pay to company profits has existed almost
since the emergence of capitalism. Albert Gallatin, U.S. Secretary of
the Treasury under Thomas Jefferson, reportedly instituted a profitsharing plan in 1795 at his Pennsylvania Glass Works out of a belief
that such a system was important for the newly developing U.S.
democracy (PSCA 1959). Experiments in profit sharing attracted sup
port from eminent scholars in the 1800s, including Charles Babbage,
John Stuart Mill, and Stanley Jevons. A pastor and crusader for profit
sharing, Nicholas Paine Oilman (1899), documented 34 profit-sharing
plans in 1899. 1 Two decades later, the National Civic Federation
(1920) documented 46 plans in the United States with worker pay tied
to a percentage of profits (and many others with more loosely based
elements of profit sharing).
Much of the early support for profit sharing can with fairness be
described as ideological. Many proponents viewed profit sharing as a
way to integrate workers into the capitalist system by sharing the bene
fits of capitalism in a more direct and tangible way than allowed by
fixed wages. Advocates promoted it as a cure for "unrest" and "irratio
nal agitation" in capitalism, arguing that the "great uplift and inspira
tion that sharing of profits cultivates in the employee" would lead to
"harmony and contentment" (Askwith 1926: 20). It was seen by many
advocates as a means to build support for capitalism and to solidify
opposition to the competing communist and socialist systems. It was
also seen by some as a logical extension of political democracy Gall
atin advocated profit sharing on the grounds that the
democratic principle upon which this Nation was founded should not be
restricted to the political processes but should be applied to the indus
trial operation (quoted in U.S. Senate 1939: 72).
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Ideological support for profit sharing has continued in the twentieth
century. A U.S. Senate subcommittee (1939) held hearings on profit
sharing toward the end of the Great Depression, clearly displaying sup
port for profit sharing as a means of strengthening capitalism. The
ideological support is well-exemplified in the title of a 1954 book by
John Spedan Lewis, Fairer Shares: A Possible Advance in Civilisation
and Perhaps the Only Alternative to Communism (1954). As a further
illustration, a 1950s comparison of attitudes between employees in
profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing companies lamented that profit
sharing "doesn't necessarily carry over into strong faith in free market
ideas broadly" (Opinion Research Corporation 1957: 16).2 Short of
engendering support for free markets and capitalism, the ideological
approach may still be exemplified today by companies that maintain
profit sharing in part out of a belief that employees should share in the
fruits of company performance (without attempting to change worker
or firm behavior).
Much of the support for profit sharing during the twentieth century,
however, has shifted from a broad ideological approach to support
based on more narrowly construed economic reasons. Undoubtedly the
dominant argument for profit sharing in the twentieth century has been
the idea that it can motivate employees to work harder for increased
profits, primarily through increased productivity. By tying worker pay
to profits, the argument goes, the incentives of workers and owners can
become aligned so that productivity-reducing conflict is minimized
and productivity-enhancing cooperation and innovation are encour
aged. This idea (which will be referred to as the "productivity theory"
of profit sharing) was one of the arguments for profit sharing among
early supporters (Oilman 1899; Askwith 1926), but assumed a larger
role in the U.S. Senate hearings in the 1930s, where it was claimed that
profit sharing brings the worker into a
thoroughly cooperative effort to increase profits of the company by
stimulating production at lower cost, conserving materials, creating sav
ings of waste, protecting the product of the institution, stimulating
greater sales effort, and bringing into harmonious cooperation all the
operating and productive factors of the company operation (U.S. Senate
1939: 65).
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This theory has received increased attention in the 1980s, stimulated
in part by concerns about lagging productivity growth.
A second argument for profit sharing (developed more recently than
the productivity theory) is that it can aid economic stability and
decrease unemployment. A key concern of market economies has been
macroeconomic instability, represented both by business cycles and, in
the extreme, by episodes such as the Great Depression in the 1930s. An
often-cited culprit in economic recessions is the fixed wage system if
wages adjusted more quickly to equate supply and demand in the labor
market, the argument goes, the economy would spend more time in
full-employment equilibrium. Making wages more responsive to eco
nomic conditions, as profit sharing allows, is seen therefore as one
potential solution to economic instability. Simply making worker pay
more flexible, however, may not contribute toward macroeconomic
stability; as John Maynard Keynes argued, flexible wages may aggra
vate business cycles through effects on aggregate purchasing power
(1964: 257-71).
Martin Weitzman has developed a theory supporting the stabilizing
effects of profit sharing that does not rely on claims of increased flexi
bility in total pay. This theory (which will be referred to as the "stabil
ity theory") holds that profit sharing changes the incentives of firms to
hire and retain workers. In brief terms, this theory suggests that firms
view profit-sharing payments not as a cost of employing labor, but
rather as a profits tax. The fact that the "tax" is being paid to the work
ers is incidental to the firm's short-run demand for labor; what concerns
the firm when hiring or laying off workers is the fixed wage that it must
pay. If, for example, the fixed wage is $9/hour and the average profit
share is $ I/hour, the firm will hire or retain workers as long as their
output exceeds $9/hour. The $l/hour does not figure into the short-run
decision since it is directly related to the company's profits, and the
worker will be hired or retained as long as s/he contributes to profits
(i.e., has output exceeding $9/hour). This is in contrast to a firm with a
fixed wage of $10/hour, which will lay off the worker when the value
of the worker's output falls below $10/hour. Assuming, therefore, that
profit-sharing payments substitute for fixed wages, average worker pay
per hour is similar in the two systems ($10/hour total), but the risk of
layoff is different because of the firm's different incentives. In the long
run, profit-sharing and fixed-wage economies will have similar levels
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of compensation and employment, but when short-run shocks occur,
the theory predicts that profit-sharing economies will have less unem
ployment and milder recessions. Unlike the productivity theory, the
stability theory provides a strong public policy case for encouraging
profit sharing, since the gains from stability accrue to the economy as a
whole.
This study will summarize existing evidence on the productivity and
stability theories and bring new evidence to bear on both of them. A
key question to be answered prior to that is why employers have
adopted profit sharing what leads firms to view it as a useful form of
compensation? These three questions adoption, employment, and
productivity effects are addressed with use of a new panel dataset on
500 U.S. firms, containing up to 21 years of employment and financial
data on each firm.
Definition and Types of Profit Sharing
No neat definition of profit sharing covers the variety of plans that
can legitimately claim to share profits with employees. One strict defi
nition would be that profit-sharing plans must have a formula specify
ing a fixed percentage of profits to be divided among employees in a
predetermined way.3 However, this excludes plans that permit a discre
tionary amount to be added to the fixed percentage. It also leaves open
the question of how profits are defined, and what kinds of restrictions
may be applied to the formula some plans provide shares of profits
only after a threshold level of profits has been met or make the percent
age of profits to be shared depend upon the overall level of profits.
Also, it excludes plans where there may be no fixed formula, but where
the discretionary contribution, in practice, systematically depends on
profits. These and other examples argue against a strict definition of
profit sharing, since the productivity and stability theories may easily
apply in cases that do not meet the strict definition.
The Profit Sharing Council of America, a nonprofit association rep
resenting U.S. companies practicing profit sharing, does not employ a
strict definition. It promotes plans that give employees "a direct stake
in profits," but notes that "profit sharing is an extremely adaptable and
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flexible invention" and that "there are many variations among individ
ual plans as to how company contributions are determined, credited to
participants' accounts, [and] distributed" (PSCA 1984: 8, 10, 16). The
PSCA membership exhibits this diversity in plan types and formulas
(PSCA 1989).
This study likewise does not employ a strict definition of profit shar
ing. Rather, a profit-sharing plan is defined broadly as a plan in which
part of employee compensation during a particular period is based sub
stantially on the profitability of the company in that period (without the
requirement of a formula).4
As used here, profit sharing is distinguished from employee stock
ownership. Profit sharing and employee ownership share many
attributes as different forms of compensation schemes tied to company
performance. Stock ownership, however, is a separate route for sharing
company success: the initial contribution of stock is generally not
based on company profits, and its value to employees is necessarily
tied not only to the company's current but also to its future expected
success. Good performance in one period has the primary effect not of
increasing employee income, but of increasing wealth through the
stock price.5 It raises significant issues related to asset portfolios of
employees, particularly by introducing substantial risk. In addition, the
perquisites of stock ownership generally include at least minimal vot
ing rights. For these and other reasons, employee ownership may plau
sibly have motivational effects different from profit sharing. Also, the
stability theory of profit sharing does not apply to employee stock
ownership. While the effects of employee ownership will be treated
incidentally here, the focus is on the direct sharing of profits with
employees, not on affecting their asset portfolios through changes in
stock price. (For research on employee ownership, see Blasi 1988;
Conte and Svejnar 1990; and Blasi and Kruse 1991).
There are three basic forms of profit sharing in the United States:
cash, deferred, and combination cash/deferred plans. In the cash form
of profit-sharing plan, employees have their share of the profits added
directly to their paychecks (usually at quarterly or annual intervals). It
is a deductible business expense for the employer, but taxable to the
employee as income. There is no central source of information on all
cash plans, since they need not be reported to the government. In the
deferred form of plan, the profit share is put into a pension trust for the
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employee, where it is invested in a pension portfolio and the eventual
value is normally received by the employee at retirement. (As such, it
is a popular form of "defined contribution" pension plan, in which the
employer's obligation is defined at the point the contribution is made,
rather than at the point the benefit is received by the employee.) The
income is not taxable to the employee until received at retirement.
Finally, the cash/deferred profit-sharing plans are simply a combina
tion of cash and deferred contributions.
There are three noteworthy features of deferred profit-sharing plans.
The first is that, beyond the direct company contribution, employees
may be permitted or required to make contributions in many of these
plans. An increasingly popular pension option has been the 401(K)
option, in which employers typically match a percentage of employee
contributions to a retirement plan. For example, a popular method is
for the employer to contribute 50 percent of the value of the employ
ee's contribution, up to a specified percentage of the employee's pay.
The 401(K) option has muddied the definition of deferred profit-shar
ing plans, since many of these plans are technically listed as profitsharing plans even though the employer contribution is not related to
profits but wholly to the employee contribution. Simply having a
401(K) option, however, does not disqualify a plan as profit sharing,
since the employer match may be tied to profitability as well as to the
employee contribution.6
A second noteworthy aspect of deferred profit-sharing plans is that,
once the employer contribution is made, it may be largely invested in
the employer's own stock. The subsequent performance of the com
pany will affect the employee's account value through the effect on the
stock price. As noted, this study distinguishes profit sharing from
employee stock ownership, but in practice the two may be combined
even in the same plan. Unlike the standard defined benefit pension, in
which the employee receives a specified benefit at retirement (usually
based on final salary and years of service), deferred profit-sharing
plans may be structured so that more than 10 percent of the assets can
be invested in the employer's stock. In this way, deferred profit-sharing
plans may closely resemble Employee Stock Ownership Plans
(ESOPs), and in fact there is overlap between them. ESOPs are pen
sion plans that are required to invest primarily in employer securities,
and thereby become a pension vehicle for employee stock ownership
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of companies (see Blasi 1988; and Conte and Svejnar 1990). Because
deferred profit-sharing plans may (but are not required to) invest
heavily in employer stock, they can combine profit sharing with a large
degree of employee stock ownership.7 Therefore there is no neat sepa
ration between profit sharing and employee ownership, and it may be
that investment of profit-sharing funds in company stock can strongly
reinforce the link in employees' minds between company performance
and personal reward.
A third noteworthy aspect of deferred profit-sharing plans is that, as
pension plans, they are subject to regulations governing pension plans.
Plan administrators each year must file a form in the Form 5500 series
(5500, 5500C, or 5500R), and such information is publicly available.
As such, it is a valuable source for research, but contains very little
information on firm characteristics.8
Growth and Prevalence in the United States
What are the trends in profit sharing? Apart from the theories on its
effects, is it a common enough phenomenon to warrant attention and
study?
Table 1.1 summarizes a variety of evidence on prevalence and
growth of profit sharing in the United States. The longest series of data
comes from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Employee Benefits Sur
vey, which has the percent of companies making profit-sharing pay
ments and the percent of payroll represented by such payments for
most of the years since 1955. The percent of companies making profitsharing payments grew through the later 1950s but has hovered
between 19 and 23 percent since 1963. The Survey of Benefits in
Medium and Large Firms, by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS), shows slow growth in the number of employees in profit-shar
ing companies over 1981-84, though no real trend in employees cov
ered by profit sharing over 1985-91 (taking into account the changed
survey coverage in 1988).9
These sources refer to both cash and deferred profit sharing. Two
additional data sources refer only to deferred profit-sharing plans. A
Hewitt panel of 250 large employers showed increased use of profit

Table 1.1 Evidence on Prevalence and Growth of Profit Sharing
Hewitt
COC (hourly (salaried, large
firms)6
employees)8
cash&
deferred
deferred
Year
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1975
1973
1971
1969
1967
1965
1963

21
22
22
20
23
22
21
20
23

21
21
20
20
20
19
22
21
19
21

Percent of companies with plans
Smith (fastB&S (public
C&S (small
growing
computer
Nickel
firms)
public)
firms)
(Fortune 1000)
cash &
cash &
cash &
deferred
deferred
deferred
cash

MLL
(bus. units, public firms)
cash &
deferred
CL
PR

37
41
28

37

17C
23
22
20
19
19
19

33

38

17
15
14
13

1961
1959
1957
1955

Percent of employees who
work in companies with plans
BLS
(medium & large firms)
cash & deferred
Year
1991
1990
1989
1988
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1975

P/A

T/C

PR

All
16
15
16
18
21
22
18

28
27
25
25

31
31
28
26

23
23
18
17

Percent of employees in plans
B&N (union
contracts negotiated
BLS
in given year)
(medium & large firms)'
cash & deferred
cash & deferred
Nonmanuf.
Manuf.
PR
T/C
P/A
18
13
17
16
18
13
15
15
21
20
0.0
18
12.2
24
23
2.1
18.0
2.6
22
17.1
22
22
1.8
12.1
16
22
19
2.2
61.4
7.9
11.5
0.4
36.5
0.0
16.7
0.0
0.7
0.2
41.6
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.1
0.0
0.0

PS contribution/
total payroll hi
firms with plansd
Kruse (all private
sector)
deferred
All

COC (hourly
employees)8
cash & deferred

Nonthrift
2.7
4.4
3.2
3.3
3.3

18.4
18.1
16.7
16.1
14.6
13.5
13.3

15.3
14.6
13.6
13.2
12.0
11.2
11.4

5.1
5.1
5.2
4.8

6.7
6.6
5.5
5.5

VO

Percent of employees who
work in companies with plans
BLS
(medium & large firms)
cash & deferred

Percent of employees in plans
B&N (union
BLS
contracts negotiated
(medium & large firms)c
in given year)
cash & deferred
cash & deferred
NonAll
P/A
T/C
PR
Manuf.
manuf.

PS contribution/
total payroll in
firms with plansd
Kruse (all private
sector)
deferred

COC (hourly
employees)8
cash & deferred

Year
P/A
T/C
PR
All
Nonthrift
1973
5.7
1971
5.5
1969
5.2
1967
5.7
1965
5.5
1963
3.9
1961
4.7
1959
5.6
1957
5.4
1955
5.5
NOTES: Employee class: CL = clerical; PR = production; P/A = professional and administrative; T/C = technical and clerical.
COC: Chamber of Commerce of the United States (various years); BLS: Bureau of Labor Statistics (various years);
Hewitt: Hewitt Associates (1985,1986); B&N: Bell and Neumark (1993); C&S: Chelius and Smith (1990); MLL: Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler (1990);
B&S: Bradley and Smith (1992); Kruse: Kruse (1991b); Smith: Smith (1988).
a. 1987-91 Chamber of Commerce surveys exclude cash profit sharing and include salaried employees.
b. 1979-84 Hewitt numbers from constant sample of 250 large employers, while 1985 number reflects larger sample of 812 employers.
c. BLS survey coverage changed in 1988; both new and old coverage numbers are presented for 1988. BLS numbers for 1990, unlike other years, are for
small private establishments. Survey methodology was changed in 1991, with a redefinition of occupadonal groups. In the new group of professional/
administrative/technical employees, 13 percent were participants, and in the new clerical/sales group, 16 percent were participants.
d. Total payroll includes payroll of nonparticipants.
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sharing over the 1979-84 period. The more comprehensive Form 5500
data, which comprise close to the universe of deferred profit-sharing
plans in the United States, show steady growth in coverage over the
1980-86 period (Kruse 199 Ib). The percentage of private wage and
salary workers covered by all deferred profit-sharing plans grew from
13.3 percent to 18.4 percent over this period, according to these data.
Eliminating the influence of 401 (K) options and other "thrift" features
(which permit or require employee contributions) shows an increase
from 11.4 percent to 15.3 percent over this period. 10
The prevalence of profit sharing does not appear to differ greatly by
occupational group (as shown by the BLS numbers, and the Mitchell,
Lewin, and Lawler comparison of clerical and production workers) or
by firm size (the Chelius and Smith numbers on small firms show a
prevalence only slightly higher than the Hewitt and Chamber of Com
merce figures, and the BLS small firm survey in 1990 shows coverage
equivalent to that in medium and large firms). The prevalence appears
higher in companies with public stock (as indicated by Bradley and
Smith, and the Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler numbers). There is also a
difference by union status: Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler (1990) report
that unionized workers were less likely to be covered by profit sharing
(among unionized groups, only 15 percent of clerical and 18 percent of
production units were covered, while the corresponding numbers for
nonunion groups were 42 percent and 46 percent). However, profit
sharing became much more prevalent among union workers in the
1980s, particularly in the manufacturing sector, as shown by Bell and
Neumark (1993). 11 Much of this was linked to concession bargaining
(Zalusky 1986,1990).12
While these numbers indicate substantial portions of employees in
some form of profit sharing, many of these plans do not tie profit-shar
ing payments tightly to company profits. As will be reviewed in chap
ter 3, most plans also allow a discretionary component by the
employer. A recent examination of 10,000 variable-pay plans found
2,200 that "have a clear, preannounced performance-payout link," are
more than one year old, cover more than 20 people, and are not fully
deferred (McAdams and Hawk 1992). 13
In summary, data on the prevalence of (broadly-defined) profit shar
ing in the United States indicate that roughly one-sixth to one-fourth of
companies have profit-sharing plans, and roughly the same percentage
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of private-sector employees are covered. Such coverage does not differ
greatly by firm size or occupational group, but is much less common
among unionized workers. Several sources point toward slow growth
in the prevalence of plans in the early 1980s, even among unionized
workers, but no general trend in the later 1980s.
Data on international trends are extremely sparse. The prevalence in
Canada appears similar to that in the United States: two surveys indi
cated profit sharing at 22.2 percent of Canadian firms in 1985, and 17.3
percent in 1989/90 (the difference apparently reflects not a decline in
profit sharing, but a tighter definition and different method in the later
survey) (Long 1989, 1992). It is clear that profit sharing is a common
practice in a number of European countries (Uvalic 1990; Perry and
Kegley 1990; D'Art 1992). 14 The PEPPER report (Promotion of
Employee Participation in Profits and Enterprise Results) documents
the extent of profit sharing and employee stock ownership schemes,
and government policies affecting such schemes, among European
Community members. One conclusion is that "recently there has been
a steady growth of various forms of PEPPER schemes in the majority
of EC countries, with widely different relative weight" (Uvalic 1990:
197). The percentage of employees covered by such schemes is esti
mated as 18 percent in France, 8 percent in the UK, 7.4 percent in the
Netherlands, 5 percent in Germany, and 3 percent or less in Ireland,
Italy, and Spain (Uvalic 1990: 200). 1S
There has been particularly strong interest in profit sharing in the
United Kingdom, spurred in part by its potential to reduce unemploy
ment. Within the United Kingdom, cash profit sharing was found in 20
percent of establishments in 1984, although only 9 percent of privatesector workers reported participating in profit sharing in 1987. Profit
sharing was found to be more common in large plants, but just as com
mon for union members as for other employees (Blanchflower 1991: 45). Results from a 1988 survey of 180 of the largest publicly held UK
companies indicated that 6.1 percent had cash-based profit sharing for
all employees (Peel, Pendlebury, and Groves 1991).16 The prevalence
appears to be increasing, spurred largely by tax incentives: SingletonGreen reports that the number of plans and employees covered doubled
between 1991 and 1992, so that 700,000 employees are now covered
(1992: 38).
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Data on profit sharing in non-European countries are difficult to
find. Florkowski (1991: 102) reports that 12 non-European countries
have some form of mandatory profit sharing in the constitution or stat
utes, but in several of these countries it is not enforced (the countries
are Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, India, Mexico, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela). A major effort has been made
in Singapore to encourage the use of profit sharing for both productiv
ity and stability reasons, and more than half of the labor contracts in
Singapore now contain profit sharing (National Wages Council 1986).
The extensive use of bonuses in Japan and Korea has been viewed as a
form of profit sharing that may have contributed to the economic suc
cess of those countries (Freeman and Weitzman 1987; Kim 1988).
While nearly all Japanese firms with more than 30 employees pay
bonuses twice a year to regular employees, only 24.6 percent of firms
have a formal profit-sharing plan (Jones and Kato 1992a).
Therefore, while the practice of profit sharing may be slowly grow
ing in the United States, it is not clear to what extent this is true outside
of the United States. At a minimum, profit sharing is very much a
strong topic of interest internationally, as legislation and public policy
discussion make clear (Uvalic 1990; Florkowski 1991).

New Data on Profit Sharing in Publicly Held Companies
Available data on profit sharing have important limitations on their
usefulness. 17 Among these limitations are one or more of the following:
lack of information on both cash and deferred plans, lack of sufficient
company performance data, response rate problems common to busi
ness mail surveys, or lack of longitudinal information on individual
companies to control for firm-specific effects.
This study surveyed 500 companies to collect information for test
ing the productivity and stability theories of profit sharing. Such tests
require longitudinal information on company performance and
employment that many companies are unwilling or unable to provide.
Companies with publicly traded stock, however, are required to make
public a wide variety of company information. These data are pack
aged in Standard and Poor's CompuStat database. A subset of 500
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companies from the 1990 CompuStat (with over 3000 public compa
nies)18 was surveyed to obtain information on profit sharing and other
firm characteristics. Firms with profit sharing were oversampled, in
order that they would constitute one-half of the final sample. An
attempt was made to pair each firm surveyed in the initial sample with
a firm of the opposite profit-sharing status in the same industry. 19 For
example, for each profit-sharing food processor, an attempt was made
to find a non-profit-sharing food processor to act as a paired control.
This could be done for 410 of the surveyed firms (creating 205 pairs).
Comparison of characteristics between the within-industry pairs will
automatically control for any industry effects on those characteristics.
Construction of the dataset is described in appendix 1.
Each company was asked, "Does your company have a profit-shar
ing plan for employees other than top management?" If the response
was positive, the company was treated as a profit-sharing company,
and a series of questions elicited information on the features and cover
age of the plan.20 The resulting sample of profit-sharing companies
may be overinclusive, since it includes whatever type of plan is viewed
by the employer as profit sharing (even if there is little or no de facto
relationship to profits). The advantage is that it allows analysis of what
goes under the name of profit sharing in the United States, with addi
tional data to distinguish plans by profit-sharing formulas and features.
The lack of a strict definition matches the practice of the Profit Sharing
Council of America, as noted earlier in this chapter.
Table 1.2 contains statistics on the prevalence of profit sharing
among firms surveyed in the initial sample (prior to the attempt at pair
ing).21 As can be seen, 112 of the 275 firms, or 40.7 percent, have a
profit-sharing plan for employees other than top management. Collec
tively the 275 firms employed slightly over 6 million employees in
1990. Profit-sharing firms had an estimated 2.3 million participants,
representing 38.2 percent of the total employees among the firms in
this sample. Industry distribution shows the highest concentration of
profit-sharing participants in durable manufacturing (47.7 percent) and
the lowest in utilities (6.3 percent).
The closest comparison for these numbers comes from the Colum
bia Business Unit Data Set (Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler 1990), which
reports results of a survey of business units among publicly held com-

Table 1.2 Prevalence of Profit Sharing in Sample

Mining/construction
Nondurable manufacturing
Durable manufacturing
Communications
Utilities
Wholesale
Retail
Finance, insurance, real estate
Service
Total

Distribution of companies
PS as percent
of all
PS firms
All firms
(3)
(2)
(1)
33.3
4
12
40.7
35
86
46.5
40
86
45.5
5
11
16.2
6
37
44.4
4
9
53.3
8
15
46.2
6
13
66.7
4
6
40.7
112
275

Distribution of employees
(1990 sum, in OOOs)
PS
PS as percent
All
of all
employees participants
(6)
(5)
(4)
12.4
2.7
21.9
24.8
345.5
1393.1
47.7
1503.2
3153.4
16.0
44.5
279.0
6.3
10.9
172.2
18.2
13.0
71.1
29.5
187.6
635.8
62.5
131.3
210.2
70.0
60.2
85.9
38.2
2298.9
6022.6

NOTES: These numbers consider only the responses from the primary sample, which was based on a systematic sample of all firms with at least eight
years of employment data over the 1980-89 period. Companies contacted to provide matched pairs are excluded from selection rule for pairing. PS =
profit sharing.

Table 13 Descriptive Statistics on Profit-Sharing Dataset

N

PS
(1)
253

Percent employees in PS

78.5

Percent cos. w/unions
Percent of employees in
union, if unionized
Majority of U workers are
in PS
Percent companies with
personnel policy:

65.9

VVithinindustry
paired
Percent
difference (PS of ps
minus NPS) empioy.
ees
NPS Mean /-stat.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
247 205
Occupational mix
Percent production/
service
Percent clerical/
75.9 -7.1* -1.77
technical

38.6

35.8

Surveys
Suggestion system
Job enrichment
Employee involvement
Autonomous workteams
Employment security

3.2

0.97

44.7

38.0
57.1
35.1
60.7
26.1
16.1

35.4
51.7
25.0
58.2
22.5
13.6

0.5
6.1
11.4**
1.6
3.7
5.1

0.11
1.22
2.63
0.33
0.91
1.52

Percent profVadmin.
Percent employees
covered by PS:
Percent production/
service
Percent clerical/
technical
Percent prof7admin.
Type of PS:
Cash
Deferred
Combination

PS
(6)

NPS
(7)

Within-industry
paired difference
(PS minus NPS)
Mean /-stat.
(8)
(9)

49.5

51.2

-3.7

-1.31

24.7

21.8

1.8

0.72

26.6

26.9

2.4

0.98

75.8

86.5
87.6
37.7
50.8
8.5

Gainsharing
45.3
Percent employees covered by
personnel policy:
Surveys
23.3
19.1
Suggestion system
14.5
Job enrichment
25.6
Employee involvement
9.5
Autonomous workteams
9.5
Employment security
19.8
Gainsharing
Percent employees
provided w/info on:
85.3
Overall co. perf.
61.8
Bus. plans & goals
30.4
Competitors' perf.

39.0

1.1

More than one PS plan

0.22

22.3
17.5
10.8
24.5
7.8
7.6
16.0

0.3
2.5
4.3*
1.6
1.9
3.1
1.3

00.8
0.90
1.67
0.47
0.99
1.15
0.40

83.4
57.5
24.6

0.8
3.6
4.6

0.29
0.97
1.24

23.0
19.8
13.0
24.2
9.3
8.7
19.8

24.7

Age of oldest PS plan
1-5
6-10

21.7
17.7
22.1
11-20
29.9
20+
8.7
NA
Change in other personnel policies when PS adopted
17.3
Yes

56.7
No
26.0
NA
1990 employment (OOOs)
21.52
Mean
5.60
Median
1.71
Mean of In(employment)
1990 sales (000,000s):
3823.40
Mean
876.55
Median
6.76
Mean of ln( sales)

18.08
5.40
1.63
3494.06
935.27
6.81

1.275

0.21

-0.048

-0.29

583.9

0.52

-0.039

-0.23

NOTES: Except where NA (not answered) is used, reported percentages exclude "don't know" responses. PS = profit sharing; NPS = nonprofit sharing;
U = union.
*Statistically significant at p <.10 **p <05.
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panics. Despite differences in the level of analysis and response rates,
the results are similar.
Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler (1990: 76) report that 36 percent of the
units have profit sharing for clerical workers, and 37 percent have
profit sharing for manufacturing production workers. This is closely in
b'ne with the 40.7 percent of companies in this study that report profit
sharing for employees other than top management.
Additional sources of data on profit sharing in publicly held compa
nies come from Smith (1988) and Bradley and Smith (1992). Report
ing on a survey of 52 of the "INC 100 Fastest Growing Publicly Held
Firms," Smith found that 17 (33 percent) reported general profit-shar
ing plans. Focusing on firms with public stock in the computer (hard
ware and software) industries, Bradley and Smith (1992) found that 41
percent reported profit-sharing plans. The results from these three data
sources on U.S. companies with public stock (consistent with Cana
dian results from Long 1992) indicate that profit sharing is more preva
lent in such companies than among private companies. One reason for
this may have to do with information disclosure about profitability: pri
vate companies may be more reluctant to give signals of profitability
(to competitors or unions) through the size of profit-sharing payments,
while publicly held companies must already report profit figures to
investors.
Descriptive statistics on the full sample of profit-sharing and non
profit-sharing companies are presented in table 1.3. Columns 1 and 2
contain statistics for the profit-sharing (PS) and non-profit-sharing
(NPS) companies. Column 3 contains the paired differences for the
410 companies that could be matched within their industry, which con
trols for any general differences associated with an industry. As in all
sampling, there exists random error from sampling a population. Col
umn 4 presents the f-statistic testing whether random sampling error in
the mean paired difference can be ruled out as an explanation of the
difference. 22
Among the profit-sharing companies, an (unweighted) average of
78.5 percent of employees participate in the profit sharing. These com
panies are less likely to have unions present (the average difference
between industry pairs is 7.1 percent, where sampling error can be
ruled out at the 90 percent level). If unions are present, a majority of
unionized workers participate in profit sharing in 44.7 percent of the
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companies. A major purpose of the survey is to determine whether
profit sharing is accompanied by other personnel policies that may
affect productivity and employment stability, either by themselves or
by interacting with profit sharing. Of the seven personnel policies that
firms were asked about, table 1.3 indicates that profit-sharing firms are
generally more likely to have all seven policies and to cover a larger
percent of employees. The differences are not large, however, and only
for job enrichment programs can one reject sampling error as an expla
nation for the difference between profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing
firms. The same story holds for information-sharing with employees:
table 1.3 indicates that profit-sharing firms share three types of infor
mation with a larger percentage of employees, but random sampling
error cannot be ruled out as an explanation for the paired differences.23
While the effects of these policies will be analyzed later, the simple
differences presented here do not support the idea that profit-sharing
companies are more likely to make greater efforts to involve their
employees through these other policies.
The occupational mix of profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing firms
shows no significant differences. Within profit-sharing firms, produc
tion and service workers are somewhat less likely to be covered (75.8
percent) than are clerical/technical (86.5 percent) and professional/
administrative employees (87.6 percent).
Among profit-sharing firms, more than one-third (37.7 percent)
have cash plans, and an additional 8.5 percent have combination cash/
deferred plans. One-fourth (24.7 percent) have more than one plan. A
majority of the plans (61.5 percent) were begun within the last 20
years, and one-sixth (17.3 percent) report changes in other personnel
policies when profit sharing was adopted. Comparisons of 1990 sales
and employment levels show no significant differences between profitsharing and non-profit-sharing companies.
The apparent growth in popularity of profit sharing in the United
States over the 1980s, and popular interest in the potential of profit
sharing to increase productivity and/or stabilize employment, provide
the setting for this study. These data will form the basis of analyses of
the productivity and stability theories of profit sharing, and of the fac
tors that predict adoption of profit sharing.
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NOTES
1. Although the rate of failure was high, however, In an 1896 survey of SO plans, many of
which were documented by Oilman in an 1891 book, only 12 were fully operating (Monroe
1896). Also, of 299 plans begun in England between 1829 and 1913, only 133 were operating at
the end of the period (National Civic Federation 1920:392).
2. A current example is the hope that profit-sharing plans may help to change negative public
opinions about corporate profits (Fosbre 1989).
3. This closely matches a resolution of the International Congress on Profit Sharing in 1889,
which defined profit sharing as an "agreement, freely entered into, by which the employee
receives a share, fixed in advance, of the profits" (quoted in National Civic Federation 1920: 22).
4. The report on the U.S. Senate hearings on profit sharing regarded "welfare and benefit pay
ments," including a wide array of fixed benefits such as health care and educational benefits, as
forms of profit sharing (1939: 53-57). Such fixed benefits, which are not viewed as "profit shar
ing" by employers, are excluded from the definition used in this study.
5. In some limited circumstances employees may be able to have quick access to the increased
wealth by selling the stock or borrowing against it.
6. The use of profit sharing in 401 (k) plans appears to be increasing (kertesz 12990).
7. This is supported by two pieces of evidence on investment of profit-sharing funds. An aver
age of 26.4 percent of these funds were invested in company stock in 1991, and the percentage of
plans where company stock represents more than 50 percent of plan assets increased from 16 per
cent in 1980 to 27 percent in 1990 (PSRF 1992b, 1992c).
8. Employers are required to report on deferred profit-sharing plans under the provisions of
the Employee Retirement Incomes Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, using the Form 5500 series.
Such reports are publicly available either by hardcopy or computer tape. These reports contain a
large amount of financial information on reported plans; however, they have the following prob
lems. Most important, while employers may check a box indicating that theirs is a profit-sharing
plan, "profit sharing" has no clear definition. Until 1986, the only restriction on what would qual
ify as a profit-sharing plan for tax purposes was that contributions to the plan could not be made in
a year in which employer profits were not positive; in 1986, even this mild restriction was
dropped. Employers need not have a clear formula typing worker pay to profits to qualify as a
profit-sharing plan, and in fact, in many of these plans contributions are wholly discretionary or a
fixed percent of participant pay. Therefore the "profit sharing" label is overinclusive. A second
problem with these data is that, while the plan's financial information is detailed, very little infor
mation is provided on the employer other than location, industry, and number of employees. For
most analyses, these data must be matched to industry data (Cheadle 1989; Kruse 1991c) or other
specific company data (Bloom 1985; Kruse 1992).
9. For further evidence from this data source, see Coates (1991). The survey is based on a
sample and the numbers are subject to sampling variability. For percentages of this magnitude, the
standard error of any one year's estimate is approximately 1.4 percent, implying a 95 percent con
fidence interval of plus or minus 2.8 percent (BLS 2336, 1989: 145). Year-to-year differences of 2
percent are clearly within the bounds of sampling variability. The changes from 1988 to 1989
could be due to sampling variability; another possible explanation is that there were several large
companies that restructured or terminated profit-sharing plans in these years to fund employee
ownership of stock, and these may have been included in the survey (Blasi and Kruse 1991: HI115)
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10. These figures constitute the "low" estimates from Kruse (1991b), which count only the
largest plan in a company. Smaller plans may cover additional workers, but there is no way to
ensure against double-counting of workers covered by more than one plan.
11. The spikes in 1982 and 1984 are primarily due to large autoworker contracts negotiated in
those years.
12. Looking at the concession issue, Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler compare union contracts
with and without profit-sharing provisions over the 1981-88 period. Of all contracts with first-year
wage decreases, profit sharing appeared in 17.1 percent of them. In the 133 contracts with profit
sharing, 36 percent involved a first-year wage decrease, compared to 14 percent of the 1,666 con
tracts without profit sharing. The prevalence of COLA freezes or eliminations was also higher
among contracts with profit sharing (1990: 25).
Bell and Neumark (1993) also report the overlap between profit sharing and wage concessions
(defined as a nominal wage freeze or decline in the first year of the contract). The percentages of
all manufacturing workers negotiating contracts in a given year in which the contract included
both profit sharing and a wage concession, were 0.0 percent through 1980, 1.4 percent in 1981,
33.2 percent in 1982, 8.4 percent in 1983,0.9 percent in 1984,1.7 percent in 1985,16.7 percent in
1986, 4.3 percent in 1987, and 0 percent in 1988. Comparison of these numbers with those
reported in table 1.1 reveals that wage concessions existed for a majority of workers in profitsharing manufacturing contracts only in 1982, 1983, and 1986.
13. Additional recent survey evidence is contained in Markham, Scott, and Little (1992) and
Lissy (1991).
14. For an earlier international survey, see Latta (1979).
15. For an earlier analysis of profit sharing and employee stock ownership schemes in Europe,
see Latta (1979).
16. For a historical view of profit sharing in the UK between 1865 and 1913, see Hatton
(1988) and Lindop (1989).
17. For a comprehensive listing of data sources and research findings, see PSRF (1989).
18. This comprises the "primary, secondary, tertiary, and OTC" files of CompuStat.
19. Such pairing was done within the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) defini
tion.
20. For respondents who inquired about the definition, a profit-sharing plan was defined as
one in which employer contributions to the plan are based at lest in part on the financial perfor
mance of the company.
21. Including the contacts during the attempts at pairing would induce a bias in the representa
tiveness of the firms, due to the stopping rules for pairing.
22. When the absolute value of the /-statistic is greater than 2, one can be confident at the 95
percent level that the within-industry difference between the profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing
firms is not due to sampling error (i.e., a difference this large from random sampling error would
occur less than 5 percent of the time).
23. These results differ from Peel, Pendlebury, and Groves (1991), who find that British firms
with profit sharing or stock ownership are more likely to share information and engage in consul
tative practices with employees.

2
Prediction of Profit Sharing
Why is profit sharing ever adopted? The simplest model of neoclas
sical economic theory assumes perfect information and mobility in
competitive labor markets, with the conclusion that each worker
receives the value of his or her contribution to output (marginal reve
nue product). In this simple model, where the employer has perfect
information on employee effort and output, the form of payment does
not matter. In the absence, however, of perfect information on worker
behavior, the employer runs the risk of employee "shirking" (substan
dard performance). Where supervision is costly, the compensation
scheme may be set up in one or more of several ways to induce appro
priate levels of worker effort.
First, if worker effort is costly to monitor but individual worker out
put can be easily measured, piece rates may be used (Parsons 1986;
Lazear 1986; Brown 1990; Keefe 1991). A compensation system is set
up which pegs worker pay to units of well-defined output. (This may
be true of only a portion of pay: a base hourly wage may be set, and the
piece rate or commission may be on top of this.) This necessitates eas
ily observable quantity and quality of output that can be attributed to
an individual. Drawbacks of piece rate systems include the possibility
of excessive wear or misuse of capital equipment and difficulty in set
ting appropriate piece rates, particularly in cases where worker collu
sion is possible (Levine 1992a).
Second, in the presence of costly monitoring, employers may
choose to defer a significant amount of employee compensation to
minimize the risk of employee shirking. Even with less than perfect
monitoring, employees will not shirk if the consequences of being
caught include the forfeiture of deferred compensation. This can be
done with a pension plan (through vesting requirements or final pay
formulas in defined benefit plans), or by "tilting" the tenure-earnings
profile so that employees are paid less than the value of their output
early in their tenure, and more than the value of their output later
(Lazear 1979).
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A third method of motivating employees in the presence of costly
supervising is to pay an above-market "efficiency" wage the wage
can be set such that employees will put forth optimal effort for fear of
being caught shirking and losing the wage premium (Akerlof and
Yellen 1986; Katz 1987).
Finally, collective incentive schemes such as profit sharing are a
fourth option in the presence of costly supervising. 1 Bringing employee
and employer incentives into closer alignment by tying a portion of
pay to a measure of company performance, the employer may be able
to lessen the principal-agent problems of costly supervision. Profit
sharing may be a better way of doing this than individual piece rates
when: (a) output is not easily ascribed to an individual, that is, produc
tion is interdependent and/or aided by worker cooperation; (b) setting
piece rates is too costly; or (c) potential misuse or abuse of capital
equipment is a concern.
Therefore one motivation for profit sharing is to induce higher lev
els of worker performance, particularly in situations where perfor
mance is enhanced by cooperation among employees. The chief
liability of profit sharing for productivity purposes is the "1/N prob
lem" if there are N workers in a profit-sharing plan, the average
worker share is only 1/N of any increased profits going to workers.
Individual incentives for better quality and quantity of work are diluted
by the fact that the economic rewards must be shared with the other
members of the profit-sharing plan. This predicts that profit sharing
will be more popular in small companies, where the smaller denomina
tor causes a smaller "1/N problem." It also predicts that profit sharing,
to have positive productivity effects, will generally need other changes
in workplace relations to encourage focus on collective goals, resulting
in increased "peer pressure" (Kandel and Lazear 1992) or "horizontal
monitoring" (Fitzroy and Kraft 1987). (This and other theoretical
issues are discussed in chapter 3.)
A second potential benefit to employers is that profit sharing builds
in a degree of compensation flexibility. When exogenous events lower
company profitability, profit sharing automatically decreases employee
compensation without the need for costly renegotiation of the hourly
wage, or worker layoffs that may sacrifice firm-specific skills. This
would lead two types of firms to adopt profit sharing as a means of
sharing variability with workers. First, profit sharing may be favored

Prediction of Profit Sharing

25

by those experiencing increased variability in company performance,
where flexibility in labor costs is desired through flexibility in worker
pay rather than through layoffs. Second, it may be favored by new
firms with uncertain prospects employees may be attracted by the
promise of a share in lucrative profits if the firm does well, without
tying the firm to a high fixed wage if the firm does poorly. By accept
ing profit sharing in this way, an employee in the new firm is essen
tially buying a lottery ticket as a part of his or her compensation. The
flexibility in compensation may be a liability for risk-averse workers
who prefer to avoid income variability this may be mitigated by
higher average levels of compensation, or lower probabilities of layoff
if the stability theory is correct.
A third potential motivation for employers to adopt profit sharing is
to discourage unionization. The reasoning is that by encouraging a
focus on profitability, profit sharing may cause employees to identify
more closely with employers, thus discouraging the adversarial act of
unionizing. While this possibility forms part of the traditional hostility
of union leaders toward profit sharing (National Civic Federation
1920: 368-381; Lindop 1989), and unionized employees are less likely
to be in profit-sharing plans (Czarnecki 1969; Mitchell, Lewin, and
Lawler 1990), no reliable evidence exists on whether it does, in fact,
discourage unionization.2
Profit sharing is predicted, therefore, in situations where: (1) super
vision is costly, group cooperation is valuable, and care of capital
equipment is a concern; (2) compensation flexibility is desired by the
firm; and/or (3) the firm desires to discourage unionization by increas
ing employee identification with the company's goals.
Prior Research
The presence of profit-sharing plans has been predicted in several
studies, but it is fair to say that this field of research is underdeveloped.
Eleven studies will be reviewed here, and are listed in table 2.1.3 As
will be seen, the findings do not support simple conclusions about the
factors predicting profit-sharing presence. In contrast to the studies

Table 2.1

Studies on Prediction of Profit Sharing

Time
Data source
period
565 French
manufacturing firms (258
1986-89
Cahuc and Donnont 1992 w/PS)
Study

Profit-sharing
measures

Main results
Pos. assoc. w/base wage, blue-collar
Profit-sharing
employees, and capital stock
income/base wage
Neg. assoc. w/market share
Pos. assoc. w/size of firm, workers' councils,
136 German
PS presence (includes and training expenditures
Carstensen, Gerlach, and manufacturing firms (45
several with employee Neg. assoc. w/degree of firm competition
w/PS)
1989
Hubler 1992
ownership)
No assoc. w/unionization
U.S. deferred profitNeg. assoc. w/unionization
sharing plans, Form
Pos. assoc. w/engineering personnel, and
5500, >100 participants,
mean age of PS in industry and state
PS presence (deferred No assoc. w/industry variability or w/size of
matched to industry data
(n=5998, 2741 w/PS)
1981
Cheadle 1989
plans)
firm
Pos. assoc. w/profits variability, market share,
works councils, job evaluation schemes
Neg. assoc. w/size of firm, blue/white-collar
52 British metalworking
ratio
1978-82
Estrin and Wilson 1989 firms
No assoc. w/unionization
PS presence
65 West German
PS income per
Pos. assoc. w/ratio of blue-collar to white1977, 1979 employee
Fitzroy and Kraft 1987 metalworking firms
collar, and w/age of PS plan
364 U.S. firms w/union
elections and matched
Freeman and Kleiner
PS presence after
PS plans tend to be dropped after union drive
pairs
1981-84
1990
union drive
whether union won or not

1,047 British
establishments (229 w/
Gregg and Macbin 1988 PS)

1984

Jones and Pliskin 1991 a

1986-87

357 Canadian firms

Kruse 1991c

183 U.S. business units
(107 w/PS)
Same as Cheadle, but
includes plans w/<100
participants

Poole 1989

303 British enterprises

Kirn 1993

1986

1980-86

Pos. assoc. w/firm size, rising product
demand, supervisor ratio, unionization,
industry employment change
Neg. assoc. w/labor costs/sales, and female,
manual, and part-time proportions
PS presence
Nonmanagerial: Pos. assoc. w/voluntary
turnover rates, and evaluations of worker
performance
Eligibility of
nonmanagerial
Production: Pos. assoc. w/evaluations of
worker performance
employees, and of
Neg. assoc. w/ unionization and capital
production
intensity
employees, for PS
Pos. assoc. w/age of plan for measures 2 and 3
PS presence, percent Pos. assoc. /profitability for measure 3
covered, and (profit Neg. assoc. w/union presence for measure 2
Neg. assoc. w/profitability for measure 1
share)/(labor costs)
Pos. assoc. w/industry variability
PS adoption (deferred Neg. assoc. w/avg. size of firm
No assoc. w/unionization
plans)
Pos. assoc. w/sales, growth in sales, and
financial sector
Neg. assoc. w/unionization and capital
intensity
PS presence

NOTES: PS = profit sharing, Neg. = negative, Pos. = positive, Assoc. w/ = associated with (all reported associations are statistically significant).
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reviewed, this one will look not simply at the presence of profit shar
ing, but will use longitudinal data to examine factors predicting the
profit-sharing adoption decision.
One of the most comprehensive attempts to predict profit sharing
was made by Cheadle (1989). Using the Form 5500 data tapes from
1981, with data on all pension plans covering 100 or more participants,
Cheadle analyzed the choice between deferred profit sharing and
defined benefit pension plans (using matched industry data as explana
tory variables). Some of his findings were that: (1) unionization is neg
atively associated with the presence of deferred profit sharing; (2) a
high ratio of engineering personnel in the industry is positively associ
ated with deferred profit sharing, "consistent with an incentive
motive"; (3) industry-level variability is generally uncorrelated with
the choice of plan; and (4) size of firm is unrelated to the presence of a
profit-sharing plan. Additionally, the mean dates of establishment of
profit-sharing plans and of defined benefit plans (by industry and by
state) have strong effects on the likelihood of adoption for the two
types of plans: "if pension plans in an industry are (on average) five
years older, the probability of a firm having a profit-sharing plan is
reduced by 13 percent" (p. 395). Cheadle concludes,
The explanation with the most consistent support is the "customary"
hypothesis, the idea that the dominant savings plan in an industry/region
is determined more by past practice than the inherent superiority of one
plan over the other, (p. 399)

In Kruse (1991c), I report on a similar analysis that uses Form 5500
and 5500C data matched to industry data, but analyzes adoption or ter
mination of the different types of plans over the 1980-86 period.
Within this period, an estimated 185,800 firms in the United States
adopted deferred profit-sharing plans, while 53,300 terminated such
plans. Lower average establishment size and higher variability of
industry employment over the 1970-80 period caused firms without
plans in 1980 to be more likely to adopt defined contribution plans (the
majority of which were deferred profit-sharing plans), rather than
defined benefit plans. This provides some support for the flexibility
argument (that increased variability favors profit sharing) and the pro
ductivity argument (that profit sharing will be more likely in small
firms where the 1/N problem is less).
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In a study of profit sharing and productivity by Fitzroy and Kraft
(1987), data from 1977 and 1979 were analyzed for 65 West German
metalworking firms. Predictions were made, not of profit-sharing sta
tus but of the profit share income per employee. The two most impor
tant variables were the ratio of blue-collar to white-collar workers, and
the age of the profit-sharing plan. Similar techniques were used by
Kim (1993) on a dataset of 183 U.S. business units in public compa
nies in 1986. The age of the profit-sharing plan was found to positively
affect both the percentage of employees covered and the profit-sharing
bonus as a percent of labor costs, while union presence was found to
negatively affect the percentage of employees covered. While profit
ability was found to decrease the likelihood of having a profit-sharing
plan, it was also found to increase the profit share as a percent of labor
costs.4
Similarly, a study of French manufacturing firms attempted to pre
dict profit share income as a proportion of the base wage, rather than
the simple existence of profit sharing (Cahuc and Dormont 1992). Pos
itive predictors were found to be the base wage level, capital stock, and
blue-collar employees as a percent of all employees in the firm, while a
negative predictor was the firm's market share in the preceding year.
Profit sharing prevalence in Great Britain has been analyzed in sev
eral studies. In Poole (1989), a sample of 1,125 large enterprises, both
with and without profit sharing and employee stock ownership
schemes, was contacted, resulting in 303 interviews. Several tests of
these 303 enterprises revealed that profit-sharing companies were more
likely to be in the financial sector, and had higher capital intensity,
sales volume, and growth in sales volume. In addition, profit-sharing
companies were found to be more likely to have staff associations, but
slightly less likely to have unions (1989: 65 116). Based on this sam
ple, Poole and Jenkins conclude that: "our data suggest that an
improved profits performance is frequently the trigger mechanism for
the adoption of schemes" (1990: 95).
A sample of 52 British metalworking firms, 21 with profit sharing,
was analyzed by Estrin and Wilson (1989). The existence of profit
sharing in 1978 was positively associated with profits variability and
market share, and negatively associated with company size and blue/
white-collar ratio. Several industrial relations variables were analyzed;
those found to be more prevalent in profit-sharing firms included
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works councils, formal job evaluation schemes, and managers' percep
tions of worker participation, but there was no significant association
with unionization.
Using the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, Gregg and
Machin (1988) analyze a cross-section sample of British establish
ments. Among the findings were that profit sharing was more likely in
firms that were very large (>50,000 employees), had rising product
demand, were in industries with smaller employment declines, did not
have high labor costs as a percentage of sales, and had smaller propor
tions of manual, female, and part-time employees but larger propor
tions of supervisors. The presence of a "strong" union (proxied by
whether members were in a closed shop) increased the probability that
an establishment would have profit sharing by 2.1 percentage points,
while the presence of a "weak" union increased this probability by 7.1
points.
The use of profit sharing in a 1989 sample of 136 German firms (45
of which had profit sharing) was examined by Carstensen, Gerlach,
and Hubler (1992). Firm size was found to be a positive predictor of
profit- sharing use, as were workers' councils and high training expen
ditures. Profit sharing was more likely among firms that had little com
petition in the product market, but equally likely among union and
nonunion firms.
Jones and Pliskin (199la) analyzed results from a 1987 survey of
313 Canadian organizations. Results indicated that the existence of
profit sharing for any nonmanagerial employees was associated with
higher voluntary turnover rates and higher managerial evaluations of
worker performance, whereas profit sharing for production employees
was associated with a lower proportion of workers unionized, lower
capital/labor ratios, and higher evaluations of worker performance. For
the production employees, the difference between 0 percent and 33
percent unionization (where 33 percent was the mean value of union
density) was estimated to be associated with only a 1 to 2.5 percent
decrease in the probability of being eligible for profit sharing.
On the unionization question, therefore, while Gregg and Machin
found a positive effect of unionism on the probability of profit sharing,
and Estrin and Wilson and Carstensen, Gerlach, and Hubler found no
effect, Jones and Pliskin found a negative effect. Unionists have long
had an uneasy and suspicious relationship with profit-sharing plans
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(see, e.g., National Civic Federation 1920, and Zalusky 1986).5 The
principal complaints against profit sharing from the union perspective
have been that profit sharing brings workers into competition with each
other, and that it is difficult or impossible for workers to verify that
managers are defining and sharing the profits properly (see discussion
in chapter 5).
One relevant study concerns the effect of new unionization on profit
sharing. Freeman and Kleiner (1990) analyzed data from 203 firms
with union elections, and from 161 matched pairs that did not have
union drives. They found that profit-sharing plans tended to be dropped
after a union organizing drive. The effect was largest where the union
had won and signed a contract, which is consistent with the traditional
union antipathy toward profit sharing. The effect, though, was also
negative where the union had lost, or won but had not signed a con
tract. However, sampling error could not be rejected as an explanation
of the differences, so it is uncertain whether new unionization does
affect profit-sharing status.
These 11 prior studies have not provided clear answers on what fac
tors predict profit sharing. There have been contradictory findings on
even basic variables such as unionization and firm size. Employee
composition, firm growth, capital intensity, and industry variability are
other variables that have been highlighted as potentially important by
previous research.
It is worth noting that most of the prior research has relied on crosssectional data, meaning that causality is a particular concern. The char
acteristics associated with profit sharing may be valid predictors of
profit sharing, or may be (at least partially) consequences of profit
sharing or of other factors related to profit sharing. This study employs
panel data, enabling analysis not only of the presence of profit sharing,
but of the factors predicting profit-sharing adoption. By examining
how changes in particular variables are related to subsequent decisions
to adopt profit sharing, one can have heightened confidence about the
causality between these variables and profit sharing.
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Motives for Maintaining Profit-Sharing Plans

The profit-sharing firms that were surveyed for this study were
asked to rate the importance of several factors in maintaining profitsharing plans. (They were not asked why such plans had been adopted,
since many survey respondents were not involved in the adoption.) The
responses are summarized in table 2.2. There it can be seen that "pro
viding a source of retirement income" is the predominant expressed
reason for maintaining profit sharing, with "recruiting and retaining
personnel" and "motivating existing employees" the next most impor
tant reasons. The remaining reasons received a majority of 1's or 2's on
the 5-point scale.
The lower half of table 2.2 disaggregates the answers by whether the
firm maintains any cash plans or not. As would be expected, "provid
ing a source of retirement income" is much more important for the
firms that maintain only deferred plans.6 For the remaining motives,
those maintaining any cash plans gave slightly higher importance to
motivating existing employees, and lower importance to recruiting and
retaining employees, and to reducing the likelihood of unionization.7
These results are broadly consistent with the expressed opinions of
Profit Sharing Council of America (PSCA) members (PSRF 1992a),
and with the stated objectives of British respondents in Poole (1989).
In a 1990 PSCA survey with 197 respondents, the most-cited objec
tives for profit-sharing plans were employee retention (95.4 percent),
increasing employee interest (94.9 percent) and sense of partnership
(90.4 percent) in the firm, motivating for higher productivity (83.8 per
cent), and recruiting key personnel (80.2 percent). Other objectives
listed by more than half of the respondents were: increasing or stabiliz
ing profits (71.1 percent) enhancing employee job security (61.4 per
cent), and providing supra-wage benefits without a fixed commitment
(57.4 percent). For each of these objectives, more than three-fifths of
those listing it stated that the plan had great or moderate success in
meeting the objective. From the British data reported in Poole (1989:
69), the three most highly-rated objectives of profit-sharing schemes,
according to executive respondents in the companies, were "to make
employees feel they are part of the company," "to make employees

Table 2.2 Expressed Motives for Maintaining Profit-Sharing Plan
Question: Each of the following are reasons for maintaining the profit-sharing plan.
Please use the 5-point scale to indicate how important each is for maintaining the profit-sharing plan(s) in your company.
Very
Not
important
important
4
5
3
2
1
Mean
(percent)
n
14.1
6.6
1.7
14.1
121
4.12
63.6
Providing a source of retirement income
10.0
2.5
38.3
25.0
120
3.72
24.2
Recruiting and retaining personnel
40.5
26.5
4.1
3.3
121
3.81
25.6
Motivating existing employees
4.2
16.8
16.0
25.2
37.8
119
2.24
Reducing likelihood of unionization
117
3.4
12.0
24.8
59.0
1.63
0.9
Reducing the probability or size of layoffs
6.8
17.0
29.7
39.8
118
2.11
6.8
Stabilizing corporate cash flow
plan:
cash
of
presence
by
Breakdown of answers
8.8
57
3.44
8.8
3.5
29.8
49.1
Providing a source of retirement
Any cash
19.1
4.8
0.0
0.0
63
4.71
76.2
income
Deferred only
32.1
28.6
12.5
5.4
56
3.52
21.4
Recruiting and retaining personnel
Any cash
44.4
3.87
22.2
25.4
7.9
63
Deferred only
0.0
44.8
1.7
1.7
58
3.91
25.9
25.9
Motivating existing employees
Any cash
37.1
6.5
24.2
27.4
4.8
62
Deferred only
3.69
2.11
12.5
17.9
23.2
42.9
56
3.6
Reducing likelihood of unionization
Any cash
4.8
21.0
14.5
27.4
62
2.39
32.3
Deferred only
7.3
7.3
55
1.69
1.8
Reducing the probability or size of
25.5
58.2
Any cash
16.4
1.57
0.0
0.0
24.6
59.0
61
Deferred only
layoffs
7.3
20.0
55
2.05
3.6
Stabilizing corporate cash flow
29.1
40.0
Any cash
6.5
14.5
30.7
38.7
62
Deferred only
2.18
9.7
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more profit conscious," and "to increase sense of commitment to the
company."

Predicting Adoption of Profit Sharing

The results from prior research provide no firm guidelines on the
variables and specifications that should be used to predict profit shar
ing. Therefore a variety of variables and techniques was used in
attempting to predict the adoption of profit sharing (discussed in
appendix 2). The adoption decision is presumably influenced by
changes that the firm is undergoing. To examine this, most variables
were specified as the change in values in the two years preceding the
adoption decision (from t - 2 to t - 1, if t is the current year).8 (The cur
rent year's values are not included since these could reflect the effects
of profit sharing, rather than causes of the decision.) The variables
examined here as possible predictors of profit-sharing adoption include
union status, firm size, and changes in the profit margin, sales, stock
price, capital intensity, research and development spending, firm and
industry compensation levels, debt levels, interest expenses, and vari
ability in sales and the profit margin.
A summary of significant results is provided in table 2.3 (based on
the logit specifications presented in tables A2.2 and A2.3 in appendix
2). Only four variables helped predict the adoption of profit sharing.
The first was an increase in the profit margin in the preceding two
years. As noted in column 2, the within-industry paired results show
that a 1-point increase in the profit margin (e.g., from 11 percent to 12
percent of sales) is associated with an increase of 5 to 7 percent in the
probability of adopting profit sharing in any year. This appears to be
important for the adoption of cash plans (row 4), but not for the adop
tion of deferred plans.
The variable that most consistently predicts the adoption of profit
sharing is a change in the stock price. As shown in column 3 of table
2.3, a 10 percent increase in stock price in the preceding two years is
associated with a 4 to 9 percent increase in the probability of adopting
any profit sharing, and this variable appears important for both cash
and deferred plan adoption. Note that stock prices should reflect inves-

Table 23 Summary Results on Prediction of Profit-Sharing Adoption
All figures based on logit specifications reported in appendix tables A2.2 and A2.3.
Percentage change in adoption probability from:
10 percent
1 percentage-point
increase in profit increase in stock
Baseline yearly
Union
price
margin
probability of
adoption in year t° (from/- 2 to/- 1) (from/- 2 to/- 1) presence
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)
.019
Adoption of any profit sharing
31 to 39
8to9
n.s.
1. Nonpaired values
n.s.
4
5to7
2. Within-industry paired differences

Inter-quartile
range of increased
variability in
profit margin
(5)
0.6
n.s.

.008
Adoption of cash plan
n.s.
126 to 167
8 to 9
n.s.
3. Nonpaired values
n.s.
83
to
60
n.s.
8to9
differences
paired
4. Within-industry
.007
Adoption of deferred plan
0.5
n.s.
9 to 10
n.s.
5. Nonpaired values
n.s.
n.s.
7to9
n.s.
6. Within-industry paired differences
Variables never found significant in predicting adoption
Change from f - 2 to f - 1 in:
Variance of change in In(sales) over t-5 to t-l
Labor expenses per employee (natural log)
Debt/asset ratio
(both firm- and industry-level)
Advertising/sales
Sales (natural log)
Depreciation/assets
Debt/equity ratio
Current ratio
Interest payments/sales
Productivity
Employment level (natural log)
Research and development/sales
Capital intensity (natural log of gross assets/employment)
zero.
NOTES: n.s. = no estimates were significantly different from
a. The baseline probability of adoption is the probability that, if a company does not have a profit-sharing plan already, one will be adopted in the current
year. These numbers represent the population probabilities (after the sample estimates were weighted to account for oversampling of profit-sharing firms),
b. Percentage change in adoption probability = (New prob.-Baseline prob.)/(Baseline prob.).
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tors' evaluations of the long-term prospects for profitability, while the
profit margin may only reflect short-term performance. This would
indicate that expectations of better long-term performance influence
the decision to adopt profit sharing. By its very nature, profit-sharingcompensation may be easily decreased if the expected better perfor
mance does not materialize, while a wage increase may be seen as an
obligation that is more difficult for the company to rescind.
A strong note of caution on the interpretation of this result, however,
is in order. Stock prices are affected by news about the expected future
profits of the company, and the announcement of profit sharing may be
taken as a positive sign of higher expected profits. Profit sharing may
have been announced in the year preceding adoption, and therefore
may have affected the stock price change prior to adoption. The
announcement of profit-sharing provisions in union contracts was
found to be associated with stock price increases by Florkowski and
Shastri (1992).9 For this dataset, whether the profit-sharing adoptions
were announced, and if so, when, is not known. It is likely that most
were not announced, as is the case with most employee ownership
transactions (Blasi and Kruse 1991). 10 Announcements are more likely
in union negotiations, and the influence of stock price changes was
found to be very similar between plans that covered a majority of
union members and those that did not. Whether this result reflects a
cause, or an effect, of profit-sharing adoption cannot, however, be
known for certain. Eliminating this variable from the equations pro
duced no noteworthy differences in the estimates for other variables. 11
A third variable that predicts adoption of profit sharing is union
presence. A union trend variable was included based on Bell and Neumark's (1993) finding, reproduced in table 1.1, that profit sharing in
union contracts has been prevalent in the 1980s (after being nonexist
ent in the major contracts of 1975). Having a union strongly increased
the probability of cash plan adoption during this period (by 60-167 per
cent), but had no significant effect on deferred plan adoption.
To test the possibility that a need for flexibility prompts firms to
adopt profit sharing, two variables were constructed to represent the
variance of the yearly changes in sales and the profit margin. 12
Increased variability in the profit margin was weakly significant in two
of the equations. The magnitude as well as the significance was weak:
firms at the 75th percentile of this variable were only 0.6 percent more
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likely to adopt profit sharing than were firms at the 25th percentile,
while firms at the 90th percentile were only 4.3 percent more likely to
adopt than were firms at the 10th percentile.
Therefore the best predictors of profit-sharing adoption are improve
ments in company performance (increases in profit margin and stock
price) and union presence. The former result is consistent with the
observation by Poole and Jenkins (1990) that profit sharing may be an
effect of better performance as well as a potential cause. This clearly
draws into question the studies that use simple statistical comparisons
between profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing companies on profitabil
ity and other performance measures (to be reviewed in chapter 3).
More generally, it calls into question the studies that use only crosssectional data. If higher profits and profit expectations precede the
adoption of profit sharing, it is not surprising that profits and other per
formance measures will on average be higher after the adoption.
Just as notable are the variables that were not significant in predict
ing profit-sharing adoption. The ability of firms to structure deferred
profit-sharing plans so that a substantial amount of the assets can be
invested in employer stock suggests that firms with need for capital
will adopt such plans. The variables used to test for this possibility are
the total value of interest payments (as a percentage of sales) and the
debt/equity and debt/asset ratios Gong-term debt over total invested
capital, and over gross assets), but none attracted a significant estimate.
Capital intensity was included as a potential predictor since it is a
complement to worker skill levels, and changes in this variable may
reflect changes in desired skills by the company. Using cross-section
data, Jones and Pliskin (199la) found this to be a significant predictor
of profit sharing, but changes in capital intensity were not found to
influence profit-sharing adoption here.
A research and development (R&D) variable was tested based on
the idea that innovative activity plausibly involves costly supervision
and the importance of group cooperation, which the productivity the
ory predicts will be associated with profit sharing. Recent changes in
R&D expenditures, however, did not appear as significant predictors of
the adoption of profit sharing. The same was true of the within-company mean of R&D levels. 13 The idea that R&D activity is not associ
ated with profit sharing is also supported by a recent compensation
survey which found that most R&D workers are not covered by profit
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sharing (only 17-37 percent of various specialties are so covered)
(Morkes 1991).
The 1/N problem suggests that profit sharing will be most effective
in small firms, and prior research (Poole and Jenkins 1990) suggests
that fast-growing firms are more likely to adopt profit sharing. Neither
idea was supported here. The employment level in the year preceding
adoption, and recent changes in employment and sales, were not sig
nificant predictors of adoption.
It might be expected that companies facing pressure from rising
compensation levels would turn to profit sharing as a way of increasing
compensation without obligating the firm to a higher wage level. How
ever, recent trends in labor costs per employee, both at the firm and
industry levels, were not significant predictors of adoption.
A variety of other financial variables was tested with no significant
findings. These included: alternative measures of the debt/equity ratio,
advertising/revenues, current ratio, depreciation/assets, return on
equity, and return on assets.

Prediction of Union and Occupation Participation
Profit sharing is not always extended to all employees within a com
pany. Under the productivity, stability, or union avoidance theories, it
may be targeted toward particular occupations or locations where it is
felt to be most useful. Among the profit-sharing companies in this sur
vey, only two-fifths (40.5 percent) include 100 percent of the employ
ees in the profit sharing. As can be seen in table 1.3, in only 44.7
percent of the unionized profit-sharing companies do more than half of
the union members participate. An average of 75.8 percent of produc
tion and service workers are covered within profit-sharing companies,
compared to 86.5 percent of clerical and technical and 87.6 percent of
professional and administrative employees.
For the firms that adopt profit sharing, what determines the partici
pation of union members and the different occupational groups? Table
2.4 presents the results predicting participation in profit sharing among
all employees, and among these four groups (based on the full results
in appendix table A2.4). Since these estimates of participation are

Table 2.4 Summary Results on Union and Occupational Participation in Profit Sharing
All figures based on specifications reported in appendix table A2.4.________________________
Effect of

Dependent variables
1. Probability of having majority of union
members participate in profit sharing"
2. Percent of all workers who participate in profit
sharing
3. Percent of clerical/technical workers
(nonexempt) who participate in profit sharing
4. Percent of professional/administrative
(exempt) workers who participate in profit
sharing
5. Percent of production/service workers
(nonexempt) workers who participate in profit
sharing
Indep. variable mean (s.d.) for line 1

Mean
(s.d.)
43.5
(50.0)
80.4
(26.0)
85.4
(28.6)

10 percentagepoint increase in
union percentage
in firm
6.5

10 percentagepoint increase in
profl/adm. share
in company
n.s.

10 percentagepoint increase in 10- year increase in
age of oldest PS
prdn7service
share in company plan in company
n.s.
n.s.

-2.2

4.4

n.s.

4.2

n.s.

n.s.

4.0

n.s.

71.0
(38.6)

-1.9

6.4

5.6

4.7

87.3
(26.8)

-3.8

10.5

4.9

n.s.

40.2
26.0
13.5
37.9
(H.6)
(20.0)
(14.1)
(24.5)
15.9
48.1
25.4
24.9
Indep. variable mean (s.d.) for lines 2-5
(12.2)
(22.2)
(13.6)
(26.9)
Variables never found significant in predicting participation in profit sharing by union and occupational status:
Interest payments/sales
Employment level (natural log)
Selling, general, and administrative expenses/sales
Capital intensity (natural log of gross assets/employment)
Research and development expenses/sales
Profit margin
Debt/equity ratio__________________________________________________________________
NOTES: n.s. = estimates were not significantly different from zero.
a. Probability effect in row one is based on mean values of variables from probit in column 1 of appendix table A2.4.

40 Prediction of Profit Sharing

restricted to profit-sharing firms (and to unionized profit-sharing firms
for the union participation estimates), they should be seen as condi
tional on a prior decision to adopt profit sharing. 14Unlike the previous
estimates in this chapter, these do not attempt to predict the adoption of
profit sharing. Rather, they employ 1990 data in attempting to describe
the characteristics of profit-sharing companies that predict current cov
erage of different employee types.15
In what unionized companies are union members more likely to be
included in profit sharing? As seen in row 1 of the summary in table
2.4, the only significant predictor of having a majority of union mem
bers participate in profit sharing is the percentage of the firm's employ
ees who are unionized. An increase of 10 percentage points in the
percent unionized is associated with a 6.5 percent increase in the prob
ability of having a majority of union members participating in profit
sharing. 16 The range of percentage unionized in this sample is 1 percent
to 80 percent. For profit-sharing firms with only 1 percent of employ
ees unionized, there is only a 21 percent probability that more than half
will be covered by profit sharing; whereas the probability rises to 71
percent if 80 percent of all employees are unionized. The occupational
composition, capital/labor ratio, total employees, profit margin, and
age of the oldest profit-sharing plan are not significant predictors of
union participation in profit sharing.
What predicts the percentage of employees covered by profit shar
ing within the firm? Row 2 of table 2.4 shows that the share of profes
sional/administrative employees in the company is a strong predictor: a
10 percentage-point increase in the share of these employees is associ
ated with an increase of 4.4 percent in employees covered (while dou
bling this share from its sample average of 25 percent is associated
with 11 percent higher profit-sharing coverage) for the firm as a
whole.17 Also, a higher percentage unionized is associated with lower
profit-sharing coverage: each increase of 10 points in unionization is
associated with 2.2 points lower profit-sharing coverage (consistent
with the results of Kim 1993). (While unionization tends to decrease
overall coverage, it increases the likelihood that union members will be
covered, as described above.) The age of profit sharing in the company
is also a strong positive predictor: each 10 years of age is associated
with an additional 4.2 percent of coverage within the firm.
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What predicts profit-sharing coverage of different occupational
groups? The results in rows 3 to 5 indicate that the occupational com
position of the company does make a difference in profit-sharing cov
erage by employee groups.18 A 10 percentage-point increase in the
professional/administrative share in the company is associated with a
6.4 percent increase in the profit-sharing coverage of professional/
administrative employees and a 10.5 percent increase in the profitsharing coverage of production/service employees. A 10 percentagepoint increase in the production/service share is associated with signif
icant increases in the coverage of each occupational group. The influ
ence of the clerical/technical share is not accounted for separately
since (as defined) it is simply the remainder after the other two occupa
tions have been measured. 19 Therefore an increase in the clerical/tech
nical share can be viewed as coming at the expense of the other two
occupational shares, indicating that companies with higher shares of
clerical/technical workers are likely to have lower profit-sharing cover
age of all employees and of each occupational group.
In line with the results on profit-sharing coverage of all workers, the
percent unionized is found to exert a significant effect on coverage of
professional/administrative and production/service workers. A 10 per
centage-point increase in unionization is found to reduce coverage of
these groups by, respectively, 1.9 percent and 3.8 percent. Finally, the
age of profit sharing in the company is associated with higher coverage
for each group, although sampling error can be ruled out only for pro
fessional/administrative employees. The magnitude indicates that an
extra 10 years of age is associated with 4.7 percentage points higher
profit-sharing coverage for this group.
To briefly summarize, this chapter has found four principal variables
predicting the adoption of profit-sharing plans: two reflecting company
performance (increases in the profit margin and increases in the stock
price), one reflecting variability (the variance of the change in the
profit margin), and the other representing union presence. The results
indicating that improvements in performance help predict plan adop
tion (consistent with Poole and Jenkins 1990) cast serious doubt on
cross-sectional comparisons of profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing
companies. Unionization is associated with lower percentages of all
employees covered, though a higher probability of having union mem
bers covered. The occupational composition of profit-sharing compa-
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nies shows that higher proportions of professional/administrative and
production/service employees are associated with greater coverage of
each occupational group, meaning that firms with a higher proportion
of clerical/technical employees will have lower profit-sharing coverage
among each occupation. A fuller summary is presented in chapter 5.
NOTES
1. As discussed in chapter 1, employee stock ownership is another variety of collective incen
tive scheme, and it has some important differences from profit sharing. Employee stock owner
ship and other schemes such as gainsharing (group bonuses tied to cost or productivity measures)
are distinguished from profit sharing, but their separate influences will be analyzed in chapter 3.
2. Czarnecki (1969) examines the union win rate over the 1961-66 period in companies with
deferred profit-sharing plans in 1965. He finds the union win rate in profit-sharing companies to
be 44.3 percent, compared to 59.8 percent among other union elections. The conclusion that profit
sharing hurts union win rates is, however, subject to a serious question of causality: almost all of
the elections took place prior to the measurement of profit sharing. The lower prevalence of profit
sharing where unions won reflects the effects of collective bargaining in a context of union hostil
ity toward profit sharing. The principal conclusion to be drawn is that profit sharing is less preva
lent in workplaces which have been unionized.
3. This review is based on all published studies that could be located in books or in economic,
personnel, and business journals (using searches up through June 1993 of the Business Periodicals
Index and the computerized databases ABI/INFORM, UNCOVER, ProQuest, and Business Date
line), and on unpublished studies made available by colleagues.
4. These estimates were made in the context of a simultaneous system, in which both profit
sharing and profitability (return on assets) were treated as endogenous.
5. See Cardinal and Helburn (1986) for a comparison of management perceptions of profit
sharing in union vs. nonunion firms.
6. The difference is statistically significant at the 95 percent level.
7. However, these differences were not statistically significant at the 95 percent level.
8. The models were estimated only on the years in which firms did not have profit sharing
already.
9. The effects of employee ownership announcements on stock prices have been more exten
sively studied and are reviewed in Blasi and Kruse (1991: 181-183).
10. An indication that such announcements are rare comes from their absence in several years
of searches on the Dow Jones newswire (Joseph Blasi, personal communication).
11. Also, use of the percentage change in stock price between t - 3 and t - 2, which is more
likely to be fully exogenous, showed coefficients of negligible magnitude and significance.
12. Specifically, these are the variance of annual changes in In(sales) and ln(profit margin)
over t - 5 to t - 1. Note that, since these represent the variance of the changes in logarithms, they
effectively represent variance around a growth trend in other words, simple straight growth in
sales or profits will not result in increased values of these variables. (Such straight growth is sepa
rately tested by sales and profit margin variables.) Note also that the current period is not included
in the calculation of the variance (/ - 5 to t - 1) so it does not include any possible effects of the
adoption of profit sharing.
13. Results for this measure are not presented in appendix tables A2.2 and A2.3 since it is not
reported for utilities and most financial companies. Its inclusion therefore substantially restricts
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the sample. The mean value of R&D/sales was close to identical between new adopters and non
profit-sharing firms (.014), but was significantly larger for old profit-sharing firms (.019).
14. Results including the non-profit-sharing firms did not produce noteworthy differences.
15. Ideally, one would have year-by-year data on which employees were covered, so that one
could analyze employee coverage at the time of adoption, as well as changes in coverage as the
plan matured. For this study, the benefits of such detailed data were judged to be outweighed by
the reduced response rate entailed in asking for such data. Therefore only current coverage by
employee type is analyzed here.
16. For example, the mean union density is 38 percent, and the mean probability of having a
majority of union members participate in profit sharing is 43.5 percent. Increasing the union den
sity by 10 points (e.g., to 48 percent) is associated with an increase in this probability of 6.5 per
cent (e.g., to 50 percent).
17. This is based on column 6 of appendix table A2.4, using only profit-sharing firms. These
results may therefore be seen as exploring the question of how firms, conditional on having
decided to use profit sharing, choose to extend coverage to various employees.
18. The small sample size prevents the use of detailed industry controls. The regressions
include seven broad industry controls to partially account for industry differences; nonetheless,
the results will reflect both within-industry and between-industry effects.
19. Its inclusion in the regressions will therefore produce perfect multicollinearity among the
three occupational shares.

The Productivity Theory
Profit sharing has long been promoted as a way to improve com
pany performance by tying the incentives of the employees more
closely to those of the owners and managers. Such incentives are theo
rized to encourage employees to put forth extra effort ("working
harder"), or to develop ways to reduce costs or improve quality
("working smarter"). As a group incentive, profit sharing is designed to
encourage such activity in cooperation with other employees. Such
cooperation can be productive in itself, and can encourage "peer pres
sure" or "horizontal monitoring," so that employees encourage better
performance by their fellow employees.
The productivity theory of profit sharing relies on the idea that
supervision is costly. If it were costless, the behaviors that are desired
under profit sharing could be directly measured and rewarded.1 As
noted in the previous chapter, several methods have been identified in
economic theory to deal with the problem of costly supervision.
1. Piece rates. Where quantity and quality of output are easily
observable and can be directly attributed to an individual, worker pay
can be directly tied to output. Costly monitoring of quality and quan
tity, the possibility of misuse of capital equipment, and difficulty in set
ting the rates are drawbacks.2 In addition, piece rates do not encourage
cooperation among employees, which may be important for perfor
mance in certain kinds of jobs.
2. Deferred compensation, in the form of a pension or an earnings
profile in which workers receive less than what they produce early in
their tenure and more than what they produce later in their tenure. Bet
ter worker performance may be motivated by the fear of being fired
and losing the deferred portion of compensation. This fear can moti
vate higher performance even under incomplete monitoring. In return,
to induce workers into such arrangements, total compensation over the
working life needs to be higher than where compensation is not
deferred.
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3. Efficiency wage. Rather than changing the type or timing of com
pensation to deal with problems of costly supervision, employers may
choose to pay an above-market "efficiency wage." This can motivate
higher effort even under imperfect monitoring.
Profit sharing may be used as a substitute or complement for these
methods when monitoring is costly. Relative to a fixed wage, profit
sharing does provide more of a link between an individual's perfor
mance and pay by allowing the worker to share in the extra value gen
erated by his or her performance. This extra value, however, is shared
with all other workers in the plan. If workers share profits equally, and
there are N workers, each one will receive only 1/N of any increased
profits going to workers. Clearly the individual incentive becomes
weak, even negligible, as N grows large.
Other conditions must be present, therefore, for profit sharing to act
as a spur to better performance. One of these conditions may be that
group cooperation increases performance. By tying the economic
reward to group performance, individuals have incentives not only to
improve their own performance, but also to improve fellow workers'
performance. This may be done in straightforward ways, such as by
sharing ideas, or in subtle ways, through encouraging co-workers and
ostracizing those who do not work hard. It may be much less costly
and more effective to have "horizontal monitoring" done by co-work
ers, rather than monitoring by supervisors.
Employees engaged in the routine day-to-day fulfillment of a task are
usually in a position to detect inefficiencies in operations that diminish
productivity. They are also likely to acquire important information con
cerning the actual productive contributions of their co-workers. ... The
information derived from such activity... is potentially very valuable to
the firm as an input to production. Yet such information transfers will
not be induced under an individual performance-based rewards system
since it does not affect his own performance measures. . . .
But under the group system, the appropriate incentives are much more
likely to be present. If there are indeed positive externalities associated
with these information inputs and all the relevant group members are
subject to the same incentives, then there is reason for the employee to
identify his own interests with those of the firm and to furnish the inputs
requisite to the firm's success (Nalbantian 1987: 26).

The Productivity Theory 47

While the possibility of information-sharing and horizontal monitor
ing may slightly mitigate the 1/N problem through enlarging the indi
vidual's range for affecting group performance, this problem would
still seem to be a strong deterrent to individual incentives. The 1/N
problem may be seen as a classic "prisoner's dilemma" from game the
ory. If one worker puts forth better performance which increases profits
while other workers maintain a constant baseline performance, the
workers all share in the increased profits from the one worker's better
performance; however, the one worker is likely to be worse off (assum
ing the extra effort is personally costly and exceeds 1/N of the
increased profits). Therefore, predicated on a lack of increased effort
by other employees, the individual incentive for increased effort is
likely to be outweighed by the costs of that effort. If, however, the
"game" is repeated in an ongoing relationship (or if the continuation of
the game is uncertain), workers can collectively establish an agreement
to work harder, and the financial rewards from sharing in the increased
profits might outweigh the individual costs from participating in the
agreement. Among the many potential equilibria that may result in this
situation, one is that the workers might establish a "cooperative equi
librium" in which performance and profits are higher (see, e.g., Axelrod 1984; Fudenberg and Maskin 1986; Tomer 1987).
A cooperative equilibrium is clearly one solution to prisoner's
dilemma situations. Two major questions are: How does one get estab
lished, and how is one maintained? Neither question has a clear-cut
answer, and in fact there may be many answers to each. Factors such as
group size, history, criteria for membership, personal connections, task
interdependence, communication system, and physical environment
may be important in establishing a willingness to cooperate for higher
performance. The same factors may be important in maintaining the
cooperative agreement, since after one is established there would con
tinue to be an individual incentive to "defect" from the cooperative
solution to share in the higher profits without putting forth the extra
effort that other workers are putting forth. The "shirkers" from the
cooperative agreement may be punished by fellow workers through
nonpecuniary sanctions such as social ostracism, or by personal guilt
or shame (Kandel and Lazear 1992; Bashir 1990). Laboratory experi
ments on prisoner's dilemma situations show that cooperation is more
common than would be predicted by simple models of self-interest,
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and is more likely when participants can begin to form a group identity
by talking with each other before making their choices (summarized in
Dawes and Thaler 1988; also see Kahneman and Thaler 1991). The
empathy with co-workers that may be built through communication
can help develop and enforce worker norms that support higher perfor
mance (Kandel and Lazear 1992; Lazear 1992).
These considerations make it clear that a profit-sharing plan cannot
simply be installed and expected to improve performance. "To get the
productivity-enhancing effects, something more may be needed
something akin to developing a corporate culture that emphasizes com
pany spirit, promotes group cooperation, encourages social enforce
ment mechanisms, and so forth" (Weitzman and Kruse 1990: 100).
This is echoed by those who set up group incentive plans: Gross and
Bacher (1993: 55) note the importance of a "supportive culture" in
which "teamwork, trust, and involvement at all levels are important."
An additional consideration is that the direct financial stake in the
group incentive may not be as important as a perception that the fruits
of greater effort are being shared with employees. If implemented in
the right way, group incentive schemes can provide a psychological as
well as financial stake in group success.3 "Theories that suggest that
workers' productivity is related to their sense of fair treatment imply
that profit-sharing plans may still lead to an increase in productivity
even when the individual's own effort has a negligible effect on prof
its" (Stiglitz 1987: 66). Put another way, workers may directly value
the existence of a pay-performance link (and possibly the group cohe
sion it may foster) apart from the size of that link.4
Profit sharing also raises the issue of managerial incentives to moni
tor workers. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argued that the optimal level
of monitoring within an enterprise requires that the monitor receive the
residual income (profits) from the activity being monitored. If profits
are shared with workers, the incentive for monitoring workers is
diluted, and both owners and workers are hurt by the lower efficiency
that results. Therefore, owners should receive the full amount of profits
in order that they (and their agents, the managers) will have the correct
incentives for monitoring.
This argument relies on several assumptions, including that there
are no principal-agent problems between owners and managers, and
that the decrease in monitoring by management will not be accompa-
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nied by an increase in workers monitoring each other.5 As noted by
Bonin and Putterman,
Alcbian and Demsetz's hypothesis is limited to the effects of a particular
specification of property rights on incentives to monitor but not on the
ability to observe accurately. ... It is possible, for example, that while
concentrated residual claimancy creates heightened incentives to moni
tor, this factor could be partly or wholly offset by reduced efficacy of
monitoring when much information concerning workers' real productiv
ities cannot be easily observed from "above" (1987:48).

One part of the argument for the importance of central monitoring is
that more monitoring induces more optimal labor effort. Putterman and
Skillman (1988) show how this is sensitive to the compensation
scheme, workers' risk preferences, and the informational content of
monitoring. In particular, monitoring may produce either an accurate
or a "noisy" signal of effort. When the signal is accurate, increased lev
els of monitoring will generally produce positive incentive effects.
When, however, the signal is "noisy" that is, there is some error in
measuring a worker's true effort increased monitoring may increase
or reduce worker effort (depending on worker risk preferences and the
compensation scheme). Putterman and Skillman conclude that
closing the story which says that a particular assignment of residual
rights will best elicit the desired monitoring effort remains a difficult
challenge, especially if monitoring is itself difficult to observe and there
are reasons why the monitor or monitors might want to misrepresent
their information (1988: 118).

An additional issue concerns the relationship between profit sharing
and capital investment (Summers 1986; Estrin, Jones, and Svejnar
1987; Weitzman 1986). If employees collectively receive a predeter
mined fixed share of profits, they will naturally share in any increase in
profits from new capital investments, thereby decreasing the return on
investment for the firm's owners.6 This decreased return would
decrease the incentives for investment, implying that profit sharing
would inhibit company growth. While the gains to employees, and
losses to owners, may be dissipated through the attraction of new
employees to the company, the adjustment lags may still represent a
disincentive for owners to invest. This disincentive would be a func
tion of having the profit share strictly tied to profits; as will be seen,
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this is rare in the United States. The discretionary component of most
profit-sharing formulas in the United States (often in addition to a fixed
percentage) adds a substantial amount of flexibility that may mute this
disincentive.
A final issue addressed here is employee self-selection. The type of
compensation system that a firm employs will clearly affect the type of
employee it attracts and retains. If profit sharing attracts higher-quality
employees, a finding that profit-sharing firms have higher productivity
may have nothing to do with the incentive effects of profit sharing, but
may simply reflect the higher labor quality of the firm.7 A priori, it is
not clear that profit sharing would attract high-quality or low-quality
workers. Employees who desire to be paid according to performance
are more likely to be more productive persons and should be attracted
to firms that have performance-dependent compensation systems.
Profit sharing may be a form of compensation that attracts higher-qual
ity workers. However, such workers may instead be attracted to com
pensation systems that are highly sensitive to individual performance,
while lower-quality workers may be attracted to group-based systems
in which the costs of shirking are shared with co-workers. An addi
tional factor that would affect self-selection of employees is the degree
of risk aversion those who are averse to income variability will pre
sumably tend to avoid compensation systems like profit sharing that
have variable payments.8
There is very little evidence on the self-selection of workers into
group incentive systems. One piece of evidence on this issue strongly
suggests that self-selection favors workers of average quality. Studying
a company in which workers started with an individual incentive sys
tem and moved into a group incentive system within several months,
Weiss (1987) found that both the initially high and low performers
were more likely to quit the company after their pay became tied to
group incentives. Among those who stayed, the performance of the
best and worst workers moved toward group averages, suggesting coworker influence upon performance. This study shows that employee
self-selection is a relevant concern in group incentive systems, but sug
gests that labor quality imparts no general upward or downward bias to
estimates of the effects of group incentive systems.
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Prior Research: Noneconometric Evidence
The relationship between profit sharing and economic performance
has been addressed in a variety of studies. These range from employee
and employer attitude surveys, to comparisons of simple statistics, to
formal econometric studies that control for a variety of influences on
productivity.
The attitude surveys and simple statistical comparisons will only be
briefly reviewed here.9 When employees in profit-sharing plans are
asked for general opinions of profit sharing, or about the effect of profit
sharing on individual and company performance, they strongly tend to
respond favorably (Bell and Hanson 1987; Colletti 1969; Jehring 1956;
Opinion Research Corporation 1957; Industrial Participation Associa
tion 1984; Poole and Jenkins 1990). Comparing expressed opinions
between employees in profit-sharing plans and those who were not, the
profit sharing employees were more likely to agree that employees "get
their share of company growth," "get credit for company progress,"
and "gain from cost-cutting" (Opinion Research Corporation 1957).
On the negative side, Bell and Hanson (1987) found that 42 percent of
respondents from 12 British profit-sharing companies felt that profit
sharing "can cause disappointment or resentment because profits can
go down." Also, Blanchflower (1991) found that worker attitudes
about the quality of industrial relations were no more favorable among
profit-sharing participants than among all private sector workers in the
United Kingdom.
Employers who have adopted and maintained profit-sharing plans,
not surprisingly, strongly tend to view it favorably. When asked about
the general success of profit sharing in their companies, strong majori
ties view it as successful (Brower 1957; Knowlton 1954; Metzger 1966
1975; New York Stock Exchange 1982; Nightingale 1980; Wider Share
Ownership Council 1985; O'Dell and McAdams 1987; Smith 1986;
Nickel 1990). Among managers familiar with flexible compensation
plans, Mitchell and Broderick (1991) found that 43 percent agreed that
cash profit sharing increases productivity, 51 percent agreed that it
increases loyalty, 44 percent agreed that it creates demands for partici
pation, and 50 percent agreed that it is difficult to administer (each of
these percentages was slightly lower for deferred profit-sharing plans).
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Asked to compare profit sharing, ESOPs, gainsharing, and simple
incentives, 28 percent (48 percent) saw profit sharing as the best alter
native for raising productivity (loyalty).
Employees and employers in profit-sharing companies, therefore,
have generally favorable views of profit sharing and its effects on per
formance measures. Among the many biases in attitude surveys, the
respondent selection bias is strong here: employees who have chosen
to work in profit-sharing companies and employers who maintain
profit-sharing plans are clearly likely to view it positively.
Two studies used regression analysis of employer opinions about
economic performance, and one study used a path analysis of
employee support for profit sharing. In a sample of 343 unionized Wis
consin firms, Voos (1987) found that profit sharing had positive effects
on employer opinions of firm performance, particularly on product
quality and productivity. Using data on employer attitudes from 1,266
British establishments in 1984, Blanchflower and Oswald (1988) use
profit sharing and other variables to predict whether the company's
financial performance was reported as "better than average." In two
estimates they find that profit sharing was a positive predictor, but sam
pling error could not be ruled out 10 They also note that there are no dif
ferences associated with profit sharing in tabulations of managers'
opinions of the "general state of relations between management and
workers at this establishment." The study of employee support for
profit sharing (Florkowski and Schuster 1992) found that perceptions
of performance-reward contingencies and pay equity, but not of influ
ence on decisionmaking, were significant determinants of support for
profit sharing among 160 employees in three U.S. profit-sharing com
panies.
Simple comparisons of performance statistics between profit-shar
ing and non-profit-sharing companies in the United States and the
United Kingdom have been done in six studies (Bell and Hanson 1987;
Howard and Dietz 1969; Howard 1979; Jehring and Metzger 1960;
Metzger and Colletti 1971; Metzger 1978). These cross-sectional com
parisons strongly favor profit sharing, with profit-sharing firms having
higher mean or median values on substantial majorities of the perfor
mance measures. In a longitudinal comparison, Bell and Hanson
(1987) found that companies that adopted profit sharing had relative
improvement in seven of nine measures (compared to non-profit-shar-
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ing firms). A more intensive examination of the Bell and Hanson data
is reported in Hanson and Watson (1990), who focus on four perfor
mance measures: return on equity, return on sales, sales growth, and
annual investor returns. Cross-sectional comparisons accounting for
industry membership show that the profit-sharing companies had
higher mean values of these measures over the 1978-85 period, while
the longitudinal comparisons show improved performance for the first
three measures but not for investor returns."
Several case studies of British enterprises that had either profit-shar
ing or employee-shareholding schemes are reported by Poole and Jenkins (1990). In examining behavioral measures, they find no clear
evidence that these schemes reduce strikes or absenteeism, although
they might reduce turnover (1990: 50). Examining case study material
on economic performance, they conclude
[T]here is almost certainly a positive relationship between company
profitability and whether or not a firm has adopted profit-sharing
schemes. However, there remains considerable doubt about the direc
tion of this relationship. In particular, our data suggest that an improved
profits performance is frequently the trigger mechanism for the adoption
of schemes. This, in turn, enables a company to continue an onward
advance in terms of profitability. . . .
Ceteris paribus, firms introducing schemes can expect positive financial
consequences, though these may well be indirect and mediated through
organizational commitment and identification. But there is not a direct
linear relationship here or any certainty that firms introducing schemes
will inevitably reap substantial financial benefits. (1990: 95)

The simple performance comparisons are clearly consistent with the
idea that profit sharing can improve economic performance, although
other explanations are clearly plausible. Poole and Jenkins note the
possibility of reverse causality: profit sharing may be causing higher
performance, but may also be partially caused by higher performance.
This possibility is reinforced by the finding of chapter 2 that increases
in profits or expected profits helped predict the adoption of profit shar
ing.
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Prior Research: Econometric Studies
The relationship of profit sharing to productivity has been addressed
by studies using formal econometric techniques only within the last 12
years. Common to these studies is the use of an objective productivity
measure (such as value-added per employee), a measure of profit shar
ing as an explanatory variable (such as a dummy, dollar figure, or per
cent of compensation), and several other explanatory variables that
may be important for productivity (particularly capital intensity). Most
of the studies reviewed here use a production function to model the
basic determinants of productivity. 12 Common problems of these stud
ies include standard statistical difficulties of proper specification, the
influence of other variables on the profit-sharing measures, the omis
sion of variables that may themselves affect productivity and be asso
ciated with the profit-sharing variable, and possible bias from the use
of financial rather than physical output measures (Gerhart and Milkovich 1992).
Table 3.1 briefly describes 26 econometric studies that include a
profit-sharing independent variable in a regression predicting produc
tivity.13 Six of these studies (numbers 10, 11, 16, 17, 19, 20) were of
worker cooperatives, in which the authors attempted to separate the
effects of profit sharing from other cooperative features (e.g., owner
ship of assets, membership on boards of directors). One study com
bined U.S. cooperatives with profit-sharing and ESOP firms (number
8), while the remaining studies were of capitalist firms in the United
Kingdom (numbers 1,4, 8, and 26), France (number 6), West Germany
(numbers 3, 5, 7, 12, 13, and 14), Japan (18), Korea (23) and the
United States (numbers 2, 9,15, 21,22, 24, and 25). Six studies report
corrections for potential statistical bias from the factors that predict the
presence of profit sharing (numbers 6,10, 11, 12, 13, 20, and 25), with
generally similar results to those found in the other studies. 14 Several
studies measured not just the direct effect of a profit-sharing variable
on the productivity measure, but also the effect of profit sharing inter
acted with capital, labor, and other variables (numbers 2, 4, 5, 9, 14,
18,19, and 26).
Overall, the prior results from econometric studies strongly indicate
positive relationships between productivity and profit sharing. There
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are 265 reported estimates on profit-sharing variables when interac
tions or lags are not included. Of these 265 estimates, 8.7 percent take
negative values, and nearly all of these are within the range of sam
pling error,15 while 57.4 percent take positive values where random
sampling error can be ruled out as an explanation. 16 If the true relation
ship between profit sharing and productivity is zero, and these esti
mates represent an unbiased sample of estimates of this relationship,
the odds are infinitesimally small of finding such positive estimates (as
indicated by a variety of meta-analyses) (Weitzman and Kruse 1990:
138). There is clearly no guarantee that this is an unbiased sample of
such estimates: as noted by Card (1990), both the stopping rules for
specification search (Learner 1978) and publication bias (Berlin, Begg,
and Louis 1989) may favor positive results where sampling error can
be ruled out. 17 While providing no guarantee of unbiasedness, the wide
range of data sources and empirical techniques employed, plus the fact
that profit sharing was not the primary focus of several of the studies,
makes it unlikely that the positive results are purely an artifact of stop
ping rules and publication bias.
These studies indicate that profit sharing may be associated with
increased productivity, but provide very little information on the cau
sality and the mechanisms through which profit sharing may affect
productivity. Most of these studies are cross-sectional, raising the pos
sibility that profit sharing is reflecting rather than causing better perfor
mance. Concerning the mechanisms, the idea that profit sharing
enhances the value of labor's contribution to output is supported by the
productivity specifications of Shepard (1986). Positive effects on
worker behavior are also reported by Wilson and Peel (1991), who find
that absenteeism and quits are significantly lower in firms with profitsharing plans than in other firms. The idea that worker participation in
decisions may increase the positive effects of profit sharing is sup
ported by Cable and Fitzroy (1980) (who find a significant positive
estimate on profit sharing only in "high-participation" firms) but not by
Jones and Pliskin (1991) (who find no positive interactions between
profit sharing and worker membership on boards of directors). The
idea that it may be most productive in small companies is supported by
Bradley and Smith (1991). 18 Cooke (1993) finds that profit sharing
appears to have much greater effects in nonunion than in unionized set
tings. (Among other possible explanations, he suggests that due to

Table 3.1

Econometric Studies of Profit Sharing

Authors of the
studies

Source of data
150 British firms with
public stock, 1978 to
1. Bhargava 1991 1989
86 U.S. firms in computer
industry with public
2. Bradley and
stock, 1986-88
Smith 1991
42 West German firms
3. Cable and
members of the AGB
Fitzroy 1980a,
from 1974 to 1976
1980b
52 U.K. firms in
engineering, from 1978 to
4. Cable and
1982
Wilson 1989
61 West German firms in
1977; 62 West German
5. Cable and
firms in 1979
Wilson 1990
565 French
manufacturing firms,
6. Cahuc and
Dormont 1992
1986-89
7. Carstensen,
Gerlach, and
Hubler 1992

136 German
manufacturing firms in
1989

Productivity
measure
Profits defined as
rate of return on
fixed capital

Revenues

Profit-sharing
measure
Dummy for firms with
profit sharing, current and
lagged
Dummy for profitsharing firms, plus
interactions wAabor

Value-added

Total profits distributed
to workers
Dummy for profitsharing firms, interacted
with firm characteristics
Dummy for profitsharing firms, interacted
with firm characteristics

Value-added
Value-added,
profits per
employee, and
return on capital

Profit-sharing payments
divided by base wage
Dummy for profit
sharing, profit share/
profits, profit share per
employee

Value-added

Value-added

Number of
coefficients
reported

Percent of Percent of
coeffs. <0 /-stats. >+2
0.0
100.0

40.0
0.0

0.0
33.3

100.0
33.3

33.3

33.3

a

a

a

a

a

a

12

0.0

83.3

21b

61.9

14.3

10 current
10 lags
2 main effects
3 interactions

3

Dummy for firms with
profit sharing
Dummy for profit
Value-added per sharing/gainsharing,
interacted with union
1,173 U.S. manufacturing employee, and
sales per employee status and work teams
firms, 1989
9. Cooke 1993
440 French cooperatives
10. Defourney,
Profits distributed to
Estrin, and Jones in 1978; 550 French
workers per head
Value-added
cooperatives in 1979
1985
Cooperatives in France
(550 in 1978-79), Italy
Profits distributed to
11. Estrin, Jones, (150 in 1976-80), and
workers per head
and Svejnar 1987 Britain (50 over 1948-68) Value-added
61 West German firms in Profits defined as
1977; 62 West German cash flow divided Profits distributed to
12. Fitzroy and
workers per head
by assets
firms in 1979
Kraftl986
Total factor
productivity
(residual of a
Profits distributed to
Cobb- Douglas
13. Fitzroy and
workers per head
estimation)
Same as above
Kraft 1987
Dummy for profit
sharing, alone and
14. Fitzroy and
interacted with capital
Kraft 1992; Kraft
and employment
Value-added
Same as above
1991
8. Conte and
Svejnar 1988

40 U.S. firms (period not
Value-added
reported)

0.0

33.3

0.0

100.0

14

0.0

64.3

11

0.0

81.8

2

0.0

100.0

2

0.0

100.0

0.0
33.3

83.3
0.0

6

8 interactions8

6 main effects
3 interactions8

Authors of the
studies

15. Florkowski
1988

16. Jones 1982
17. Jones 1987

Source of data
3 U.S. profit-sharing
companies (monthly
data)
From 46 to 30 British
cooperatives over the
period 1948-68
50 British cooperatives in
the retail sector in 1978

Productivity
measure

Value-added per
worker

Value-added
Gross margin

18. Jones and Kato 100 Japanese firms over
Value-added
1992b
1973-80 period

19. Jones and
Pliskin 199 Ib

20. Jones and
Svejnar 1985

70 firms in clothing,
footwear, and printing
over the period 1923 to
Real sales
1968
316 Italian cooperatives
from 1975 to 1978; 3 15
Italian cooperatives from
1975 to 1980
Value-added

Profit-sharing
measure
Intercept and slope
effects before and after
the plan introduction or
modification

Individual bonus to labor
Surplus distributed to
workers as dividend
Profit-sharing bonus per
employee, and divided by
base wage, alone and
interacted with capital,
labor, and ESOP presence
Size of bonus and dummy
for bonus, alone and
interacted with capital,
labor and employees on
board

Profits distributed to
workers per head

Number of
coefficients
reported

Percent of Percent of
coeffs. <0 /-stats. >+2

6

16.7

16.7

52

5.8

40.4

2

0.0

0.0

15 main effects
59 interactions8

0.0
45.8

73.3
32.2

12 main effects
27 interactions8

8.3
55.6

50.0
3.7

0.0

100.0

6

21. Kirn 1993

183 U.S. companies with
Return on assets
public stock, 1986

2,976 U.S. companies
with public stock, 1971- Sales per
employee
85
Index of industrial
23. Lee and Rhee Industry data from South production/total
labor hours
Korea, 1972-89
1992
Sales per
employee; return
24. Mitchell,
Lewin, and Lawler 495 U.S. business units, on investment;
return on assets
1983-86
1990

22. Kruse 1988,
1992

25. Shepard 1986, 20 U.S. chemical firms
from 1975 to 1982
forthcoming

Value-added

26. Wadhwani and 96 U.K. firms from 1972
Real sales
to 1982
Wall 1990
Total main effects, where no interactions or lags appear*

Dummy, percent of
workers covered, and
bonus/labor costs
Dummy for firms with
profit sharing; percent of
employees covered by
profit sharing
Profit-sharing bonus
divided by wage

15

6.7

20.0

76

5.3

68.4

7

0.0

85.7

0.0

83.3

0.0

81.3

0.0
0.0
8.7

0.0
100.0
57.4

Dummy for firms with
12
profit sharing
Dummy for firms with
profit sharing; profits
distributed to workers per
head; ratio of profit
sharing to fixed
16
compensation
Dummy for firms with
1 main effect
profit sharing, and
1 interaction*
interaction w/capital
265

a. For the study using lags (number 1), all 10 specifications indicate posidve effects of adopdng and maintaining profit sharing. For the eight studies using
interactions, six (numbers 4, 5,9,14,19,26) indicate that profit sharing is associated with higher performance at mean values of the interacted variables
(die productivity difference is 3 to 8 percent in study 4,20 to 30 percent in study 5, and 1.4 to 28.3 percent in study 14). Study 2 reports posidve associa
tions only for small firms, and study 18 reports posidve effects only when profit sharing is associated with employee stock ownership,
b. Estimates with industry controls.
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lower base pay in nonunion settings, the profit share may be a better
motivator since it is a larger portion of total compensation.)
Finally, a study that does not measure productivity directly, but mea
sures stock price response, is Florkowski and Shastri (1992). 19 They
report on a study of 45 announcements of union contracts that included
profit sharing over the 1979-88 period. These announcements were
found to be associated with positive abnormal returns to shareholders.
Such positive returns could reflect expectations of better overall eco
nomic performance, a shareholder premium for sharing future income
risk with employees, or simply a transfer from employees to sharehold
ers if the profit sharing comes in lieu of higher wages or benefits
(Abowd 1989). The positive returns were not found to be significantly
higher when the contract included wage reductions or signalled the end
of a strike, but were significantly higher when the firm was reported to
be facing bankruptcy or plant shutdowns. The fact that returns were not
significantly higher when wage reductions were announced points
against a simple story of profit sharing signalling wealth transfers, but
it is still very possible that profit sharing was viewed as substituting for
more costly wage and benefit increases. This evidence is clearly con
sistent, however, with the proposition that profit sharing improves
overall performance.
Prior research thus indicates a good likelihood that profit sharing is
positively related to productivity, but the causality has not been well
disentangled (most studies share a weakness of not analyzing produc
tivity before and after the adoption of profit sharing, leaving open the
possibility that more successful firms are more likely to adopt profit
sharing). In addition, these studies provide very little evidence on the
mechanisms by which this may happen. This study will build upon this
research by intensively analyzing the effects of profit-sharing adoption
and presence, and the role played by different plan types, formulas,
firm sizes, and information-sharing and personnel policies.

Simple Comparisons on Productivity Levels and Growth
To examine the productivity effects of profit sharing, two measures
of productivity are employed in this study: sales per employee, and
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value-added per employee. The first measure is calculated in a straight
forward way, while the second is not straightforward because it
requires data on labor costs, which are not reported by most publicly
held companies. Where labor cost data were not available, the value
was imputed using industry compensation levels, sales, and employ
ment levels.20
Table 3.2 presents simple statistical comparisons on productivity
levels and changes. Mean levels of the productivity measures for 1975
and 1990 are at the top, with the within-industry comparisons on lines
3 and 6. There it can be seen that profit-sharing firms had 4.0 percent to
7.4 percent higher average productivity in 1975, and 1.0 percent to 3.5
percent higher productivity in 1990, but random sampling error cannot
be ruled out as an explanation of the differences.21
Comparisons of productivity growth are reported on lines 7 to 13.22
Over the sample period the average yearly growth rates for non-profitsharing companies in the two measures were approximately 8.1 per
cent and 7.6 percent. The growth rates for profit-sharing companies
were slightly lower: 7.3 percent and 7.1 percent for the companies that
adopted profit sharing before 1975, and 8.0 percent and 7.3 percent for
those that adopted it after 1975.23 (Note that the numbers on lines 7 to 9
reflect inflation as well as pure productivity increases the inflation
rate averaged 6.0-6.2 percent.)24
Comparisons of productivity growth between within-industry pairs
will automatically control for any general productivity trends in an
industry in a given year. The comparisons of non-profit-sharing com
panies with pre-1975 ("old") adopters are reported on line 10, while
lines 11 to 13 answer the question, "How did average yearly productiv
ity growth compare between profit-sharing adopters and their non
profit-sharing pairs prior to the adoption (line n), during the year of
adoption fline 12), and after adoption (line 13)?"
The old profit-sharing firms had slower productivity growth than
their pairs in the 1970s and 1980s. Line 10 shows that the average
yearly productivity growth of old adopters was less than that of their
pairs by 0.7 percent for sales/employee and 0.5 percent for valueadded/employee.25 This is not so for the new adopters. Productivity
growth was, on average, slightly and insignificantly lower in the preadoption period (line 11), but higher in the year of adoption (line 12).
When profit sharing was adopted, average sales/employee increased

Table 32

Simple Statistical Comparisons on Productivity
N
(1)

Productivity levels (means)
1.1975 No PS in 1975
357
2.
PS in 1975
99
3.
Paired difference
76
4. 1990 No PS in 1990
250
5.
PS in 1990
211
6.
Paired difference
169
Yearly productivity growth, / - 1 to /(trimmed means)0
Nonpaired values
7.
NPS
4,678
8.
PS adopted before 1975
1,962
9.
PS adopted after 1975
2,004
Paired differences between PS and NPS
10.
Pre-1975 adopters
1,417
Post-1975 adopters
11.
Preadoption
1,172
12.
Year of adoption
98
13.
Postadoption
699

Sales per employee
(2)
73,318
69,617
7.4%
213,110
182,510
1.0%

(3)

(1.23)

(0.23)

8.1%
7.3%
8.0%

Value-added per employee
(4)
32,355
33,479
4.0%
96,700
87,590
3.5%

(5)

(0.83)

(1.06)

7.6%
7.1%
7.3%

-0.7%

(1.69)

-0.5%

(1.14)

-0.1%
4.1%
-0.7%

(0.22)
(2.34)
(1.17)

-0.3%
2.3%
0.0%

(0.59)
(1.11)
(0.00)

Paired differences between cash PS and NPS
365
Pre-1975 adopters
14.
Post-1975 adopters
2,341
Preadoption
15.
45
16.
Year of adoption
240
Postadoption
17.
Paired differences between deferred PS and NPS
684
Pre-1975 adopters
18.
Post-1975 adopters
2,242
Preadoption
19.
61
adoption
of
Year
20.
466
Postadoption
21.

0.0%

(0.00)

0.4%

(0.42)

-0.3%
4.7%
-2.8%

(0.94)
(1.61)
(2.66)

-0.3%
0.8%
-1.4%

(1-10)
(0.22)
(1.22)

-0.9%

(1.54)

-1.1%

(1.78)

-0.5%
4.3%
0.4%

(1.46)
(2.14)
(0.56)

-0.3%
4.1%
1.0%

(0.82)
(1.67)
(1.15)

NOTES: NPS = no profit sharing; PS = profit sharing. N = 247 for NPS companies, N = 103 for pre-1975 PS adopters, N = 128 for post-1975 adopters.
Paired differences represent value for PS company minus the value for its same-industry NPS pair for that year. Absolute values of f-statistics in

parentheses.

a.Trimmed means were calculated after removing the upper 1 percent and lower 1 percent of values.
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4.1 percent, and value-added/employee increased 2.3 percent, relative
to the industry pairs; sampling error can be ruled out for the former dif
ference. Once adopted, average yearly growth in sales/employee is 0.7
percent lower, and in value-added/employee is equal, between the
adopters and their pairs. While the 0.7 percent difference is not signifi
cantly different from zero, the point estimate indicates that the 4.1 per
cent jump in sales/employee when profit sharing is adopted is
dissipated within six years (perhaps indicating a positive "honeymoon"
effect that dies over time).
These results may clearly differ by type of plan. In this period, 45
cash or combination plans were adopted and 61 deferred plans were
adopted. The remainder of table 3.2 presents similar comparisons by
type of plan (where cash plans include combination plans, since they
both have cash components). The initial patterns are similar to those
described above: the preadoption comparisons indicate lower produc
tivity growth for the adopters, while productivity jumps up during the
year of adoption (with these jumps being statistically significant at the
90 percent level for deferred plans, but not for cash plans). The postadoption growth comparisons are negative for cash plans (significantly
so for the sales/employee measure, indicating that the initial upward
jump is dissipated in two years), but insignificantly positive for
deferred plans. The "honeymoon" effect may therefore be more impor
tant for cash plans than for deferred plans.
Productivity growth among profit-sharing adopters (compared to
their industry pairs) appears, therefore, to be slightly lower prior to
adoption, to jump up during adoption, and to be flat or declining after
adoption. This upward jump apparently exists for both cash and
deferred plans, but the subsequent decline is apparent only for cash
plans. These simple comparisons control for industry and year effects,
but do not control for other important influences on productivity, most
notably capital intensity. The comparisons would be biased if, for
example, capital intensity tended to dramatically increase when profit
sharing is adopted, indicating that the upward jump in sales/employee
is due to forces other than profit sharing. These influences can and will
be accounted for in the analysis that follows.
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Estimating the Productivity Effects of Profit Sharing

Following most prior econometric work, this study investigates the
relationship between profit sharing and productivity using a production
function framework. The framework will be briefly outlined here (with
technical detail in appendix 3). Labor and capital are viewed as the two
most important inputs to the production process, and the levels of these
factors and their relation to each other are expected to be key influ
ences on output. With longitudinal data on each firm, such as exists in
this database, changes in capital and labor can be related to changes in
output per worker, which subtracts out any constant unobserved fea
tures that may make one firm more productive than another (such as
particularly strong market placement, or high quality management).
The potential effects of profit sharing and other company policies on
output per worker are accounted for after controlling for the effects of
changes in labor and capital stocks. In this analysis, with up to 20 years
of data on any firm, there may also be general time trend effects or
industry growth effects; these are accounted for by the addition of time
and industry variables to the unpaired estimates, or by looking at dif
ferences between paired firms within the same industry and year.
Two possible ways in which profit sharing may affect productivity
are examined here. First, profit sharing may have a simple effect on the
productivity level, implying an upward or downward jump in produc
tivity when profit sharing is adopted. Second, profit sharing may have
an effect on productivity growth after adoption possibly a positive
effect if employees gradually learn how better to cooperate and
improve performance, and possibly a negative effect if workers' initial
optimism is unfulfilled and they gradually return to preadoption levels
of performance. Both the initial adoption effect and subsequent trend
effect are reported here.
The potential effects of several other firm characteristics are
included in all specifications. ESOPs, defined benefit pensions, and
unions may all have independent effects on productivity, and their
omission could lead to biased estimates of the effect of profit sharing.26
A serious problem in estimation involves potential statistical bias
from self-selection of profit-sharing status by companies. A classic
experiment would randomly assign firms to profit-sharing or non-
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profit-sharing status, and then compare their performance to obtain
unbiased estimates of the productivity effect of profit sharing. Random
assignment of profit sharing in a classic experiment, as desirable as it
may be for a researcher, is obviously not possible. In a field study,
when the subjects have been able to select themselves into or out of the
condition being studied, there is a strong possibility that the selection
rule is itself related to the outcome being measured.27 For example, if
profit-sharing companies are found to have better performance, it may
be that these companies would have had high performance even in the
absence of profit sharing (suggested by Poole and Jenkins 1990).
Statistical bias from self-selection may be manifested in many ways.
Four broad types of statistical bias from self-selection will be
described here, and appendix 3 describes a variety of statistical meth
ods to control for several of the biases. The simplest and clearest form
of statistical bias from self-selection is when companies with pre-exist
ing high productivity are more likely to select profit sharing. If this is
the case, a cross-sectional comparison of profit-sharing and non-profitsharing companies will show higher productivity among the profitsharing group, but the profit sharing is not causing the higher produc
tivity rather, the causality may be reversed. This simple form of sta
tistical bias from self-selection is controlled by comparing preadoption
and postadoption productivity levels, as is done here with the panel
data.
Several forms of statistical bias from self-selection may exist even
in comparing preadoption and postadoption outcomes. One is that the
companies selecting profit sharing may have been on an upward
growth path in productivity, and profit sharing may have played no role
in stimulating the higher growth.28 This is a particular problem if there
are only single observations before and after the adoption; however,
with multiple observations (as exist in this dataset) the preadoption and
postadoption trends can be checked.
A third form of statistical bias from self-selection is that companies
may be undergoing other changes at the time profit sharing is adopted,
and any productivity changes may be due to these other changes rather
than to profit sharing.29 Without controlling for these other changes,
profit sharing may statistically reflect the productivity effects of these
changes. This potential bias is partially addressed in this study by ask
ing the firms about the existence and duration of other policies that
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may affect productivity, and by analyzing responses to an open-ended
question about any significant changes in other policies that accompa
nied profit-sharing adoption. There nonetheless remains the possibility
that, at the time of profit-sharing adoption, the company was undergo
ing other changes in financial and organizational structure that were
responsible for any changes in productivity.
These three forms of statistical bias from self-selection, therefore,
address ways in which profit sharing may mistakenly be concluded to
have a true effect on productivity. A fourth broad form of statistical
bias from self-selection addressed here posits that profit sharing may in
fact have a true effect on productivity, but that this effect varies across
firms. The incentive to adopt profit sharing is clearly strongest where it
is expected to have the most impact reflecting, perhaps, a particular
organizational structure, culture, or history into which profit sharing
meshes well. This implies that, even though profit sharing may have
helped fuel a productivity increase in some companies, the result can
not be generalized (i.e., the effect would be much smaller or nonexist
ent in other companies). This bias is made more plausible by the fact
that these companies have continued to maintain profit sharing,
whereas it may have been terminated before the survey date by compa
nies in which the profit sharing made little difference.30 If this were the
case, it would nonetheless be of interest that profit sharing helped pro
ductivity in some companies, and investigation of the circumstances
that created this effect would be valuable to study.
The first two forms of statistical bias from self-selection are easily
addressed with panel data, while the second two are not. A variety of
techniques were employed to statistically correct for such bias (dis
cussed in appendix 3), using the factors that help predict profit-sharing
adoption from chapter 2. There were no substantial differences in con
clusions reached by any of these techniques (reflecting in part the diffi
culty in finding variables that predicted profit-sharing adoption). For
the two performance variables that appeared to predict adoption
(change in stock price and change in profit margin in the two years pre
ceding adoption), the profit-sharing effects on productivity were calcu
lated separately for those experiencing positive and negative changes
in stock price and profit margin, and the results were equivalent. From
a variety of sources, therefore, statistical bias from self-selection does
not appear to be strongly influencing these results.
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The results that are presented are restricted to the years 1977 to
1991. Exclusion of 1970-76 observations was done for two reasons:
(1) use of a selection term to correct for statistical bias, based on the
variables predicting profit-sharing adoption (removing the first several
years of the panel); and (2) substantial concern about the accuracy of
data on adoptions reported this long ago (in particular, there are sharp
upward spikes in reported ages of "15" or "20" years, which are likely
to represent convenient targets for those who are not certain). Results
employing the entire 1970-91 panel, without the selection term, were
similar to those reported but indicated slightly lower and more dis
persed effects of profit-sharing adoption (as would be expected if mea
surement error is greater for the adoption dates of these earlier plans).31

Do Profit-Sharing Adoption and Presence Affect Productivity?

A summary of the profit-sharing estimate from the productivity
regressions is on b'nes 1 and 2 of table 3.3 (based on results in appen
dix table A3.2). As shown in the first column, the adoption of profit
sharing was accompanied by an estimated 4.4 percent increase in sales
per employee, and random sampling error can be ruled out at a 99 per
cent level of confidence.32 The within-industry comparison, in column
2, is almost identical for this productivity measure.33 Columns 3 and 4
measure productivity as value-added per employee, where it can be
seen that the unpaired results are stronger for profit sharing (an esti
mated 5.0 percent increase) and weaker for the within-industry pairs
(3.5 percent, where sampling error can be ruled out only at the 90 per
cent level).
The subsequent trend after profit sharing was adopted is estimated
as slightly positive but not significantly different from zero in all four
columns. Therefore one cannot confidently say that there is either a
positive or negative trend effect associated with profit sharing. A sim
ple trend effect may, however, be a misleading guide to the postadoption effects of profit sharing. The productivity effects may be nonlinear
and may grow either stronger or weaker during the first several years
after adoption. They may grow stronger if it takes time for employees
to develop the cooperative effort that is theorized to lie behind a posi-
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live effect of profit sharing. There may be a negative effect, however, if
initial enthusiasm for profit sharing is not maintained; perhaps the
innovation raised hopes that were not fulfilled. The preadoption growth
path should also be examined; it is possible that the firm was simply on
an upward growth path when profit sharing was adopted, and profit
sharing may have played little or no role in this.
To examine this, for the firms that adopted profit sharing within the
sample period, estimates were made of the productivity effects in each
of three preadoption and postadoption years. The productivity path
revealed by such estimates is illustrated in figure 3.1 for each of the
four productivity measures.34 This figure illustrates the consistent find
ing of an upward jump in productivity in the year that profit sharing is
adopted, which is maintained above the levels predicted for nonadopters in subsequent years.
Figure 3.1
Predicted Productivity Path of Adopters
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Table 33 Summary Results on Productivity Growth and Profit Sharing

Productivity measure
All profit-sharing plans
1. Year of adoption
2. Subsequent trend
Cash vs. deferred plans
Cash profit sharing
3. Year of adoption
4. Subsequent trend
Deferred profit sharing
5. Year of adoption
6. Subsequent trend
Plan formulas
Percent-of-profits plan
7. Year of adoption
8. Subsequent trend
Discretionary plan
9. Year of adoption
10. Subsequent trend

Yearly growth in sales per
Yearly growth in value-added per
employee
employee
r
J
Within-industry
Within-industry
Unpaired
pairs
Unpaired
pairs
(D
<»
<3>
(4)
Estimated productivity effects (percent)
4.4***

4.3**

5.0***

3.5*

0.2

0.8

1.0

1.9

Roc-^rl nn

results
from
appendix
table
A3.2

A3.3
3.5**
0.5

6.5**
-0.4

1.8
0.2

0.9
2.5

3.6**
-0.3
1.4
3.6***

4.3
0.8
-1.1
2.7
A3.4

4.8
-0.2

2.2
3.7

7.9**
-2.5

1.4
0.5

7.7**
-0.4

3.8
3.5

9.2**

10.5**
5.0*

2.1

Percent-of-pay plan
11. Year of adoption
2.2
3.3
-1.6
12. Subsequent trend
-1.7
2.4
-2.8
Other plan formula
13. Year of adoption
1.6
2.9
0.7
14. Subsequent trend___________________-0.1_______-0.9________-0.4

4.4
-5.1*
1.6
-1.2

NOTES: Results based on coefficients from regressions listed in last column. All regressions include controls for capital and labor ratios, adoption and
presence of defined benefit plans and ESOPs, and union presence. The unpaired results (columns 1 and 3) contain controls for broad industry trends and
year effects. The paired results (columns 2 and 4) are paired differences between profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing companies within industry and
year.
"'Significantly different from zero at 90 percent level **95 percent level ***99 percent level.
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This figure has two other findings of interest. First, each measure
indicates a decrease in productivity two years prior to adoption, fol
lowed by an increase in the preadoption year. This raises the possibility
that profit sharing was adopted during a rebound from poor perfor
mance, but leaves open the question of causation profit sharing may
have helped cause the upward jump in productivity, or it may simply
reflect a policy which happens to have been adopted during normal
recovery from poor performance. If profit sharing were purely a symp
tom of rebounding from poor performance, however, one would not
expect performance to remain high in subsequent years.35
Second, while each measure indicates continued productivity
growth in the year following adoption, three of the four measures in
figure 3.1 indicate a productivity decrease in the second year. If profit
sharing is in fact a key cause of the productivity trends, such a decrease
in the second year may indicate problems in maintaining an initial
increase in worker performance.36 However, none of these decreases is
statistically significant, and they are all followed by further increases in
productivity in the third year.
Does every adopter of profit sharing experience a productivity
increase? This is certainly not the case. While the average productivity
increase in the year of adoption is about 4 percent, between one-fourth
and one-third of the adopters had no productivity increase beyond that
predicted by the other factors in the equation.37
Adoption of defined benefit pensions and ESOPs are both associated
with small productivity increases (about 0.9 percent to 2.7 percent for
defined benefit pensions, and 0.3 percent to 1.4 percent for ESOPs),
but these estimates are not significantly different from zero (results in
appendix table A3.2). Union presence is estimated to decrease growth
in sales per employee by about 0.4 percent to 0.8 percent per year, but
this effect is also not significantly different from zero. 38 The capital and
labor terms of the production function were strong predictors of pro
ductivity changes.39
Additional tests were made measuring profit sharing as proportion
of employees covered (columns 5-8 in appendix table A3.2). If profit
sharing does have a positive productivity effect, one would expect this
effect to be larger as a greater proportion of employees is covered. The
practicality of estimating this effect, however, is limited by its low
variance: over 50 percent of the profit-sharing companies include 90
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percent or more of their employees in profit sharing. Results from mea
suring profit sharing in this way were similar but slightly weaker.40
The finding from table 3.2, that sales/employee jumps upward when
profit sharing is adopted, is replicated here when controlling for capi
tal, labor, deferred benefit plans, ESOPs, union presence, and the sam
ple selection term. The adoption effect is slightly weaker when profit
sharing is measured as proportion covered. It is notable that the esti
mated increase in productivity when profit sharing is adopted an
average of 4.3 percent across the four estimates is remarkably close
to the 4.4 percent median estimate of effect sizes from other studies.
The studies surveyed in Weitzman and Kruse (1990) were analyzed for
the estimated productivity differentials associated with profit shar
ing the median estimate was 4.4 percent (with a mean of 7.4 percent,
and lower and upper quartiles of 2.5 percent and 11.0 percent). As
noted there, "Such estimates strike us as reasonable they are neither
so small as to be negligible, nor so large as to be implausible when
adjustment costs are considered" (1990: 138-9).

Do Cash and Deferred Plans Have Different Effects?
It is often theorized that cash plans will be more effective motivators
for employees, since they provide more immediate rewards. This is
supported by the expressed motives in table 2.1, where the average
expressed importance of "motivating existing employees" was slightly
higher for firms maintaining any cash plans than for firms maintaining
only deferred plans.41
This theory is supported by the results summarized in table 3.3
(based on results from appendix table A3.3), that separate profit shar
ing into cash plans and deferred plans.42 The adoption of cash profit
sharing is predicted to increase sales per employee by 3.5 percent and
6.5 percent in the first two estimates (line 3), both effects being signifi
cant at the 95 percent level. The estimated adoption effects are similar
in size (3.6 percent and 4.3 percent) when productivity is measured as
value-added/employee, but sampling error cannot be ruled out for the
latter result. The postadoption trend effects are close to zero, and can
not be statistically distinguished from zero.
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None of the estimates on adoption of deferred plans indicate a sig
nificant change in productivity. The first three columns indicate posi
tive effects of 0.9 percent to 1.8 percent from adopting deferred profit
sharing, while the fourth column indicates a small decrease; the trend
effects are all positive but sampling error can be ruled out for only one
of them (column 3).43

Does the Profit-Sharing Formula Matter?

There is no set formula among profit-sharing plans for how the com
pany's profit-sharing contribution should be tied to profits. Several
common formulas follow, along with the percentage of respondents
using these formulas from the Profit Sharing Council of America
(PSCA 1989), and the percentage of participants in deferred plans that
use these formulas (BLS 1990):
PSCA

Specific percentage of profits
Specific percentage of profits in excess of amount reserved
for return on stockholder equity
Sliding percentage based on profits, sales, or return on
assets
Percentage of participants' pay
Specific percentage of profits plus a discretionary amount
Discretionary amount

17%

BLS

10%

11 %
18%
12%
7%
46%

40%

Tying the formula to a specific percentage of profits is clearly the
most straightforward way to link employee rewards to the performance
of the firm and should, therefore, have the greatest effect on employ
ees.
The lack of a formula where the employer can simply determine a
discretionary amount is popular, and is not straightforward to ana
lyze. There is no guarantee that higher profits will result in higher
profit-sharing payments, so that the incentive effect would appear very
weak. In any given period, a firm maximizing short-run profits for
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investors would clearly have an incentive to provide no profit-sharing
payment to employees. The fact that these plans are maintained, how
ever, clearly indicates that firms see them as useful and do make contri
butions to them. There may be a strong relationship between profits
and contributions to these plans, so that these may clearly be de facto
profit-sharing plans even if there is no formula tying payments to prof
its. As will be discussed, it may be that the discretion allows managers
to provide a better reward for employee performance (subtracting out
influences on profits from other sources).
The formula that appears least consistent with profit sharing is mak
ing profit-sharing payments a fixed percentage of participants' pay.
Taken literally, this implies that "profit-sharing" payments have the
same relationship to profits as do fixed wages, so that there is nothing
distinctive about them as a form of compensation. Presumably these
are called "profit-sharing" payments so that they may be cut more eas
ily than wages when the company is undergoing financial difficulties.
This implies, however, only a very weak relationship to profits. Any
productivity effect would therefore be expected to be much weaker or
nonexistent.
Profit-sharing firms in the survey being analyzed here were asked
for the method by which profit-sharing payments were determined.
The breakdown of methods (for 163 plans in 124 companies reporting)
was the following:
1. Specific percentage of profits
2. Specific percentage of profits in excess of amount reserved for
dividends or retained earnings
3. Fully discretionary
4. Specific percentage of profits plus discretionary amount
5. Specific percentage of participants' pay
6. Other

19.6%
3.7%
22.1 %
4.3%
30.1 %
34.4%

(Total exceeds 100 percent because more than one method could be listed for each plan)

These responses were classified into four categories so that the rela
tionship to productivity could be analyzed: (a) payments linked to spe
cific percentage of profits (1, 2, and 4 from above); (b) payments that
are fully discretionary (3 from above); (c) payments that are a specific
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percentage of pay (5 from above); and (d) "other" methods (6 from
above, where the variety prevented any neat classification).
Of the profit-sharing firms, 90 provided data on yearly profit-sharing
contributions as a percentage of participants' pay. The mean value
across all reported years was 7.4 percent, with a median of 4.0 percent.
Correlations between year-to-year changes in contributions and
changes in profits per employee were calculated. As expected, this cor
relation was close to zero when a percent-of-pay plan was in place (r =
-.001). Also as expected, the correlation was positive when a percentof-profits plan was in place (r=.102); somewhat unexpectedly, the cor
relation was higher for discretionary plans (r=.220).44 Therefore dis
cretionary plans do appear to operate as de facto profit-sharing plans.
The results of estimating separate productivity effects for different
formulas are summarized in table 3.3 (based on results presented in
appendix table A3.4).45 These are based on: 30 companies that main
tained percent-of-profit plans (15 adopted in sample period), 20 com
panies that maintained discretionary plans (11 adopted in sample
period), 23 companies that maintained percent-of-pay plans (12
adopted in sample period), and 46 companies that maintained plans
based on other formulas (27 adopted in sample period). Clearly the
small number of plan adoptions in the sample period limits the ability
to obtain consistent estimates.
Plan adoption tends to be positively related to productivity for all
methods (rows 7, 9, 11, and 13), with the only negative estimate
appearing for percent-of-pay plans (in row 11, column 3). However,
sampling error cannot be ruled out for most of the estimates. The most
favorable results appear for discretionary plans: in three of the esti
mates, the adoption of discretionary plans is associated with significant
increases in productivity (of 7.7 percent to 10.5 percent). The only
other statistically significant estimate is for the adoption of percent-ofprofits plans (an estimate of 7.9 percent in row 7, column 3). Adoption
of plans with percent-of-pay or other formulas, and the postadoption
trends, are never associated with significant productivity changes.
With the small number of observations for any plan formula, the
results are somewhat sensitive to different specifications. In particular,
expanding the sample slightly by deleting the selection terms for the
different plan formulas produces results somewhat more favorable to
percent-of-profits plans.46
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The pattern of results suggests that percent-of-pay plans do not have
positive effects on productivity, since there is one negative estimate
and no significant positive estimates. This is consistent with theory on
a positive motivational role for profit sharing, since a fixed percent-ofpay has little or no relationship to profits. There are stronger indica
tions that adoptions of percent-of-profit plans and discretionary plans
have positive productivity effects. The results are most favorable,
somewhat surprisingly, for discretionary plans. The lack of a specific
formula may seem to represent a strong drawback for profit-sharing
plans, since it leaves open the possibility that firms will share very lit
tle with employees even when employees may have contributed to
high profits. It is nonetheless possible that the employer's discretion
may be used to more accurately reward employee efforts, in an atmo
sphere of high trust. As argued by Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1993),
almost every objective performance measure is subject to contamina
tion from influences other than the performance it is designed to mea
sure. In the case of profit sharing, company profits are clearly
influenced by a large variety of factors other than employee perfor
mance, such as capital investment, imports, managerial decisions, and
regulations. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy note that while
an ideal performance measure would reflect an employee's contribution
to firm value,.. unfortunately, for most employees, contribution to firm
value is not objectively measurable. ... [I]t sometimes can be subjec
tively assessed by managers and supervisors who are well placed to
observe the subtleties of the employee's behavior and opportunities.. .
[A]n implicit contract based on subjective performance assessments
may augment or replace an explicit contract based on objective perfor
mance measurements (1993: 2).

If payments are at the discretion of the employer, there is no written
contract that can be legally enforced. Noting that "trust between work
ers and supervisors is essential if subjective performance assessment
systems are to be successful," Baker and his colleagues show how an
implicit contract based on subjective assessments can be enforced by
the firm's concern about its reputation in the labor market. In the con
text of profit sharing, this implies that companies with high employee
trust may be able to use discretionary payments to encourage and
maintain high employee effort and commitment. The high effort and
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employee trust would be threatened if the employer took advantage of
the discretion to, for example, pay very little in a year when employees
have contributed to higher profits.47
This raises two opposing interpretations of the strong upward jump
in productivity when profit sharing with discretionary payments is
adopted (before employees have had a chance to observe the com
pany's pattern of profit-sharing contributions). A first possible interpre
tation is that, since profit-sharing plans with no formula should not be
good motivators, it is likely that the profit-sharing variables are simply
reflecting productivity increases that are due to other factors (as is
clearly possible with all estimates reported in this chapter). A second
possible interpretation is that, in a company where there is an atmo
sphere of trust between employees and employers at the time of adop
tion, the lack of a profit-sharing formula may not be a hindrance to
positive effects on employee behavior and relations (i.e., the
announced profit sharing may build on past trust to make employees
optimistic about the company's use of profit sharing to reward employ
ees for better performance).

Does Company Size Matter?

The effect of a group incentive system such as profit sharing is
strongly predicted to depend upon the size of the group. As described
earlier, such systems have a 1/N problem (with N representing group
size), in which the direct individual reward from better individual per
formance becomes more diluted as the work group grows larger. For
the group incentive to have a positive effect on group performance,
some form of cooperative solution to this problem, relying on
increased monitoring of co-workers and group identification, would
appear to be necessary. Game theory is silent on how such a solution
may be established; in a business, it plausibly involves changes in per
sonnel policies, information-sharing, and employee relations to
increase employee identification with co-workers and the company.
The establishment of such a cooperative solution may be easier in a
small company, in which any one employee is more likely to have per
sonal contact with top managers and with a greater proportion of the
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workforce. Personnel policies may be more quickly established and
adapted to maintain employee identification with co-workers and the
company. In combination with the 1/N problem, this consideration pre
dicts that profit sharing is more likely to have a positive effect on per
formance in small companies.
To the extent that personnel policies and information-sharing have
large fixed costs, the establishment and maintenance of such policies
may be done more easily and costlessly in a large company. In addi
tion, larger companies may have more experienced employee relations
staffs who are better able to coordinate profit sharing with other per
sonnel policies. Finally, to the extent that worker behavior is affected
not by the size of the performance-pay link, but instead by the exist
ence of such a link, company size may not be a crucial variable large
size may not be a strong disadvantage as predicted by the 1/N problem.
To examine the relationship of profit sharing and work group size,
the sample of profit-sharing adopters was split into five groups. These
groups were defined by employment size at the time of profit-sharing
adoption, for which the lowest decile, lower quartile, median, and
upper quartile were, respectively, 775, 1681, 4599, and 17,600. These
four cut-offs were used to create five groups, and the adoption and
presence of profit sharing were interacted with group membership. In
addition, the terms of the production function were interacted with
group membership, to allow different production functions by group
size. Because there were very few cases in which paired firms fell into
the same employment size class, reliable results for the paired sample
could not be obtained.
The employment size class results are summarized in table 3.4
(based on results in appendix table A3.5). In the smallest size class, the
productivity effect of profit-sharing adoption is large and highly signif
icant (11.1 percent and 17.2 percent, where sampling error can be ruled
out at the 99 percent level). The subsequent presence of profit sharing,
however, is not estimated to have any significant effect on productivity
growth. The second and fourth size classes show no significant esti
mates of profit-sharing adoption or subsequent trend, while the third
size class shows a weakly significant estimate of a 4.2 percent increase
in sales per employee when profit sharing is adopted, and a 2.2 percent
trend in value-added per employee. The fifth and largest size class

Table 3.4 Summary Results on Profit-Sharing Effects by Company Size and Profit-Sharing Contribution
Yearly growth Yearly growth
in value-added
in sales per
employee
per employee

Size class

Empl.<775
Year of adoption
Subsequent trend
775 < = Empl.< 1681
Year of adoption
Subsequent trend
1681 < = Empl.< 4599
Year of adoption
Subsequent trend

Unpaired
Unpaired
(1)
(2)
Estimated productivity effects
(percent)
11.1***
-0.7
-1.5
-0.3
4.2*
0.2

17.2***
0.1
6.2
1.1
-3.3
2.2*

Yearly growth in sales Yearly growth in valueadded per employee
per employee
WithinWithinindustry
industry
pairs
Unpaired
pairs
Unpaired
(6)
(5)
(4)
(3)
Contribution size
Estimated productivity effects
(percent)
PS plans with low mean employer contributions
-1.9
2.1
-1.9
1.4
Year of adoption
-3.2
0.8
-1.4
0.8
Subsequent trend
PS plans with high mean employer contributions
10.0
7.3*
10.7*
13.1***
Year of adoption
-1.1*
2.9
-0.3
4.4**
Subsequent trend
For those reporting profit-sharing contribution as a percentage of participant
payroll, the mean figure for each company was calculated. The median of these
figures was 3.62 percent. A mean contribution less (greater) than 3.62 percent
was designated as a "low" ("high") mean employer contribution.

4599 < = Empl.< 17,000
2.9
2.2
Year of adoption
1.2
0.1
Subsequent trend
Empl. > = 17,000
5.8***
6.9***
Year of adoption
0.8
0.1
trend
Subsequent
NOTES: All regressions include controls for capital and labor ratios, adoption and presence of defined benefit plans and ESOPs, and union presence. The
unpaired results (columns 1, 2, 3, 5) contain controls for broad industry trends and year effects. The paired results (columns 4, 6) are paired differences
between profit-sharing and nonprofit-sharing companies within industry and year. Paired results could not be computed for size classes due to inadequate
observations. For regression results, see appendix tables A3.5 and A3.6.
*Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence **95 percent confidence level ***99 percent confidence level.
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shows significant effects of profit-sharing adoption of 6.9 percent and
5.8 percent.
The result that profit-sharing adoption is estimated to have the
strongest productivity effects in the smallest size class is consistent
with the above considerations about the 1/N problem and the relative
ease of establishing a cooperative solution in a small work group. The
result that smaller, but still highly significant, productivity effects are
estimated in the largest size class is not consistent with these consider
ations. It may be that, as noted above, there are fixed costs in estab
lishing and maintaining personnel policies conducive to a positive
effect of profit sharing; therefore large companies may be more likely
to have these in place or be able to adopt them along with profit shar
ing. In addition, the larger companies may have more experienced
employee relations staffs. Finally, as discussed above, it may be that
the existence of profit sharing creates a psychological stake in the
company apart from the direct financial stake, so that increased
employer size may not be a strong liability. It is possible that these
productivity jumps may be traced to profit-sharing adoption. Nonethe
less, given the minute contingency between employee effort and profit
share in large companies, and the small proportion of fellow workers
with whom an employee would interact, it is somewhat difficult to
believe that adoption of profit sharing would cause productivity to
increase by over 6 percent in such very large firms.

Does Size of the Profit Share Matter?

The size of the profit share in relation to other employee compensa
tion should clearly be an important factor in the impact of profit shar
ing upon workplace relations and performance. A profit share that, for
example, averages less than 1 percent of employee compensation is
unlikely to be taken seriously by employees as an incentive for
increased effort, monitoring, and cooperation with co-workers.
What size of profit share is necessary to improve employee perfor
mance is an open question. For this study, profit-sharing firms were
asked to provide the size of the employer's profit-sharing contribution
as a percentage of participant payroll for the years 1975-90. Of respon-
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dents, 71 firms provided three or more years' worth of data. The aver
age contribution was calculated for each of these 71 firms. Of these 71
average contributions, the mean was 4.95 percent, the median was 3.63
percent, and the upper and lower quartiles were 1.98 percent and 7.35
percent.
To examine the relationship between productivity and bonus size,
one could simply enter the yearly bonus size as an explanatory variable
in the productivity equation. This approach, however, would be
strongly plagued by a statistical bias of simultaneity (reflecting reverse
causality): an increase in productivity will clearly lead to larger
bonuses in a given year, whether or not the bonus size has any direct
effect on productivity. What is desired is a measure of company policy
regarding size of contributions does the company intend profit shares
to be a large chunk of employee compensation? To minimize the
simultaneity bias, profit-sharing firms were divided into two groups:
those with "high" and "low" average contributions (as percentages of
payroll, with separate selection terms for these two groups). The cut
off between these two groups was defined as the median average con
tribution of 3.63 percent i.e., a high-contribution firm was defined as
one that provided, on average, profit-sharing contributions exceeding
3.63 percent of participants' payroll. By not focusing on each year's
bonus size and by using separate selection terms for the two groups,
the simultaneity bias is minimized, and the membership in high- or
low-contribution groups comes closer to a measure of company policy
on size of profit shares in relation to compensation.48
If profit sharing does positively affect productivity, the effect is
clearly expected to be larger where it represents a higher percentage of
pay. The results summarized in table 3.4 (based on estimates in appen
dix table A3.6) are consistent with this expectation. The adoption of a
low-contribution plan is never estimated to have a significant associa
tion with productivity change, while the adoption of a high-contribu
tion plan is estimated to have significant associations with 7 percent to
13 percent increases in productivity in columns 3 to 5 (and a nonsignif
icant 10 percent increase in column 6). A strong positive postadoption
association with productivity growth is found in column 3, but not in
the other columns (in fact, a significant negative trend is found in col
umn 6).
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Therefore the limited available data on size of profit-sharing contri
bution is consistent with the expectation that a policy of larger contri
butions will have more positive productivity effects. No significant
effects were detected for either the adoption or presence of a low-con
tribution plan, and the signs of several of these estimates were nega
tive. In contrast, the adoption effects were all large and positive for
high-contribution plans.

Is Profit Sharing a Proxy for Other Company Policies?

A serious problem with nonexperimental data is that the variable of
interest may be strongly correlated with, and may act as a proxy for,
other variables that affect the observed outcome. Firms that adopt
profit sharing may also adopt a variety of other policies designed to
improve company performance. There are two fundamental ways in
which these other policies may affect company performance, by hav
ing: (1) direct effects on performance, or (2) interactive effects with
profit sharing.
If profit-sharing firms adopt other policies that have direct effects on
performance but are not measured in the equation, profit sharing may
act as a proxy for these variables and attract a positive significant esti
mate even if profit sharing itself has no effect on performance. (The
estimated profit-sharing effect may be unduly high because of bias
from the omitted variables.) In addition, profit sharing may be associ
ated with differences in managerial quality, representing another possi
ble omitted variable. This potential bias is a standard criticism of the
positive results for profit sharing represented by the studies in table
3.1.
This section will address whether profit sharing is simply reflecting
other company policies or management changes that may in fact be the
important influences on productivity, while the following sections will
address whether such policies interact with profit sharing to influence
performance.
The use of longitudinal data to analyze yearly changes in productiv
ity levels will automatically control for the effects of any company
characteristics, such as constant high-quality management, that affect
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productivity levels but do not change over time. The obvious case in
which managerial quality may not be constant is where there is a sig
nificant change in management personnel. Profit-sharing firms in this
study were asked, "Was the profit-sharing plan adopted following a
change in management personnel?" Of the 122 respondents, four (3.3
percent) answered affirmatively. This makes it highly unlikely that the
profit-sharing adoption variable is measuring significant changes in
managerial quality.
The policies identified here as being particularly likely to compete
or interact with profit sharing are those that seek to increase involve
ment of the employee in the company by tapping employee ideas,
opinions, and decisionmaking skills. There has been substantial exper
imentation with such policies over the 1970s and 1980s (see, e.g.,
Lawler, Ledford, and Mohrman 1989; and Eaton and Voos 1992). Such
policies may improve company performance both directly through
making use of employee information and skills and indirectly by
increasing employee identification with the company, which may
reduce turnover and improve both quality and quantity of work.
Survey respondents were asked about the presence, age, and cover
age of seven company policies. Two policies that solicit employee
ideas and opinions are employee surveys and suggestion systems.
Three policies that seek to change the structure of work are job enrich
ment, self-managed work teams, and employee involvement programs
such as quality circles.49 Gainsharing plans represent an alternative
group incentive system, typically increasing employee involvement in
production decisions and tying employee bonuses not to overall com
pany performance but to more narrowly-defined group performance.50
Finally, a formal policy of employment security attempts to increase
employee identification with the company and willingness to share
information.51 The definitions provided to survey respondents of these
seven policies were based on the General Accounting Office's 1987
survey of employee involvement efforts in Fortune 1000 firms. These
definitions are presented in table 3.5, with the percentages of profitsharing and non-profit-sharing firms who maintain these policies in
table 1.3. 52
Tests of the effects of the adoption and presence of these policies are
presented in appendix table A3.8 (with descriptive statistics in appen
dix table A3.7). 53 Results are presented both with simple measures of
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Table 3.5 Definitions of Personnel Policies
The term in capital letters is the one used in the tables presented here, followed by the term pre
sented to survey respondents, and the definition made available to respondents. (Definitions are
based largely upon the 1987 General Accounting Office survey of employee involvement in For
tune 1000 companies.)
SURVEY: Attitude survey feedback. Use of employee attitude survey results, not simply as an
employee opinion poll, but rather as part of a larger problemsolving process in which survey data
are used to encourage, structure, and measure the effectiveness of employee participation.
JOB ENRICHMENT: Job enrichment and redesign. Design of work that is intended to increase
worker performance and job satisfaction by increasing skill variety, autonomy, significance and
identity of the task, and performance feedback.
EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT: Employee involvement groups, such as Quality Circles or
other formal committees. Structured type of employee participation groups in which groups of
volunteers from a particular work area meet regularly to identify and suggest improvements to
work-related problems. The goals are improved quality and performance: there is no direct
reward, group problemsolving training is provided, and the groups' only power is to suggest
changes to management.
AUTO. WORKTEAM: Self-managed work teams. Also termed autonomous work groups,
semi-autonomous work groups, self-regulating work teams, or simply work teams. The work
group (in some cases acting without a supervisor) is responsible for the whole product or service,
and makes decisions about task assignments and work methods. The team may be responsible for
its own support services such as maintenance, purchasing, and quality control, and may perform
certain personnel functions such as hiring and firing team members and determining pay
increases.
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY: Company policy designed to prevent layoffs.
SUGGESTING SYSTEM: Company system of soliciting employee suggestions for improved
performance.
GAINSHARING: Productivity-related Group Bonuses. Plans based on a formula that shares
some portion of gains in productivity, quality, cost effectiveness, or other performance indicators.
The gains are shared in the form of bonuses with all employees in an organization (such as a
plant). It typically includes a system of employee suggestion committees. It differs from profit
sharing or an ESOP in that the basis of the formulas is some set of local performance measures,
not company profits. Examples include the Scanlon Plan, the Improshare Plan, the Rucker Plan,
and various custom-designed plans.
For each policy, survey respondents were asked about its presence and age, as well as percent
age of corporate employees and (for profit-sharing companies) of profit-sharing participants who
participate. The percentage figures were categorized as None (0 percent), Some (1-40 percent),
About half (41-60 percent), Most (61-99 percent), or All (100 percent). "Proportion covered" for
table 3.16, and columns 5-8 of tables 3.13 and 3.14, were computed from these five categories as,
respectively, .00, .20, .50, .80, and 1.0.
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each policy's existence (in columns 1-4), and with proportions of
employees covered by each policy (in columns 5 to 8).
The results are not summarized in a separate table because they are
so easily summarized in text: the profit-sharing estimates change negli
gibly with the addition of the other policy variables.54 Estimates on the
personnel policies are of interest in themselves. Across the eight col
umns, there are no estimates indicating a significant positive effect of
adoption or presence of these seven policies. One negative estimate
attains the standard level of significance at which sampling error is
ruled out (adoption of job enrichment in column 4), but in the absence
of a clear pattern this is very weak evidence.55 There is no clear evi
dence of productivity effects for these individual policies.56

Does Information-Sharing Enhance Profit-sharing Effects?
While sharing sensitive business information with employees may
have positive or negative consequences for the firm (see, e.g., Kleiner
and Bouillon 1988, 1991), it is commonly believed that profit-sharing
plans have more positive effects when the companies make extra
efforts to share information with employees. Such information-sharing
is a plausible part of establishing and maintaining worker norms in the
cooperative solution to the problem of diluted individual incentives.
Survey respondents were asked, "About how many corporation
employees, excluding top management, are routinely provided with: a.
Information about the company's overall operating results; b. Informa
tion on business plans and goals; and c. Information on competitors'
relative performance?"57 From this the approximate proportions of
employees provided with such information were constructed.58 As can
be seen in table 1.3, profit-sharing companies, on average, provided
more of this information to their employees (85.3 percent compared to
83.4 percent for operating results, 61.8 percent compared to 57.5 per
cent for business plans and goals, and 30.4 percent compared to 24.6
percent for competitors' performance), but none of the paired differ
ences indicated that sampling error could be ruled out.
The key question examined in this section is whether informationsharing interacts with profit sharing in affecting company perfor-
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mance. 59 The three information-sharing variables are interacted with
profit sharing and added to the standard productivity equations. The
results, in appendix table A3.9, include profit-sharing adoption and
presence without the interactions; therefore the interaction estimates
represent productivity effects on top of the "main" (noninteracted)
effect60
As with the personnel policy results, a summary can easily be pre
sented in text. Interactions of the first two types of information-sharing
with profit sharing have no significant associations with productivity
growth. The third type of information-sharing on competitors' perfor
mance has an intriguing interaction with profit-sharing adoption in
significantly increasing sales per employee, but no significant relation
ship with value-added per employee. This is the type of information
that is least likely to be shared with employees by any firms, and with
which there is the largest association with profit sharing as noted in
table 1.3, the average percentage of employees provided with this
information is 4.6 percent higher for profit-sharing than for non-profitsharing firms. There is greater dispersion on this variable than on the
first two types of information-sharing: of the firms that adopted profit
sharing in the sample period, 96 percent shared each of the first two
types of information with at least some employees, while only 70 per
cent shared information on competitors' performance with at least
some employees. The results here provide some weak evidence that the
productivity increases are greater for the profit-sharing adopters that
share information with employees on competitors' performance. Given
that this result is strongly significant in only one of the four estimates,
and that the estimated effect sizes vary considerably, it should not be
taken as strong evidence.61
The lack of strong evidence that sharing these three types of infor
mation enhances the effects of profit sharing can be interpreted in sev
eral ways. First, and most obviously, it may be that informationsharing does not enhance the effects of profit sharing. Second, it is pos
sible that the information measured here is superfluous; the size of the
profit share is an important signal of company performance, and there
are many informal ways in which employees gain company perfor
mance information in their daily work (through news reports, union
negotiations, existence and severity of layoffs, etc.). Third, it is clearly
possible that more detailed measures of information sharing includ-
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ing not only different types of information but also different mecha
nisms for its distribution would produce different results.

Does Profit Sharing Interact with Other Personnel Policies?
Profit sharing may need to be combined with other personnel poli
cies to create group cooperation for improved company performance.
Theory suggests the need for other policies to counteract individual
disincentives in a group incentive plan, and case study material often
emphasizes the importance of combining profit sharing with such poli
cies (see, e.g., Gross and Bacher 1993; Doherty, Nord, and McAdams
1989 for gainsharing case studies; more generally, see Huselid 1992
and Ichniowski 1992 on synergy among human resource policies). In
general, the prescribed policies seek to tap the ideas and skills of
employees, thereby increasing the involvement and identification of
the employee in the workplace and company. The results of Fitzroy
and Kraft (1987) support the idea that worker participation in decisions
may enhance the productivity effects of profit sharing, while Quarrey
and Rosen (1986), U.S. GAO (1987), and Rooney (1992) suggest that
such participation may enhance the performance of ESOP companies.
Two types of data are used here to address the possibility of interac
tions between profit sharing and other policies. First, the seven person
nel policies that were earlier analyzed as potential "omitted variables"
in the productivity equations are tested for interactions with profit shar
ing in affecting performance. Second, profit-sharing companies were
asked what other changes in personnel policies and compensation were
made when profit sharing was adopted.
Profit-sharing companies were asked, for each of the seven person
nel policies, what approximate percentage of the profit-sharing partici
pants were covered by this policy. The mean percentages covered
(including zeros for those without the policy) are presented in table 1.3
(e.g., among profit-sharing companies, an unweighted average of 21.6
percent of profit-sharing participants are covered by employee sur
veys). The proportion covered was interacted with the presence of both
profit sharing and the personnel policy for each company in each year,
and this was used to create variables for both the adoption and trend
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effects of combining profit sharing with a particular policy.62 For exam
ple, the adoption of the interaction between employee surveys and
profit sharing indicates that both were present in the given year, while
at least one was not present in the preceding year. In addition to these
interactions, the simple profit-sharing adoption and presence variables
were included in the specifications.63
Results on personnel policy interactions with the profit-sharing vari
ables are presented in appendix table A3.10. Once again, these are not
separately summarized in a table because the bottom line is simple:
there is very little support for the idea that these policies interact with
profit sharing in affecting company performance. The simple (noninteracted) profit-sharing adoption estimates are similar in magnitude
and significance levels to the results without personnel policy interac
tions, and the majority of estimates do not indicate that these policies
add to, or subtract from, the main effect. Employee involvement is the
only policy that may interact positively with profit sharing, since it
shows one weakly significant estimate (in column 2) and the other esti
mates are all positive (in columns 1, 3, and 4, unlike the pattern for all
other interactions).
Positive effects of such an interaction is consistent with case study
material and prescriptive literature emphasizing the importance of
drawing workers into decisionmaking, but the results here must be
regarded as very weak. There are two negative estimates of adopting
profit sharing with an employment security policy, probably indicating
that these policies were adopted when the firms were undergoing finan
cial stress.
A finding reported earlier is that the positive adoption effects of
profit sharing are concentrated among the very smallest and very larg
est firms. What personnel policies were in effect in these firms at the
time of adoption? A comparison revealed no strong differences among
the different size classes, with the exception that employee involve
ment programs were somewhat more prevalent among the largest
adopters.64 This again suggests that the 1/N problem may be overcome
in large companies through a combination with other policies to gain
greater employee input; however, the general lack of differences in
policies among firm sizes casts further doubt on the idea that these pol
icies have important interactions with profit sharing.
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The presence of error in measuring the age or substance of these
policies will bias the estimates toward zero. If there were a "true" posi
tive effect of the interaction of profit sharing with a particular policy,
though, it is likely that the pattern of estimates would remain positive.
This pattern remains positive only for the employee involvement esti
mates; none of the others are uniformly positive across all four esti
mates, suggesting it is unlikely that a true positive effect is being
mismeasured.65
The second method for testing interactions between profit sharing
and personnel policies relied on the survey question to profit-sharing
respondents:
When the profit-sharing plan was established, were any significant
changes made in personnel policies or other compensation? (If yes:
Please describe these changes.)

As shown in table 1.3, one-sixth (17.3 percent) of the profit-sharing
respondents replied yes, one-fourth (26.0 percent) could not answer,
and the remainder (56.7 percent) replied no.
The profit-sharing adoption and presence variables were interacted
with two dummy variables indicating "yes" and "no" responses to the
above question (excluding those who could not answer). The resulting
variables were used in the productivity specifications in place of the
standard profit-sharing variables, and the results are summarized in
table 3.6.
Estimated productivity growth is higher for profit-sharing adoption
when significant changes had been made in personnel policies or other
compensation. When such changes were made, the initial productivity
effect of profit sharing is estimated as 6.1 percent to 7.5 percent (all
significantly different from zero at 90 percent level), while the corre
sponding estimates when such changes were not made were 0.8 per
cent to 3.7 percent (only two of which were significantly different from
zero). All estimates for postadoption trends in productivity were esti
mated as positive for both groups, though were not strongly significant.
It appears that the productivity increase is higher when profit-shar
ing adoption is accompanied by other significant changes. What is the

Table 3.6 Summary Results on Significant Changes Accompanying Profit Sharing_________________
Profit-sharing companies were asked, "When the profit-sharing plan was estabh'shed, were any significant changes made in personnel
policies or other compensation?" "Yes" and "no" answers are interacted with profit-sharing adoption and subsequent trend.

Productivity measure
Significant changes made when profit sharing adopted
Year of adoption
Subsequent trend
Significant changes not made when profit sharing adopted
Year of adoption
Subsequent trend

Yearly growth in value-added per
employee
Yearly growth in sales per employee
Within-industry
Within-industry
pairs
Unpaired
pairs
Unpaired
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)
Estimated productivity effects
(percent)

6.1**
0.7
3.7**
1.9

7.5**
6.5*

7.3***
1.0*

7.5*
6.9*

2.2
2.5

3.5**

0.8
3.1

3.8

NOTES: All regressions include controls for capital and labor ratios, adoption and presence of defined benefit plans and ESOPs, and union presence. The
unpaired results (columns 1 and 3) contain controls for broad industry trends and year effects. The paired results (columns 2 and 4) are paired differences
between profit-sharing and nonprofit-sharing companies within industry and year. Based on regressions presented in appendix table A3.11.
*Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence level **95 percent confidence level ***99 percent confidence level.
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nature of these other changes? The 37 open-ended answers that were
solicited from the respondents were coded in the following categories:
Change in incentive plans
1. Replaced a different incentive plan
2. Added another incentive plan
3. Combined or extended existing incentive plans
Changes in wages or benefits
4. Replaced pension plan
5. Established in lieu of wage increase
6. Part of effort to reduce fixed costs
7. Improvement in other benefit
8. Technical changes in other benefits
9. Part of labor negotiations
Other
10. Part of new training program
11. Part of new "working smarter" philosophy
12. Company went public
13. Company recovering from bankruptcy
14. Part of a merger

7
2
6
2
2
3
1
6
3
1
1
1
1
1

This distribution of responses provides no clear pattern concerning
the types of changes that may enhance the effectiveness of profit shar
ing. Changes in existing incentive plans were reported by 15 of the
respondents (categories 1, 2, and 3 above). Changes in wages or bene
fits were reported by 17, with four of these changes representing unam
biguous sacrifices by employees (categories 4 and 5). The combination
of profit sharing with changes in noncompensation policies is clear
only for the two companies in categories 10 and 11. While these
responses provide a useful portrait of the circumstances under which
profit sharing is adopted, there is no clear answer to the question of
what types of policies may enhance the performance of profit sharing.
Summary and conclusions regarding the productivity theory will be
presented in chapter 5.
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NOTES
1. If worker effort is public knowledge, profit sharing that is proportionate to individual effort
can produce excess incentives (Sen 1966; Israelsen 1980). For further discussion of alternatives
under costly supervision, see Parsons (1986), Calvo (1987), Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988),
and Lazear (1992).
2. See Lawler (1971) for a summary of studies showing the development of adversarial rela
tions between system designers and employees when piece rate systems are put into place.
3. "[I]n the absence of any relationship between the success of the organization and the pay of
individuals, an important part of the business experience for the individual is missing. Everything
known about motivation clearly points out that it is greatest when people have both a psychologi
cal and a financial stake in the organization's success" (Lawler 1987: 85).
4. An additional perspective on the dilution of individual incentives through the 1/N problem
concerns the perception of the actual performance-pay link. Brickley and Hevert (1991) use pros
pect theory to argue that employees may systematically overweight the likelihood that their
actions will affect firm value. While this may mitigate the 1/N problem in small groups, it would
seem less plausible in groups of thousands of employees.
5. Alchian and Demsetz mention the "public good" benefits of loyalty and "team spirit," but
these play no role in their analysis.
6. This problem is in some respects parallel to the theorized disincentive for investment within
a labor-managed firm (Furubotn and Pejovich 1970; summarized by Bonin and Putterman 1987).
In such a firm, if workers cannot receive the capitalized value of the firm's investments upon leav
ing the firm, there will be a tendency to favor investments with a short-run payoff. Such a labormanaged firm may underinvest because the investment returns would be shared with future
employees, while the capitalist profit-sharing firm may underinvest because the investment
returns are shared with current employees.
7. If the higher labor quality can be traced to the profit-sharing plan, this may be a strong argu
ment for individual firms to adopt profit sharing, though the advantage would clearly decline as
other firms adopted profit sharing.
8. An employee's calculation of income risk would include not only the risk from variability
of profit-sharing payments, but also the risk of layoff. If profit- sharing companies are less likely
to close, or are otherwise less likely to lay workers off in the face of demand shocks (as predicted
by the stability theory, to be explored in the following chapter), then risk-averse workers may
instead be attracted to profit-sharing companies. For a discussion of compensation and risk, see
Parsons (1986).
9. See Weitzman and Kruse (1990) for a summary of findings. For additional research findings
see Profit Sharing Research Foundation (1989). For a more general review of employee attitudes
under profit sharing, employee ownership, quality circles, and autonomous work groups, see
Kelly and Kelly (1991).
10. Their regression controls for size, industry demand, percent labor costs, and unionism.
The ^-statistics on the profit- sharing variables were 1.4 and 1.6.
11. The authors note that average investor returns were significantly higher for the preadoption group than for other non-profit-sharing companies, and suggest that the "market may have
anticipated a positive productivity effect" (though there is no information on when profit sharing
was announced) (1990:180).
12. Such as Cobb-Douglas, constant elasticity of substitution (CES), or translog functions.
13. This table is updated and adapted from table 4 in Weitzman and Kruse (1990). It does not
include studies of productivity-gainsharing plans such as Scanlon and Rucker plans (Schuster
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1983, 1984), and IMPROSHARE (Fein 1981, 1983; Globerson and Parsons 1987; Kaufman
1992). For gainsharing case studies see the meta-analysis in Bullock and Tubbs (1990), as well as
Robertson and Osuorah (1991), Markham et al. (1992), Masternak (1991/92), Masternak and
Ross (1992), Gowen (1990), and Hansen and Watson (1990). This review is based on all pub
lished studies that could be located in books or in economic, personnel, and business journals
(using searches up through June 1993 of the Business Periodicals Index and the computerized
databases ABI/INFORM, UNCOVER, ProQuest, and Business Dateline), and on unpublished
studies made available by colleagues.
14. These studies used instrumental variable techniques to account for the endogeneity of
profit-sharing status. Several studies used instrumental variables for the labor and/or capital stock,
although not for profit sharing (numbers 1, 4,18, and 25).
15. Only two negative coefficients have /-statistics lower than -2, as found by Carstensen,
Gerlach, and Hubler (1992) in their estimates with industry controls, when they use profit share
divided by profits in predicting value-added. The authors note that this measure is contaminated
by the influence of productivity on the denominator of the measure, and the opposite result is
obtained (with significant positive coefficients) when profit sharing is measured as profit share per
employee.
16. Each of these coefficients have /-statistics greater than 2, indicating that there is less than a
5 percent chance that the true coefficient is zero and the estimate is due to random sampling error.
The overall positive results are also reflected in the specifications with interactions and lagged
values (see note at bottom of table 3.1).
17. Of the 26 studies, 16 had been or are being published.
18. Additional evidence comes from Smith (Forthcoming), who examines financial perfor
mance of Italian cooperatives and finds it to be higher among firms which stress production
knowledge of employees, high quality products, and specialized corporate alliances.
19. Stock market reactions have often been studied in announcements of managerial compen
sation plans (see, e.g., Brickley, Bhagat, and Lease 1985, and Tehranian and Waeglenin 1985).
20. Standard and Poor's CompuStat reports labor expenses for less than one-fourth of the
companies. Value-added is the value of final output minus the value of nonlabor inputs. Com
puStat reports "cost of goods sold" which includes labor and rental expense as well as material
inputs. Since labor and rental expense are part of value-added, these data were required for calcu
lation of value-added as Sales - (cost of goods sold - labor costs - rental expense). Labor costs
were imputed in the following way. Average compensation per employee for the industry was cal
culated from National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data. For the firms reporting labor
costs, independent variables used to predict ln(total labor costs) in the firm in year / were the log
arithm of average industry compensation in t and / - 1, logarithm of sales in t and t - 1, logarithm
of employment in t and t - 1, and eight industry dummies. This regression used 3283 observations,
and had an /^-squared of .982. The coefficients on these variables were then used to predict labor
costs in the firms for which labor costs were not reported. This number was used in the above
equation for the calculation of value-added.
21. None of the /-statistics indicate statistical significance at even a 90 percent level. It is
clearly possible that profit-sharing plans existed in 1975 that were terminated before the survey
date and were therefore not recorded in this survey. Thus either the non-profit-sharing or profitsharing groups may be misclassified as not having profit sharing in earlier years. While this intro
duces measurement error in the comparisons, it is not likely to produce any systematic biases.
Data on terminated plans were not collected due to a substantial concern about the quality of the
data. It is unusual for respondents to the phone survey to have been in their positions for more
than a few years; therefore their direct knowledge about earlier-terminated plans would be sus-
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pect, and a request to look up old records on terminated plans would have resulted in greatly
diminished response rates.
22. These values represent trimmed means, where the highest 1 percent and lowest 1 percent
of values have been excluded so that the means are not unduly influenced by these outliers.
23. A1975 cut-off point was chosen for the comparisons since it allows a comparison of sev
eral preadoption and post- adoption values for the adopters.
24. Average yearly growth in the GNP deflator was 6.0 percent, and in the Consumer Price
Index was 6.2 percent
25. Though only the former difference is statistically significant at the 90 percent level.
26. For research on the productivity effects of ESOPs see Conte and Svejnar (1990), of pen
sions see Alien and Clark (1987) and Gustman and Mitchell (1992), and of unions see Hirsch
(1991). All specifications account for the adoption and subsequent trend effects of defined benefit
pensions and ESOPs, and the trend effects of unions. The variables representing defined benefit
plans and ESOPs were constructed from the 1988 Form 5500 pension tapes, which include both
the beginning year and the number of participants in these plans. The proportion covered by each
plan is projected back to the beginning dates of the plans an assumption which will result in
some downward bias of the coefficients if there is mismeasurement of the true proportion cov
ered, but is unlikely to produce systematic error. Companies were only asked about union status at
the survey date; the gains from identifying changes in union status were felt to be very small.
27. Treatments of selection bias in economic studies include Heckman (1976, 1979, 1990),
Maddala (1983), Heckman and Robb (1985), Manski (1989), and Heckman and Hotz (1989).
28. This is known as a selection-maturation interaction (Cook and Campbell 1979).
29. Referred to as an interaction between selection and history, or "local history" (Cook and
Campbell 1979).
30. The survey did not ask about terminated plans and policies, due to substantial concern
about biases and inaccuracies in reporting on benefits and policies that no longer exist (particu
larly if they were not terminated recently and the respondent may not have been with the company
or in a position to know of the policy). Future survey data from these companies can, however, be
used to create a more reliable database that includes terminated plans.
31. Taking all reported ages as accurate, the estimated adoption effects range from 2.3 percent
to 4.1 percent (to be compared with row 1 of table 3.3). Removing plans with reported ages of 15
or 20 years produces a wider range of estimates: 3.0 percent to 5.5 percent (all statistically signif
icant at p <.05).
32. The value of using panel data, which subtracts out constant firm factors that may affect
productivity, is illustrated by comparing these results with simple cross-sectional estimates. Using
the same explanatory variables specified as levels rather than as yearly changes, cross-sectional
regressions for each year produce an average productivity difference of 6.0 percent between
profit-sharing and non-profit- sharing firms, representing an upward bias due to the effect of con
stant firm factors.
33. For the paired results, the value of each variable for the non-profit-sharing firm was sub
tracted from the value for the profit-sharing firm, so that a positive value indicates that the profitsharing firm exceeds its pair on this variable. This technique was also employed by Freeman and
Kleiner (1990) in their study of union drives.
The sample size is substantially smaller for the paired regressions, primarily because each
observation represents a pair of firms rather than a single firm.
34. This figure is based on the variables and samples used in regressions 1 to 4 of appendix
table A3.2, but with separate dummy variables for each of the three preadoption and postadoption
years.
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35. The statistical regression threat to validity is that outliers will tend to return to mean values
over time, and policies adopted when performance is especially high or low may have no role in
the return to mean values. Such a threat is unlikely in this case, since the productivity jump is not
returning the adopter to mean values, but is putting the adopter at a higher-than-predicted level
which does not subsequently return to low levels. It is nonetheless possible that profit sharing was
adopted along with other changes that keep productivity at high levels.
The regression threat is also discounted by the finding that the especially poor performers in
year t -2 did not have especially high productivity jumps in the adoption year; in fact, the adop
tion-year productivity increases were similar between those adopters above and below the median
productivity change in / - 2.
Productivity changes in years t- 2 and t - I were used to explain profit-sharing adoption with
the other independent variables in the specifications of chapter 2 and were never statistically sig
nificant predictors.
36. This could possibly indicate a "Hawthorne effect," in which changes in performance are
due to the novelty of a new treatment rather than to its substance.
37. The basic productivity specifications were run without the profit-sharing variables, and the
residuals were analyzed for years in which profit sharing was adopted. In the four specifications,
the percentages of profit-sharing adopters with positive residuals were, respectively: 69.5 percent,
72.7 percent, 60.0 percent, and 68.2 percent. Of the adopters, the lower quartile of residuals at the
time of adoption ranged from -1.1 percent to -3.7 percent, while the upper quartile ranged from
10.2 percent to 12.2 percent. In other words, approximately one-fourth of adopters had productiv
ity increases exceeding 10 percent, while one-fourth had productivity changes worse than -2 per
cent.
The dispersion of the residual was equivalent between the entire sample and the observations
representing profit-sharing adoption. For regression 1, the standard deviation of the residual for
the entire sample was .101, and the inter-quartile range was .103 (from -.051 to .052), compared
to figures of, respectively, .115 and .126 for the profit-sharing adoption observations.
This technique has the advantage of providing a conservative estimate of the effect of profit
sharing, since any collinearity between profit-sharing and other variables is attributed to the other
variables. The mean residuals for profit-sharing adopters in their year of adoption were: 3.9 per
cent, 4.0 percent, 4.0 percent, and 3.4 percent.
38. Hirsch (1991) finds that slower growth in productivity among unionized firms in the 1970s
and 1980s is mostly due to industry differences; he concludes that "we cannot reject the hypothe
sis that unions, on average, have little direct effect on productivity and productivity growth"
(1991: 111).
39. Coefficients on the terms including labor will be somewhat biased if there is measurement
error in employment levels, since employment also appears in the denominator in the dependent
variable. This does not, however, bias the profit-sharing coefficients; results for the variables of
interest were equivalent when employment levels were not in the denominator of the dependent
variable.
40. This contrasts with my results for deferred plans in Kruse (1992), in which proportion
covered resulted in higher coefficients than did simple dummies. This difference may be partly
explained by the much smaller variance in proportion covered in this sample: the mean proportion
covered in the plans analyzed in Kruse (1992) was 40.7 percent, with very few firms having 100
percent coverage, while the firms in this sample have a mean proportion covered of 78.5 percent
and nearly half report 100 percent coverage. The smaller variance in this sample allows for less
precise estimates; also, the data are based on self-reports rather than administrative records, intro
ducing a downward bias due to measurement error. It is also possible that, in firms with less than
total coverage, profit sharing has been extended to key employees whose participation is expected
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to affect firm performance, so that total coverage is not needed for strong effects. Nonetheless this
result is at variance with my past research and the expectation that, if the productivity theory is
correct, broader coverage should produce larger effects.
41. See Wray (1993) for an overview of cash plans in the United States.
42. As in table 3.2, combination plans are included with cash plans since they both contain
cash elements which provide immediate rewards to employees. The reported regressions include
separate inverse Mill's selection terms for cash and deferred plans.
43. These magnitudes are lower than those from my previous analysis of deferred plans using
administrative data and similar specifications (Kruse 1992), in which the estimated effects of plan
adoption were in the range of .025 to .028. The results presented here are based on a smaller sam
ple size, and are more prone to a downward bias from measurement error.
The difference between results for cash and deferred plans may reflect in part the stronger
relation to profits among the former. For companies reporting the profit share as a percentage of
participant payroll, the correlation between the change in profit share and the change in company
profits per employee is .191 for cash plans (n = 203), and .063 for deferred plans (n = 281).
44. The sample sizes are, respectively, 105, 152, and 92. If contributions were closely tied
only to profits/employees, the correlation should be close to 1.0. The existence of other factors in
the formula, and the use of other measures of profitability (including thresholds that must be met
before contributions are made), account for the low correlations. When profit margin rather than
profits/employees is used, the correlation for percent-of- profits plans is .124, for discretionary
plans is .096, and for percent-of-pay plans is .061.
45. The regressions contain separate inverse Mill's selection terms for each of the plan formu
las. None of the coefficients on these terms was statistically significant.
46. None of the selection terms attracted significant coefficients. Without these terms, three
regressions show estimated effects of 5.7 percent to 8.1 percent (significant at p <.10), with only
one significant coefficient for discretionary plans (10.4 percent), and a significant negative coeffi
cient for percent-of-pay plans (-6.6 percent).
47. As noted earlier, an advantage of discretionary plans to employers is that profits due
wholly to other factors (e.g., new capital investment) can be excluded from consideration. A percent-of-profits plan has the risk of discouraging new capital investment, since some of the gains
will have to be shared with employees.
48. As noted in appendix 3, the simultaneity bias can also be addressed through instrumental
variables. As before, however, instrumental variables estimates produced implausibly large esti
mates of profit-sharing's effect.
49. For reviews of theory and research on worker participation experiments, see Gershenfeld
(1987), and Levine and D' Andrea Tyson (1990). For their relationship to unions see Eaton (1992)
and Eaton and Voos (1992). For research on higher-level employee participation in the form of
workers' councils, see Freeman and Rogers (Forthcoming) and Addison, Kraft, and Wagner
(Forthcoming).
50. For studies of gainsharing see the meta-analysis in Bullock and Tubbs (1990), as well as
Schuster (1983 1984), Robertson and Osuorah (1991), Markham et al. (1992), Masternak (19917
92), Masternak and Ross (1992), Gowen (1990), and Hanson and Watson (1990).
51. For a general discussion of employment security strategies, see Dyer, Foltman, and Milkovich (1985). For discussion of the relationship between employment security and firm perfor
mance, see Osterman (1987) and Ichniowski (1992).
52. The percentages in table 1.3 exclude "don't know" responses. Those who responded "don't
know" for the existence of the policies were: 2.4 percent for attitude survey feedback, 5.6 percent
for suggestion system, 5.2 percent for job enrichment, 3.8 percent for employee involvement
groups, 4.0 percent for self-managed workteams, 2.0 percent for employment security, and 4.2
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percent for productivity-related group bonuses. Also, the percentages of those responding that
they had the policy but did not know its age were, respectively, 3.6 percent, 6.6 percent, 4.0 per
cent, 4.4 percent, 3.0 percent, 1.2 percent, and 5.4 percent
53. While the rates of response on the individual policy questions were high (see previous
note), a substantial number of the respondents answered "don't know" on the existence or age of
at least one of the policy questions. Excluding these respondents greatly diminishes the sample
size for the regressions. Given the earlier-noted dispersion in outcomes for profit-sharing adopt
ers, changes in the sample size can have substantial effects on the profit-sharing coefficients (with
much higher or lower coefficients, due not to the added variables but to the change in sample). To
maintain the sample size for comparability with previous results without providing bias to the
reported coefficients, the "don't know" responses were coded as separate dummy variables for the
regressions reported in appendix table A3.S. The coefficients on the "don't know" variables,
which are not reported here, were uniformly small and statistically insignificant. An additional
complication is that the reported ages of the personnel policies showed sharp spikes at 5 and 10
years, undoubtedly representing convenient focal points for those who are not sure about the age.
Regressions were run treating these alternatively as valid values, and as missing values; results
between the two sets of regressions were similar, and the latter results are presented here.
54. F-tests reveal that there were no significant changes in profit-sharing coefficients from the
results presented in appendix table A3.2.
55. With 112 coefficients across the eight regressions, it is expected that about six would be
randomly "significant" at the 95 percent level. In the absence of a clear pattern, very little impor
tance should be attached to one "significant" coefficient.
56. Clearly the attempt to measure the effects of these policies is limited by error in measuring
the age, coverage, or substance of the policies. To focus on respondents who would be more
knowledgeable about these policies, the sample was restricted first to Vice-Presidents of Human
Resources, and then expanded to include Directors of Employee Benefits, with a similar lack of
noteworthy patterns for the personnel policy coefficients. Even among this more knowledgeable
group, it is clear that the substance of the policies may differ greatly among firms, creating sub
stantial measurement error.
These results cast doubt on the idea that any one of these policies in isolation can be expected
to have an impact on productivity. However, it remains possible that some combination of these
with other human resource policies may have consequences for firm performance. For evidence
that such a combination may improve company performance, see Ichniowski (1990) and Huselid
(1992). For discussion of how human resource policies can interact for better labor-management
relations and higher performance, see Ichniowski (1992).
57. These questions were taken directly from the GAO survey of employee involvement in
Fortune 1000 firms.
58. The answer options were "none" (0 percent), "some" (1-40 percent), "about half (41-60
percent), "most" (61-99 percent) or "all" (100 percent). The proportions assigned to each of the
five categories were, respectively, 0, .20, .50, .80, and 1.0. While the use of categories produces
some measurement error, this should not be systematic error. Following the GAO survey, catego
ries rather than "exact" percentages were used to encourage a higher response rate.
59. This is separate from the question of whether information- sharing itself affects company
performance. Kleiner and Bouillon (1991) find that sharing of sensitive information is associated
with lower profitability. The information- sharing measures in this study had no significant direct
relationship with level or growth of either productivity measure.
60. When the three types of information-sharing are interacted with profit sharing and
included in the same regression, there is obviously high multicollinearity among these variables,
which raises standard errors and makes estimates less precise. To reduce the multicollinearity
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bias, each information-sharing interaction was entered separately in regressions. The results were
very similar.
61. To reduce multicollinearity, the interaction terms for the first two types of information
were removed. The regression coefficients for the competitors' performance interaction term were
.054, .ISO, .033, and .065, with the second of these being significant only at rx.10. Reducing mul
ticollinearity therefore weakens the case that sharing this type of information has strong interac
tion effects with profit sharing.
62. The interaction was first-differenced, so that the "adoption" of this interaction may signify
either the adoption of profit sharing when the policy is present, or the adoption of the policy when
profit sharing is present (separate tests on these situations produced no noteworthy differences in
results). The trend effect of the interaction simply indicates that both profit sharing and the policy
were in effect in that year. Note that the personnel policy variable is defined as the proportion of
profit-sharing participants covered by this policy at the time of the survey the technique
employed here extrapolates this proportion back through the time that both profit sharing and the
policy were in effect. The measurement error thereby created will bias the coefficients toward
zero. Concerns about data quality and response rate precluded asking for detail on personnel pol
icy coverage of profit-sharing participants in earlier years.
63. In addition, tests were made using separate inverse Mill's ratios for the presence of each
interaction in each year, but these provided consistently negligible coefficients and were dropped
in the final specifications.

64. Among the adopters in the largest size class, an average of 24.5 percent of profit-sharing
employees were covered by employee involvement programs which existed at the time of profitsharing adoption, compared to 12.5 percent among adopters across the other size classes (and
compared to 12.6 percent of employees covered in non-profit-sharing firms in the largest size
class). Interaction terms revealed that the large adopters using employee involvement programs
for profit-sharing employees did have larger productivity increases, but the statistical significance
was weak for most of these interactions, and the estimated productivity increases were still signif
icant for the adopters that did not use employee involvement.
65. The multicollinearity of these variables will increase the standard errors of the coeffi
cients. To reduce multicollinearity, the interactions were entered individually in the specifications,
and the results were very similar.

4
The Stability Theory
Economic instability is a problem of modern capitalist economies.
While simple neoclassical economic models predict that market econo
mies will always be at or close to full employment of all resources,
underutilization of resources in market-based economies has been
apparent both in business cycles and in more severe episodes such as
the 1930s depression. A major aim of government economic policies in
Western economies in the twentieth century has been to stabilize the
economy and avoid the economic and social costs of unemployment. A
variety of policies have been employed for this purpose, ranging from
broad monetary and fiscal stimuli to labor market policies such as
unemployment compensation and support for job training.
A key element of the simple economic models that predict full
employment is mobility and price flexibility for all factors, including
labor. If there are unemployed workers, they should be able to bid
down wages until all are employed. If the unemployment is prolonged,
one culprit may be "sticky wages" that do not decrease to encourage
additional hiring.1 According to this logic, forms of compensation that
provide downward flexibility such as profit sharing should encour
age employers to retain and hire workers. This flexibility has been one
of the arguments for profit sharing.2 Downward flexibility in wages
was, though, not part of the "Keynesian revolution" in economic pol
icy that developed in the 1930s depression Keynes in fact warned
that wage decreases could work against economic recovery by decreas
ing aggregate purchasing power (1964: 257-71).
Profit sharing may have stabilizing potential apart from downward
flexibility in compensation. Martin Weitzman developed the theory of
the "share economy," in which widespread use of profit sharing would
help inoculate the economy against instability and unemployment
(1983, 1984, 1985, 1986). The key element of this theory is that firms
will essentially ignore the profit share when making employment deci
sions in the short run rather, they will base such decisions only upon
the fixed wage that must be paid to each worker. The conclusion is that
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firms with substantial profit sharing will not only have a strong incen
tive to retain workers when business shocks occur, but also an incen
tive in equilibrium to snatch up any unemployed workers who may
appear in the labor market.
This theory received wide attention in the business press and aca
demic publications and conventions in the 1980s. After reviewing the
theory and several objections, this chapter will review existing empiri
cal work and present new evidence.
The fundamentals of this theory will be described here, with a fuller
explanation in appendix 4. Employment decisions of firms are based
on the value of the worker's output in relation to the cost of the worker.
A profit-maximizing firm will employ labor up to the point where the
value of the last labor hour (the marginal revenue product) is no less
than the wage that must be paid. For a fixed-wage firm with a wage of
$10/hour (representing the marginal cost of a labor hour), a firm will
employ such labor only if the value of the worker's output exceeds $107
hour.3 When a negative business shock reduces the value of the work
er's output below $10/hour, workers will be laid off or their hours
reduced.
The stability theory of profit sharing posits that the view of labor's
cost is different in a profit-sharing firm. A profit-maximizing firm with
a profit-sharing plan is interested in retaining and hiring workers as
long as the value of the worker's output exceeds the base wage, rather
than the worker's total remuneration (base wage plus profit share). The
profit share is essentially ignored by the employer when making the
employment decision, since profits are maximized by employing work
ers whenever the value of their output exceeds the base wage. This can
be seen through the following example. Say that workers are paid a
base wage of $9 per hour, and the employer pays 25 percent of profits
to the workers representing, on average, an extra $1 per hour in profit
share for each worker (so that average pay is $10 per hour). Initially,
the company's product demand is high enough that the value of each
labor hour is at least $10/hour. If the company's product demand drops
so that the value of the last labor hour is only $9.60, a firm that paid a
wage of $10 per hour would lay some workers off, or reduce hours.
But the profit-sharing firm would retain workers since the last labor
hour still contributes $.60 to profits (i.e., $9.60 minus the $9 base
wage, with 15 cents of the difference going to workers under the profit-
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sharing plan). Because of the reduced product demand, both the com
pany and the workers are earning fewer profits than previously, but
employment has remained stable.
The same incentive that impels the firm to retain workers in bad
times will also cause it to look hard for workers during normal times.
Under the example here, while a fixed-wage firm paying $10/hour will
hire new workers only if the value of their output exceeds $10/hour, a
profit-sharing firm will want to hire new workers if the value of their
output exceeds $9/hour. Profit-sharing firms will have this incentive in
the short run, but such excessive hiring will not be possible in the long
run. While employers ignore the profit share in their short-run employ
ment decisions, workers do not. As more workers are hired, the profit
share established by the employer must be divided among a larger
number of workers, decreasing its value to any one worker. Workers
base their labor supply decisions not on the base wage, but on total
compensation. When the total compensation falls below the market
level, profit-sharing firms will have difficulty attracting and retaining
workers. These firms in the long run will adjust their base wage and
profit share so that the expected total compensation paid to workers
will equal the value of the last worker's output, but the firms maintain
an incentive in the short run to hire any worker as long as the worker's
output exceeds the base wage.
The different incentives for fixed-wage and profit-sharing firms are
illustrated in figure 4.1 (adapted from Nordhaus 1986). The curve
labeled Demand represents the value of worker output from an addi
tional labor hour (the marginal revenue product, or MRP, which is
assumed to be the same in the two types of firms). A conventional
fixed-wage firm, in the top left diagram, will hire workers up to the
point where the MRP equals the fixed wage, with LQ workers hired.
Compare this with a profit-sharing firm, in the top right diagram, which
has the same average compensation, but pays half of this in a base
wage and half as a profit share. The demand curve is identical, and the
profit-sharing firm has an incentive to operate at point B, where the
MRP equals the base wage and L, workers are hired.4 Under full
employment, however, the firm must operate at point A, with L0 work
ers, due to the lack of labor availability when compensation is below
the market level. While the profit-sharing firm has no incentive in equi-
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librium to change the compensation parameters, it would h'ke to hire
more labor at the current compensation parameters.
Figure 4.1
Employment Incentives for Fixed-Wage and Profit-Sharing Firms
Labor Demand in Equilibrium
Fixed-Wage Firm
(l)

Profit-Sharing Firm
(2)

Demand

Labor Demand Under Negative Demand Shock

\Demand
Demand*
0 ^2

LQ = initial employment levels
LI = desired employment by profit-sharing firm
LZ = desired employment levels after negative shock
Demand = labor demand curve (marginal revenue product of labor)
Demand1" = new labor demand curve after decline in product demand
w = wage in a fixed-wage firm
w' = base wage in a profit-sharing firm
c = total compensation in a profit-sharing firm

*M
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This incentive to hire more workers is the driving force in the share
economy theory. If new workers enter the labor market, the fixed-wage
firm would be indifferent about hiring them until the new workers
could bid wages down sufficiently. However, the profit-sharing firm,
desiring more than LQ workers, would quickly snatch them up:
A share system looks very much like a labor-shortage economy. Share
firms ever hungry for labor are always on the prowl cruising around
like vacuum cleaners on wheels, searching in nooks and crannies for
extra workers to pull in at existing compensation parameter values
(Weitzman 1984: 98-9).

Therefore, in full-employment equilibrium, compensation and
employment levels of the two types of firms are similar. The behavioral
differences occur when there is reduced demand for the company's
products (shifting the labor demand curve inward). A key result of this
theory is that profit sharing induces greater employment and output
stability than does a system with short-run fixed wages. If wages
remain fixed, a negative demand shock (shifting the labor demand
curve inward to Demand* in the bottom two diagrams of figure 4.1)
leads to layoffs in a fixed-wage firm, with a resulting employment level
of LZ (in the bottom left diagram). However, the similar shock does not
lead to layoffs in a profit-sharing firm, where the new desired L^ is still
greater than the old L,. Layoffs will occur only if the new L2 is less than
the old Io, and even then they will be smaller than layoffs by the fixedwage firm. Employee compensation in the profit-sharing firm is
decreased, but this decrease is not driving the incentive to retain work
ers; rather, the lower fixed cost of labor hours perceived by the firm is
driving this incentive.
While this theory predicts that profit sharing will be associated with
fewer layoffs, one must also consider voluntary labor turnover. By
decreasing employee compensation, a negative demand shock may
cause workers to seek work elsewhere or drop out of the labor force. In
the case of an idiosyncratic demand shock that affects only one or a
few firms, the short-run employment change is likely to be less in a
profit-sharing firm than in a fixed-wage firm. Due to the lowered com
pensation in the affected firm, some workers will seek work elsewhere
at the market compensation level, and the firm's compensation level
will gradually increase to the market level as workers leave and the

106 The Stability Theory

firm adjusts its base wage or profit-sharing rule. It is likely that volun
tary turnover will occur more slowly than would layoffs (due to worker
mobility and information costs), so that the short-run change in
employment is likely to be less for profit-sharing firms. (The adjust
ment path of employment and compensation also depends on the speed
of readjustment of pay parameters.)
In the case of a general negative demand shock, the short-run
employment changes are also likely to be smaller for profit-sharing
firms. As explained above, the profit-sharing firms are likely to have
fewer or no layoffs. In the extreme case of an equal demand shock
among all firms in a share economy, the decrease in average compensa
tion would be the same across all firms, and there would be no incen
tive for workers to voluntarily switch firms (although some may leave
the labor force). In the case of an unequal demand shock, however,
workers will choose to switch from the harder-hit firms to the firms
that are less hard hit, due to the relatively higher average compensation
in the latter. The former will experience an employment decrease, and
the latter an employment increase, with near-full employment being
maintained. For the individual firm, any decrease in employment under
profit sharing is likely to be less than under the wage system since
there will be fewer layoffs in the former, and the lowered average com
pensation in the former reduces the extent to which workers can gain
through voluntary job-switching. (Again, the timing of the change
would depend on the speed of turnover and readjustment of pay param
eters.)
How do the systems respond to a positive demand shock? In the
case of a positive demand shock starting from full employment, the
behavior would be similar. Additional hiring by any type of firm is
only possible if employee compensation is increased, luring new work
ers into the workforce. Intuitively, a positive demand shock creates a
temporary excess demand for labor in a fixed-wage economy to match
the permanent excess demand for labor in a profit-sharing economy, so
that the employment behavior is similar. If the positive demand shock
represented a recovery from a previous negative demand shock, the
theory's prediction is that profit-sharing firms would hire back fewer
workers than would fixed-wage firms, simply because profit-sharing
firms laid off fewer to begin with.
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The stability theory therefore predicts that a profit-sharing economy
will have more employment stability with negative shocks and recov
ery from negative shocks than will a fixed-wage economy, and similar
behavior under new positive shocks. In a mixed profit-sharing/fixedwage economy this conclusion should remain true, since the microeconomic incentives for each type of firm remain the same. The issue is
complicated by the possibility that, given a general negative demand
shock, some workers may leave profit-sharing firms to search for jobs
at the fixed-wage firms that maintain higher compensation in the short
run; this would be mitigated, however, by the increased unemployment
from the fixed-wage firm layoffs. Also, in this situation a profit-sharing
firm may be more likely to see an employment increase, since it would
stand willing to hire the workers laid off by the fixed-wage firms.
This theory has engendered a substantial amount of debate. There
have been five major objections. First, employed workers will resist
the hiring of new workers, since the pay of employed workers would
be decreased (Summers 1986). Second, as mentioned in chapter 3,
employers may be reluctant to invest in new capital since some of the
resulting profits would have to be shared with workers (Summers
1986; Estrin, Jones, and Svejnar 1987). Third, if labor productivity
depends on worker compensation, as predicted by some efficiency
wage theories, the excess demand for labor property would be lost
since hiring new workers would lower the productivity of all workers
(Levine 1987, 1989). Fourth, if tax incentives are granted for profit
sharing, employers and employees may design "cosmetic" schemes to
gain tax advantages without the desirable properties of "true" profitsharing (Estrin, Jones, and Svejnar 1987). Finally, in full-employment
equilibrium firms may regard average compensation as the cost of an
extra labor hour (due to the labor supply constraint), which would
eliminate excess demand for labor (Nordhaus 1988). (For responses to
several of these criticisms see Weitzman 1986 and 1988.)5
There are two key propositions that emerge from the theory of the
share economy:
1. Firms do not view profit-sharing payments as part of the short-run
marginal cost of labor in making their employment decisions; and
2. Firms that pay part of their compensation in the form of profit
shares will have greater employment stability than non-profit-
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sharing firms, particularly with regard to negative demand
shocks.

Prior Research

Research on these two propositions of the stability theory is not as
extensive as research on the productivity theory. The fifteen empirical
studies are summarized in table 4.1.6 In the studies that use firm or
aggregate data (except Gerhart 1991; and Kraft 1991), the level or
change in employment is used as the dependent variable. Tests of prop
osition 1 have used the profit-sharing bonus/wage ratio (B/W) as an
explanatory variable, whereas tests of proposition 2 have used the sim
ple existence of profit sharing, or percent of workers covered, as
explanatory variables.
Proposition 1, that profit shares are not viewed as part of the mar
ginal cost of employing labor, has been addressed in two studies with
aggregate data on the Japanese bonus system (with favorable evidence
provided by Freeman and Weitzman 1987, and unfavorable evidence
from Estrin, Grout, and Wadhwani 1987). Also, six studies have
employed firm-level datasets from Great Britain, France, and the
United States (with favorable evidence from Bradley, Estrin, and Taylor 1990; Estrin and Wilson 1989; and Kruse 1991b; unfavorable evi
dence from Wadhwani and Wall 1990; and Fitzroy and VaughanWhitehead 1989; and mixed evidence from Jones and Pliskin (199la).
Proposition 2, that profit-sharing firms will have greater stability,
has been addressed in nine studies. Bell and Neumark (1993) analyze
profit sharing in U.S. union contracts, finding that the adoption of a
profit-sharing provision is associated with higher employment growth
and lower variability than previously, though the possibility of no
change in behavior cannot be rejected. Chelius and Smith (1990) find
that in response to sales decreases, U.S. profit-sharing small businesses
have smaller employment decreases than do comparable non-profitsharing firms. Also, they find that workers who were in a profit-sharing
plan were less likely to report having been laid off in the previous year,
controlling for individual characteristics and industry employment
trends. Kraft (1991) finds that West German firms with profit-sharing

Table 4.1 Profit Sharing and Employment Stability Studies
Data source
Study
Disaggregated data

Unit of
analysis

N

Time period

Profit-sharing
measures

U.S. publicly traded
firms with union
Bell and
Neumark 1993 constracts

Firm

204

1978-87

Dummy for PS
negotiated in union
contract

Large British retail
chains (one with PS)

Firm

5

1971-85
(balanced)

PS dummy and B/W

Bradley and
Estrinl990

Chelius and
Smith 1990
Estrin and
Wilson 1989

(1) U.S. small
businesses
(2) Quality of
Employment Survey
British firms in
metalworking and
engineering

PS dummy and B/W
(cash and deferred
plans)

Firm

2997 1987

Persons

404

1977

PS dummy

Firm

52

1978-82
(balanced)

PS dummy and B/W

Main results
Weakly favorable: adoption of PS in
union contract associated with higher
employment growth and lower
employment variability, though effects
not statistically significant
Mixed: PS firm had higher
employment than others, and B/W
positively related to employment
changes, but similar employment
changes over the business cycle
Generally favorable: PS firms have
smaller employment decreases when
sales decline; result is stronger for PS
dummy than for B/W
Favorable: workers in PS plans were
less likely to be laid off in previous year
Generally favorable: authors reject
hypothesis that PS payments are part of
the marginal cost of labor

Study

Data source

Unit of
analysis

n

U.S. publicly traded
firms in
manufacturing

Firm

132

French
manufacturing firms

Firm

116

Florkowski
1991

U.S. publicly traded
firms

Firm

516

Gerhart 1991

Exempt employees,
U.S. business units

Firm

156

Jones and
Pliskin 1989

British firms in
printing, footwear,
and clothing

Firm

127

Kraftl991

West German firms

Firm

62

Finseth 1988
Fitzroy and
VaughanWhitehead
1989

Profit-sharing
measures

Main results
Mixed: B/W more responsive than W
to changes in profits, mixed results on
PS dummy and B/W stability (PS increases employment
when profits/L is used as demand
(both cash and
1971-85
measure)
(balanced) deferred plans)
Mixed: profit share per worker
negatively related to employment, but
PS dummy and profit cash PS firms maintain higher
1983-85
employment in downturn
(balanced) share per worker
Mixed: pre/post comparisons for
profit-sharing adopters found greater
postadoption stability only in 5- and 61971-87
year comparisons
(balanced) PS dummy
Favorable: higher B/W associated with
lower variability of exempt
employment, controlling for variability
B/W, net of human
1981-85
(unbalanced) capital and job factors of firm performance
Mixed: PS dummy associated with
lower employment, but B/W
coefficient sensitive to whether
1890-1975
(unbalanced) PS dummy and B/W measures of worker part are included
Favorable: PS firms had lower
dismissal rate
1977, 1979 PS dummy

Time period

PS dummy, and
percent of workers
covered (deferred
plans)

Kruse 1991a

U.S. publicly
traded firms

Firm

1971-85
1383 (balanced)

Kruse 1991b

U.S. publicly
traded firms

Firm

568

1980-86
(unbalanced) B/W

Firm

101

1972-82
(balanced)

Wadhwaniand British publicly
Wall 1990
traded firms
Aggregate data

PS dummy and B/W

Estrin, Grout,
andWadhwani Japanese aggregate
1987
data

Aggregate
economy

1959-83

B/W

Freeman and
Weitzman
1987

Aggregate
economy
and manuf.

1959-83

B/W

Japanese aggregate
and industry-level
data

NOTES: PS = profit sharing, B/W = profit-sharing bonus/wage, W = wage.

Generally favorable: PS associated
with more stability in the face of
negative demand shocks in
manufacturing, but not in
nonmanufacturing
Generally favorable: PS payments,
unlike wages and defined benefit
payments, do not appear to be treated as
part of marginal cost of labor
Unfavorable: Both PS measures
statistically insignificant, but
magnitudes indicate B/W depresses
employment more than wages do
Unfavorable: wages and bonuses have
slightly positive, insignificant
coefficients, when controlling for
capital and not output (in contrast to
Freeman and Weitzman)
Favorable: Bonus appears to have
profit-sharing components, and, unlike
wages, relates positively to
employment (controlling for output
changes)
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plans in 1977 and 1979 had lower dismissal rates. Mixed evidence is
provided by Finseth (1988), using a sample of U.S. publicly traded
manufacturing firms, while unfavorable evidence is provided by Brad
ley, Estrin, and Taylor (1990), who study one British profit-sharing
firm relative to four competitors. Smaller employment decreases in
economic downturns were detected by Fitzroy and Vaughan-Whitehead (1989) for French firms with cash profit-sharing plans. Looking at
employment changes in relation to aggregate and industry measures of
economic activity, reveals a similar pattern of smaller decreases during
downturns (Kruse 1991a) for U.S. publicly traded manufacturing
firms, although not for nonmanufacturing firms. This data source was
examined (using a repeated ANOVA technique) by Florkowski (1991),
comparing firm stability before and after the adoption of a deferred
profit-sharing plan; his findings were that greater postadoption stability
was detected only for the five- and six-year comparisons, concentrated
among firms that adopted profit-sharing between the two recessions of
the period. Finally, Gerhart (1991) used data on exempt employees
from 156 business units over the 1981-85 period. Organizations that
had a higher average ratio of bonus to base pay for exempt employees
had lower variability for exempt employment (controlling for variabil
ity in profits, sales, total assets, and stockholders' equity).
Prior research produces no clear conclusion on the relationship of
employment and profit sharing. While the productivity theory lends
itself to fairly standard tests using a production function, there has
been a much greater variety of techniques used to examine the stability
theory. Almost all of the studies that directly measure stability find
some evidence of profit sharing being associated with greater stability,
though the studies on how the profit share is treated in employment
decisions are more mixed. Whether these differences in employment
behavior are in fact due to profit sharing, or to other company charac
teristics, is a key question.

Does Profit Sharing Imply Lower Wages?

The driving force behind the share economy theory is that the per
ceived short-run cost of labor is lower for profit-sharing firms than for
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fixed-wage firms in other words, profit sharing substitutes for a por
tion of fixed wages and benefits. If, however, the profit share is simply
added to the fixed wages and benefits i.e., it is simply "gravy" no
employment benefits would be predicted. This is complicated some
what by higher pay which may result from higher company productiv
ity, if the productivity theory applies. As will be discussed later, the
profit share is only considered "gravy" if it is added to regular pay for
the same level of employee performance; if however, employee perfor
mance is higher, then the profit share may substitute for regular pay in
compensating the higher performance (so that the stability theory may
still apply).
There are very few studies on the relative earnings of profit-sharing
participants. Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler (1990) use a 1974 compen
sation survey by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and find that total com
pensation per hour and wage per hour are higher in firms with profitsharing bonus payments.7 In a 1988 survey, the U.S. Chamber of Com
merce (1989) found similar results for nonmanufacturing firms, but not
for manufacturing firms. For nonmanufacturing firms, compensation
other than the profit share (adjusted for industry differences) averaged
$14.06 for profit-sharing firms and $13.53 for non-profit-sharing firms.
In contrast, excluding the profit share, manufacturing profit-sharing
firms had average compensation of $14.89, compared to $15.08 for
non-profit-sharing firms.8 This would imply potentially stabilizing
effects of profit sharing in manufacturing but not in nonmanufacturing.
Limited evidence on the substitution between profit sharing and
other wages and benefits comes from union contracts. Mitchell, Lewin,
and Lawler document the extent of profit sharing in concession bar
gaining: 36 percent of the U.S. union contracts with profit-sharing pro
visions in the 1981-88 period included first-year wage decreases, while
only 14 percent of contracts without profit sharing involved first-year
wage decreases.9 Bell and Neumark (1993) found that, among manu
facturing workers covered by negotiated contracts that included profit
sharing in the 1979-88 period, over half of the workers also had wage
concessions in 1982, 1983, and 1986, but not in other years. 10 Subse
quent to adoption of contracts with profit sharing, they find that labor
costs grew more slowly relative both to industry trends and preadoption firm trends. The association with concessions has clearly wors
ened the image of profit sharing in the eyes of unionists. 11 Finally,
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limited evidence from the United Kingdom and Germany goes against
the idea of a trade-off between profit sharing and other pay. Average
pay in British engineering and metalworking firms, excluding the
profit share, was higher in profit-sharing firms for four of the five years
between 1978 and 1982 (Estrin and Wilson 1989). Similarly, German
evidence indicates that profit sharing is associated with higher individ
ual wages (Hart and Hubler 1991; Hubler 1993) and higher average
pay in manufacturing firms (Carstensen, Gerlach, and Hubler 1992).
The relative pay of profit-sharing companies is examined here in
several different ways. To adjust for industry differences, each com
pany's average compensation was divided by its industry average com
pensation. 12 Because fewer than half of the firms with public stock
report their total labor expenses, the calculations of average compensa
tion per worker are based on a substantially restricted sample. Due to
the small sample size, for most of the comparisons in this section it is
not possible to rule out random sampling error; the results are pre
sented simply as indicative, without any strong claims about compen
sation patterns in profit-sharing firms.
Table 4.2 examines just those firms reporting both labor expenses
and profit share in the 1975-90 period (number of firms = 30, with 254
observations). Including the profit share, total compensation was
slightly higher than industry averages among all profit-sharing compa
nies (indicated by both the mean and median values), while excluding
the profit share leads to compensation slightly below the industry aver
age. 13 Separate computations for the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing companies indicate that the average compensation levels (both
with and without profit share) for profit-sharing firms are lower than
industry averages for manufacturing firms, but higher for nonmanufacturing firms.
Yearly growth in average compensation (relative to the industry) is
presented on the right side of table 4.2. There it can be seen that the
growth levels of these companies were slightly lower than industry
averages: within these profit-sharing companies, mean yearly growth
of all compensation lagged 0.03 percent behind industry averages,
while mean yearly growth of compensation excluding the profit share
lagged 0.10 percent behind industry averages.
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Table 4.2 Compensation in Profit-Sharing Companies, With and
Without Profit Share, as Percent of Industry Average
______Compensation___________________________
Sample: 30 companies reporting both profit share and labor expenses within 1975-90.
All figures are on per employee basis.
Median

Levels
Mean

Median

Yearly growth
Mean

N

All
compensation
Excluding
profit share

102.7

103.8

(25.4)

254

-0.20

-0.03

(5.7)

216

97.3

97.6

(22.2)

254

-0.26

-0.10

(5.4)

216

NOTES: Compensation is calculated as a percentage of industry average compensation per
employee, for each year, from the National Income and Product Accounts. The upper and lower
1 percent of the levels and growth variables have been trimmed.

A different approach is taken in table 4.3, which includes all firms
reporting labor expenses in any year of the period (not just those
reporting the profit share). 14 The levels and growth of compensation are
reported for three groups: non-profit-sharing companies, "old" profitsharing companies (in which profit sharing was adopted prior to 1975),
and "new" profit-sharing companies (in which profit sharing was
adopted in 1975 or later). For the new profit-sharing companies, fig
ures are presented for preadoption, year before adoption, year of adop
tion, and postadoption (only for companies that report labor expenses
both before and after adoption). This enables one to examine the possi
bility that high-compensation firms, or firms with faster growth in
compensation, were more or less likely to adopt profit sharing.
A striking finding from table 4.3 is that the old profit-sharing (old
PS) firms had higher levels of compensation than did either the non
profit-sharing (non-PS) or post-1975 adopter (new PS) firms. Mean
compensation for the old PS firms was 108.2 percent of the industry
average across the entire period (line 5), compared to 95.1 percent for
the non-PS firms (line 4), and 98.7 percent for preadoption and 96.3
percent for postadoption for the new PS firms (Hues 6 and 9). The dif
ference between average preadoption and postadoption compensation
is reported on line 10, where the mean of 0.9 percent and median of 1.9
percent indicates that total compensation (relative to industry aver
ages) rose slightly after adoption. 15 Given that this slight rise in total

Table 43 Levels and Growth of Compensation as Percent of Industry Average

1991
1. Non-PS
2. Pre-1975 adopters
3. Post- 1975 adopters
Entire period
4. Non-PS
5. Pre-1975 adopters
Post-1975 adopters
6. Preadoption
7. Prior year
8. Adoption year
9. Postadoption
10. Difference between
average pre- and
postadoption

Levels
Median

Mean

(s.d.)

100.5
109.2
100.9

(22.0)
(26.6)
(16.2)

97.6
104.5
100.4

56
18
23

0.4
-2.3

95.1
108.2

(20.3)
(29.5)

92.8
103.3

98.7
97.8
97.9
96.3

(18.1)
(17.0)
(17.1)
(14.9)

0.9

(10.4)

n

Mean

Yearly growth
(s.d.)
Median

n

0.8
-1.6

0.3

(4.7)
(6.2)
(4.1)

0.4

53
18
21

2014
651

0.3
0.4

(5.2)
(6.2)

0.0
0.6

1817
579

98.8
93.3
97.2
95.7

397
33
34
213

0.4
0.1
-0.1
0.4

(5.5)
(6.3)
(6.1)
(5.2)

0.4
0.1
0.2
0.5

354
32
33
204

1.9

42

0.2

(3.5)

0.2

35

NOTES: Compensation is calculated as a percentage of industry average compensation per employee, for each year, from the National Income and Prod
uct Accounts. The upper and lower 1 percent of the compensation levels and growth variables have been trimmed.
PS = profit sharing.
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compensation is less than the average value of profit sharing for this
sample (the mean and median profit shares are approximately 3.5 per
cent of payroll), it appears that at least some of the profit share is com
ing at the expense of existing compensation for the post-1975 adopters.
For the old PS firms, the much higher mean and median compensation
levels makes it appear that profit sharing may simply be added on to
existing compensation.
There appears to be very little difference in average compensation
growth among the three groups of firms. The old PS firms had mean
growth of compensation exceeding industry growth by 0.4 percent per
year (line 5), compared to 0.3 percent per year for the non-PS firms
(line 4). For the adopters, the preadoption and postadoption growth
means were 0.4 percent per year Qines 6 and 9), although mean com
pensation growth in the adoption year and prior year was lower (lines 7
and 8), possibly indicating that profit sharing was adopted during times
of financial stress.
Therefore there may be a fundamental difference between old and
new PS firms: the old PS firms appear to pay better than industry aver
ages, while the new PS firms do not.
Pay levels are obviously subject to many influences. Estimates were
made of the relationship of profit sharing to 1991 compensation and to
compensation growth over the full period, after controlling for the
effects of unionization, defined benefit plans, and ESOPs. 16 A summary
of key results is presented in table 4.4 (based on estimates presented in
appendix table A4.1). The results are similar to those presented in table
4.3. Relative to non-profit-sharing companies, the presence of old
profit sharing is associated with 11-14 percent higher compensation in
1991 (similar to table 4.3), while the presence of new profit sharing is
associated with 7-9 percent lower compensation (unlike the pattern
from table 4.3). Unionization of the workforce is associated with
higher levels of compensation (consistent with the large literature sur
veyed by Lewis (1986), but this effect depends on whether a majority
of union members are covered by profit sharing. If not, the union wage
effect (for average union coverage) is 9.0 percent. However, if a major
ity of union members is covered by profit sharing, the union wage
effect is only 2.0 percent. It is likely that this largely reflects the adop
tion of profit sharing in exchange for union wage and benefit conces
sions in the early and mid-1980s.17

Table 4.4 Summary Results on Compensation and Profit Sharing
Based on regressions presented in appendix table A4.1. Compensation is measured as the company's labor expenses per employee, which is
divided by the industry's average compensation per employee (calculated from National Income and Product Accounts data). Controls in
regressions include defined benefit plans and ESOPs.
1991 compensation levels
Yearly compensation growth
Estimated difference in 1991 compensation associated with
Estimated difference in yearly compensation growth associated with
Presence of pre-1975 PS8
11.3% to 13.8% Presence of pre-1975 PSa
-0.1%
Presence of post-1975 PSa
-9.2% to -7.1% Post-1975 PS plan8
Average proportion unionized
Year of adoption
-0.3%
If majority of union members are covered by PSb
Year after adoption
2.0%
1.7%
If majority of union members are not covered by PSb
9.0%
Subsequent trend
0.8%
Average proportion unionized5
-0.1%
Estimated difference in 1991 nonpension compensation
Estimated difference in yearly growth in nonpension compensation
associated with
associated with
Cash/combination plana
Presence of cash/combination PS plan
2.5% to 6.1%
Year of adoption
-1.9%
Presence of deferred PS plan8
-4.5& to -4.6% Year following adoption
0.2%
Average proportion unionized
Subsequent trend
0.5%
If majority of union members are covered by PSb
-3.1%
Deferred plan8
If majority of union members are not covered by PSb
5.7%
Year of adoption
-1.5%
Year following adoption
-0.3%
Subsequent trend
-0.2%
Average proportion unionized5
0.0%
NOTES: The majority of these estimates are not significantly different from zero, due in part to the small number of firms reporting labor expenses. The
estimates should therefore be seen only as indicative. PS = profit sharing.
a. Profit-sharing estimates are relative to nonprofit-sharing companies.
b. Union estimates based on difference between nonunion company (0 percent coverage) and average union coverage (35 percent).
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The results of analyzing compensation growth across the entire
period are summarized on the right side of table 4.4. There it can be
seen that the presence of old PS had a slight negative effect (-0.1 per
cent per year), while the initial adoption of profit sharing was associ
ated with a small decrease (-0.3 percent) in the adoption year, a 1.7
percent increase in the following year, and a 0.7 percent increase in
subsequent years. 18 The increases after the adoption year may clearly
be related to higher company productivity of adopters, as explored in
chapter 3. 19
On the bottom of table 4.4 are summaries of results that analyze
non-pension compensation (as a proportion of industry average com
pensation), and divide profit-sharing plans into cash/combination plans
vs. deferred plans to examine whether there are distinct effects of these
plans on nonpension compensation. As can be seen, the presence of
cash/combination plans is associated with slightly higher overall com
pensation, while the presence of deferred plans is associated with
slightly lower compensation. When a majority of union members is not
covered by profit sharing, the union effect on nonpension compensa
tion is estimated at 5.7 percent (for average levels of coverage), while
the effect is estimated as slightly negative (-3.1 percent) if a majority is
covered (again reflecting the union wage concessions of the early
1980s). The adoptions of both cash/combination and deferred profitsharing plans are accompanied by a slight decrease in overall compen
sation, and postadoption trends are positive for cash/combination plans
but negative for deferred plans (again possibly reflecting larger pro
ductivity gains among companies adopting cash plans).
Does profit sharing imply lower wages or other benefits? The princi
pal conclusion from the variety of evidence presented here is that there
may be a substantial difference between old and new profit-sharing
companies. The old profit-sharing companies had average compensa
tion levels over the 1970-90 period that were higher when compared to
the industry, new profit-sharing companies, and non-profit-sharing
companies. This provides little evidence that profit sharing traded off
against other wages and benefits for these companies it may have
been "gravy" for the employees (consistent with the analysis of 1974
data in Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler 1990). Compensation growth kept
up with industry averages for these companies.
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For new profit-sharing companies, on the other hand, several pieces
of evidence point to more of a trade-off between profit sharing and
other compensation. Average compensation levels in these companies
are lower than industry averages, as indicated by both simple compari
sons and regressions. While the adoption of profit sharing in this sam
ple is associated with an initial slight decline in compensation, the
subsequent positive trend leads most of the adopters to have an
increase in average compensation levels between pre- and postadoption periods (with a mean increase of 0.9 percent and a median of 1.9
percent). The overall increase in average compensation levels may
reflect the sharing of benefits from higher productivity, as found in
chapter 3. For the stability theory, the key element is whether base pay,
excluding profit share, has increased or decreased. Since the average
compensation increase is smaller than the typical profit share, it
appears likely that regular fixed pay (relative to industry trends) may
have slightly declined in a number of firms. The relationship of these
compensation changes to the stability theory will be discussed and
tested below. (Again, it should be cautioned that, due to the restricted
sample of companies reporting compensation data, these results should
be seen as indicative but not strong.)

Do Profit-sharing Contributions Act Like Wages?

Proposition 1 of the stability theory is that profit-sharing payments
are fundamentally different from straight wages in affecting employ
ment. An increase in wage rates will increase the cost of the last labor
hour employed (the marginal cost of labor), leading to lower employ
ment levels. If profit-sharing payments are simply "disguised
wages" that is, the employer views them as a standard cost of
employing labor then such payments should act like wages in affect
ing employment. If, on the other hand, the employer views them not as
a cost of employing labor, but as a "tax" on profits, then they should
not affect employment levels in the same way as straight wages. 20 As
displayed in table 4.1, this proposition has been addressed in eight
studies, with mixed results.
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The proposition that profit-sharing payments do not behave in the
same way as other wages and benefits is tested using a standard labor
demand function, relating employment levels to the cost of labor, aug
mented to separate profit sharing from other compensation. This
enables one to compare the employment effects of base wages to
profit-sharing payments.21 The base compensation measure is defined
as the (change in) average value of all compensation minus profit-shar
ing payments (including not just wage and salary payments, but all
compensation other than profit-sharing payments).22 The profit-sharing
measure is defined as the change in the company's profit-sharing con
tribution as a percentage of participant payroll. Since the average com
pensation measure is defined across all employees, the profit-sharing
measure is only meaningful when all or nearly all employees are par
ticipants. Therefore, profit-sharing companies with fewer than 90 per
cent of employees covered have been excluded. The profit-sharing
portion of compensation, which is used as an explanatory variable, suf
fers from a serious bias due to the fact that good performance by the
firm may increase both the profit share and the employment level,
causing a spurious positive association between the two; this bias is
corrected using the variables to predict profit-sharing adoption from
chapter 2* Finally, the estimates account for each company's change
in output (measured as the change in sales adjusted for inventory
changes) and time and industry effects.24
Results were calculated for five samples of firms. The first sample
includes only those firms that reported both labor expenses and profitsharing contribution in a given year. The remaining samples use pre
dictions of labor expenses and profit-sharing contributions to impute
values for these variables in four (progressively larger) samples: all
firms reporting the profit-sharing contribution for a given year; all
profit-sharing firms reporting labor expenses in a given year; all profitsharing firms; and finally, all profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing
firms.
The results (presented in appendix table A4.2) generally accord with
theoretical expectations, with some exceptions. The company's output
change is strongly positively related to employment changes, as
expected. Increases in base compensation are negatively related to
employment change in all but one estimate, with magnitudes generally
in line with past studies (see Hamermesh 1993 for a survey and Kruse
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19915 for a similar sample). The estimates are only significantly differ
ent from zero, though, in the two largest samples. The key variable of
interest is the change in the profit-sharing contribution, which attracts a
positive estimate in each column. Are the estimates equal between
profit sharing and base compensation changes? A test for equality
between the base compensation and profit-sharing estimates (reported
on the last row of appendix table A4.2), shows that the hypothesis of
no difference can be rejected at the 95 percent level for the largest two
samples.
These results appear generally favorable for proposition 1 of the sta
bility theory: profit-sharing payments do not appear to act like wages
in affecting desired employment levels. Exploration of alternative
methods for removing bias from the profit-sharing estimates, however,
revealed that the results were quite sensitive.25 While these results are
generally favorable to the stability theory, no firm conclusion is drawn
here regarding proposition 1.

Estimating the Stability Effects of Profit Sharing

Are profit-sharing firms more stable? The second proposition of
Weitzman's stability theory of profit sharing is that profit sharing will
increase the stability of employment. The theory predicts that, in the
long run, an economy of profit-sharing firms will have compensation
and employment levels equivalent to those in a fixed-wage economy.
Starting from an equilibrium setting, the predicted response to positive
demand shocks is equivalent for both economies; they both need to
increase compensation to draw more workers into the labor force. The
predicted response to negative demand shocks, however, is different:
fixed-wage firms see the current compensation per worker as part of
the cost of the last labor hour (the marginal cost of labor), and must lay
off workers, while profit-sharing firms view only the (lower) base com
pensation as part of the cost of the last labor hour, and will be less
likely to lay off workers (as illustrated in figure 4.1). In response to a
subsequent positive shock that restores the previous level of demand
and costs, the profit-sharing firms would also hire back fewer workers
than would fixed-wage firms to return to the equilibrium position.
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Simple comparisons of employment growth and stability are pre
sented in table 4.5, with comparisons between non-profit-sharing and
old and new profit-sharing firms, again using 1975 adoption as a cutoff
between the two profit-sharing groups.26 Average yearly employment
growth was 0.9 percent for non-profit-sharing firms (line 1), and 2.9
percent for old profit-sharing (old PS) firms (line 2). For new profitsharing (new PS) firms, average employment growth was 1.7 percent
prior to adoption, -0.5 percent during the year of adoption, and 2.2 per
cent after adoption (lines 3 to 5). These comparisons are made for the
paired differences in lines 6 to 9, and broken out for periods of rising
and falling unemployment in lines 10 to 17. In both rising and falling
unemployment, the old PS firms had higher average employment
growth than did their non-profit-sharing pairs. This was also true for
postadoption growth of new PS firms; however, prior to adoption and
during the year of adoption, the new PS firms had inferior employment
growth compared to their pairs when unemployment was rising.
This suggests that, prior to adoption, profit-sharing adopters may
have been more sensitive to recessionary shocks than their pairs. The
employment variability of firms is examined on the right side of table
4.S.27 The variability of employment is slightly higher for non-profitsharing companies (by comparing line 1 to lines 2 and 5), but the vari
ability of adopters is equivalent between pre- and postadoption peri
ods. The paired differences on lines 6 to 9 show that the old PS firms
had, on average, lower variability of employment than did their sameindustry pairs, while the profit-sharing adopters had a slight decline in
relative variability between preadoption and postadoption periods.
The simple comparisons suggest that profit sharing is associated
with higher employment growth, and that firms adopting profit sharing
were less stable prior to adoption (both in overall variability and in
responses to recessionary shocks). Employment behavior is here ana
lyzed more intensively with regressions that control for growth trends,
and separately examine positive and negative demand shocks using
several measures of such shocks.
There are potentially important differences in compensation
between old profit-sharing firms and new adopters in particular, the
profit share is more likely to be added onto regular compensation for
old profit-sharing firms, and more likely to substitute for other com
pensation for new adopters (as revealed in tables 4.3 and 4.4). Since

Table 4.5 Simple Comparisons on Employment Growth and Variability
Yearly percentage growth in
employment
Mean
N

Nonpaired values
1. Non-profit-sharing
2. Old (pre-1975) PS
New (post-1975) PS
3. Preadoption
4. Year of adoption
5. Postadoption
Paired differences between PS and NFS
6. Old (pre-1975) adopters
New (post-1975) adopters
7. Preadoption
8. Year of adoption
9. Postadoption
Periods of rising unemployment
10. Old (pre-1975) adopters
New (post-1975) adopters
11. Preadoption
12. Year of adoption
13. Postadoption

Std. dev. of change in ln(L), within
company
Mean
N

0.9
2.9

4807
1930

0.141
0.134

247
101

1.7
-0.5
2.2

1509
124
784

0.138

121

0.138

106

2.1 (3.30)

1505

-0.020 (1.45)

74

1.2 (1.99)
0.4 (0.13)
1.2 (1.19)

1210
98
648

0.019 (1.34)

99

0.008 (0.51)

78

1.4 (1.29)

514

-0.4 (0.39)
-6.9 (1.54)
1.1 (0.73)

478
23
166

Periods of falling unemployment

14. Old (pre-1975) adopters
New (post-1975) adopters
15. Preadoption
16. Year of adoption
17. Postadoption

2.5 (3.11)

911

2.1 (2.49)
3.7(1.13)
1.5 (1.21)

676
70
444

NOTES: Absolute values of /-statistics, testing whether paired difference equals zero, in parentheses. PS = profit sharing; NPS = nonprofit-sharing.
Paired differences represent value for PS company minus the value for its same-industry NPS pair.
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this distinction is crucial for the theory, the separate responses of old
profit-sharing firms and new adopters are broken out in most of the
estimates. This has the added advantage that the employment
responses of new adopters can be compared before and after the adop
tion of profit sharing giving an indication of whether the adopters
were particularly stable or unstable beforehand. To obtain estimates on
how firms responded to negative shocks prior to adoption, the adopters
sample is restricted to firms that adopted after the 1973-75 recession.
In addition (as with the estimates for proposition 1), the sample of
profit-sharing firms is restricted to those that had all or nearly all (90
percent or more) of their employees participating in profit sharing, so
that variations in overall company employment would be likely to
affect profit-sharing participants. 28
As with the productivity tests, estimates were made both from the
entire sample (with industry variables to control for general industry
growth and decline),29 and then for the within-industry paired data. To
allow for the possibility that defined benefit pension plans may have
effects on employment changes, and to control for any potential bias
created by their omission, the estimates include defined benefit plans
interacted with the demand shocks. To control for differential employ
ment growth, variables were included to capture growth trends of old
profit-sharing firms and new adopters (with separate terms for pre- and
postadoption periods). Several methods were used to control for poten
tial selection bias,30 and several extreme values of employment
changes were trimmed.31
Demand shocks are measured with two economy wide and one com
pany-specific measure: (1) change in the national unemployment rate,
(2) percentage change in Gross National Product, and (3) percentage
change in the company's sales. 32 The values for the first two measures,
and descriptive statistics for sales changes are given in appendix table
A4.3.
Why not use just the company's sales changes, since these are most
specific to the company? Ideally, the demand shocks will measure
inward shifts of the demand curve for the company's product. Sales
changes would appear to be the most specific to the company, but may
suffer from the following problem. The stability theory predicts not
only that employment will be more stable under profit sharing, but that
output will be more stable. When faced with negative demand shocks,
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profit-sharing firms are predicted to be more likely to keep employ
ment and output stable while cutting prices to sell the output. The prob
lem with using sales changes as a demand measure is that it is
impossible to distinguish changes in prices from changes in output. If
sales changes primarily reflect output changes (as in a competitive
market, or in an industry where price changes are highly correlated
across firms and are picked up by industry terms), then under the sta
bility theory, even if output and employment are more stable in the
profit-sharing firm, there may be no estimated effect of profit sharing
on employment stability (because the output-employment relationship
is the same between the two types of firms).33 If, in contrast, sales
changes combine both output changes and company-specific price
changes, then there should be an estimated effect of profit sharing on
employment stability. This would be the case in an imperfectly com
petitive market where, based on several assumptions about the struc
ture of costs and demand curves, it is estimated that the effect of sales
changes on employment changes for profit-sharing firms would be
approximately half the size of that for a non-profit-sharing firm.34
Since the stability theory predicts that both employment and output
will be more stable under profit sharing, sales changes may or may not
be an appropriate measure of demand shocks for the stability theory,
which is why two economywide measures are also used (with the
industry paired differences controlling for differential sensitivity to
demand shocks by industry).
Finally, it is necessary to discuss the appropriate method of examin
ing employment responses to demand shocks. As can be seen in figure
4.1, the relationship between profit sharing and demand shocks is not a
simple linear one. According to the stability theory, the profit-sharing
firm has a "cushion" of employees it will maintain in a demand shock
(representing the difference between L0 and Lj the excess demand for
labor); once this cushion is exhausted by a severe demand shock, it
will lay off workers at a pace just as rapid as that of the non-profitsharing firm. Therefore the relationship between profit sharing and
employment changes is discontinuous and depends on the degree to
which the profit share substitutes for regular compensation (i.e., the
gap between c and w1 in figure 4.1). If a subsequent positive shock
restores the previous level of demand, the profit-sharing firm will hire
back fewer people, since it laid off fewer to begin with. If starting from
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an initial equilibrium position, an increase in demand should cause the
responses to be the same between the two types of firms, since labor
would be available on the same conditions. However, the theory pre
dicts that profit-sharing firms are generally more willing than fixedwage firms to hire workers, so the employment response to a positive
shock in a time of unemployment may be even stronger for a profitsharing firm.
A full test of the stability theory therefore requires an estimate of the
predicted nonlinear relationship between demand shocks and employ
ment responses. A more complete discussion of the complicated rela
tionship between profit sharing and demand shocks is given in
appendix 4, where it is noted that the information required for a full
test is not available (in particular, the degree to which profit sharing
substitutes for fixed compensation, and an accurate measure of demand
shocks which distinguishes whether they represent recovery from pre
vious negative shocks). Some estimates will be reported which attempt
to approximate the conditions for a full test of the theory. Most of the
estimates presented, however, follows previous research by relying on
a simpler test of whether profit-sharing firms respond differently from
non-profit-sharing firms to positive and negative demand shocks.
Because the stability theory's predictions about behavior under nega
tive shocks are more straightforward, more attention will be paid to the
employment responses to negative shocks.

Does Profit Sharing Increase Stability of Employment?

Summary results on several employment stability tests are presented
in table 4.6 (based on estimates in appendix table A4.5). The employ
ment sensitivity of non-profit-sharing firms is presented on line 1,
where it can be seen that a 1 percent increase in GNP35 is associated
with a 1.3 percent increase in company employment (column 1), while
a 1 percent decrease in GNP is associated with a 1.2 percent decrease
in employment (column S).36 For old profit-sharing firms (that adopted
profit sharing prior to 1975), line 2 shows a slightly lower sensitivity to
GNP increases, and a slightly higher sensitivity to GNP decreases (nei-

Table 4.6 Summary Results on Employment Stability
^^

_______

______

*

__y__

*:_

*L _

___

_

_

___

Numbers represent estimated change in company employment for a 1 percent change in GNP, or in company sales.
Company sales
GNP
1 percent increase 1 percent decrease 1 percent increase 1 percent decrease
(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-1.1

0.5
0.6

0.6
0.6

-0.6
-0.5

-0.6
-0.5

0.0

-1.9
-1.2

0.4
0.5

0.5
0.7

-0.5
-0.6

-0.6
-0.5

1.3

-0.9

-0.9

0.5

0.6

-0.5

-0.6

0.7

0.7

-1.2

-1.8

0.5

0.6

-0.5

-0.6

0.3

0.6

-1.5

-2.1

0.5

0.5

-0.5

-0.5

0.6
0.4

0.6
1.1

-1.5
-1.0

-1.6
-1.5

0.5
0.4

0.5
0.5

-0.4
-0.4

-0.5
-0.4

(2)

(3)

1.3
1.0

0.9

-1.2
-1.5

0.8
1.4

0.9
1.4

1.3

(1)
Overall patterns
1 . Non-profit-sharing
2. Old PS
New PS
3. Preadoption
4. Postadoption
Unionization
5. Nonunion, non-profit-sharing
6. Average unionization,8
non-profit-sharing
Average unionization, a w/majority
of union members in PS
7. Old PS
New PS
8. Preadoption
9. Postadoption

-2.2***

Table on
which
results are
based
A4.5

A4.7

NOTES: Columns 1,3, 5, and 7 are based on regressions 3 and 5 of the indicated tables. Columns 2,4,6, and 8 are based on paired results in regressions
4 and 6 of indicated tables.
a. Assuming 37 percent of firm's workers are unionized (representing sample average for unionized firms).
***Difference between pre- and postadoption response is significant at p <.01.
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ther of which were significantly different from the non-profit-sharing
effects).37
Comparisons of employment stability before and after adoption of
profit sharing are presented on lines 3 and 4. Compared to non-profitsharing firms, under a positive shock the adopters were slightly less
likely to increase employment prior to adoption (line 3), and slightly
more likely after adoption 0ine 4). The notable difference appears for a
1 percent decline in GNP: prior to adoption the predicted employment
decrease was 2.2 percent, and after adoption was very close to zero
(column 3, lines 3 and 4). This change in sensitivity (unlike most of the
other estimates to be reviewed), is significantly different from zero (at
the 99 percent level). This same pattern is observed (but is no longer
statistically significant) in the paired results in column 4, where the
predicted employment decrease goes from a preadoption value of -1.9
percent to a postadoption value of -1.2 percent.38
These results may be more easily seen in figures 4.2 and 4.3, which
give the predicted employment paths of non-profit-sharing firms, and
old and new profit-sharing firms (under the assumption that the new
profit-sharing firms adopted it in 1978). There are two things to note.
First, the profit-sharing firms are faster-growing, with the new profitsharing firms showing faster growth both before and after the adoption.
Second, the sensitivity to negative shocks is seen by comparing the
1973-75 recession to the 1980-82 recession. In the earlier recession, all
three types of firms show employment declines, but the new profitsharing firms (prior to adoption) show the steepest decline.39 In the
1980-82 period, after adoption, the new profit-sharing firms show no
decline while the other two groups do show declines.
This appears to indicate that the new profit-sharing firms were par
ticularly susceptible to negative shocks prior to adoption, and much
less so afterwards. The results for the estimate on paired data are dis
played in figure 4.3, which show a slightly different story.40 The new
profit-sharing firms are again seen to have a steeper employment
decline than the old profit-sharing firms in the 1973-75 recession, but
the two groups show equivalent declines in the 1980-82 recession.41
Similarly, between the two periods the new profit-sharing firms show a
slight improvement relative to the non-profit-sharing firms. The pattern
makes it appear that the adopters were especially sensitive to negative
shocks prior to adoption, and less so afterwards.

131

Figure 4.2
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Predicted Employment
(regression 4, table A4.6)
160
150

140
t
4>

130

I

120
110
100
90 LJ——L

71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
Year

132 The Stability Theory

When demand shocks are measured by increases and decreases in
company sales (summarized in columns 5 to 8 of table 4.6), there are
no significant estimates indicating greater or less employment stability
among profit-sharing firms, either compared to non-profit-sharing
firms or to preadoption behavior. The decreased sensitivity to negative
aggregate shocks but not to negative sales shocks implies that sales
were more stable after adoption of profit sharing.
These estimates rely on a simple test of whether profit-sharing firms
have different responses to demand shocks than do non-profit-sharing
firms. As discussed in the preceding section and in appendix 4, the
actual relationship predicted by the stability theory is a discontinuous
nonlinear one, depending in part on whether or not the firm is recover
ing from a prior negative shock. A full test of the stability theory
requires information on the degree to which the profit share substitutes
for regular compensation, the relationship between wage levels and
desired employment, and prior negative shocks. Using several pieces
of data to make assumptions about these relationships, the results from
an approximation of a full test are presented in appendix table A4.6.42
Three main conclusions may be drawn from these approximations
of full tests. (1) Employment behavior of profit-sharing firms generally
appears to be different from that of non-profit-sharing firms.43
(2) Profit-sharing employment responses to demand shocks were
favorable, compared to non-profit-sharing responses, when firms were
not recovering from a prior negative shock.44 Specifically, the profitsharing firms had stronger employment responses to positive shocks,
and smaller responses to negative shocks than did the non-profit-shar
ing firms, and the pattern was generally favorable for the stability the
ory.45 (3) The situation was more mixed when firms were recovering
from a prior negative shock, with profit-sharing firms having a favor
able smaller response to further negative shocks and generally equal or
larger responses to positive shocks, though this latter finding does not
fit the theory since the theorized response should have been smaller.46
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Unions, Profit Sharing, and Employment Stability
The proportion of a company's workforce that is unionized may
have direct effects on employment stability, through union effects on
labor costs and rules governing employment adjustments within the
firm. While there have been a number of studies of union effects on
turnover and temporary layoffs, only Leonard (1986) has directly
examined the cyclical sensitivity of unionized vs. non-unionized firms.
His findings were that blue-collar employment in unionized plants in
California was less sensitive to changes in GNP than it was in non
union plants, and that there was little difference in termination and
new-hire rates.
Results on the relationship of unionism to demand shocks, and the
potential effects of having a majority of union members covered by
profit sharing, are summarized in table 4.6 (based on full results in
appendix table A4.7).47 The estimated employment responses of non
profit-sharing firms are given on line 5 (for nonunion firms), and line 6
(for union firms with average unionization). With respect to changes in
GNP, unionized firms have less favorable behavior: they have stronger
employment cutbacks when GNP decreases, and smaller employment
increases when GNP increases, than do nonunion firms. These differ
ences, however, are not estimated as statistically significant, and there
is no difference in sensitivity to company sales increases and
decreases.
Does union participation in profit sharing make a difference in com
pany employment responses? The results of table 4.4 indicate that
average pay is lower when a majority of union members participate in
profit sharing (essentially eliminating the union wage advantage), but
this may be counterbalanced by greater employment stability for these
union members. As summarized in table 4.6, there were no profit-shar
ing results that could be confidently established as significantly differ
ent from zero. For new profit-sharing firms, the pre- and postadoption
estimates showed a favorable decrease in sensitivity to negative shocks
(for example, prior to adoption the employment decline for a 1 percent
GNP decline was 1.5 percent to 1.6 percent, and after adoption was 1.0
percent to 1.5 percent, for a firm with average unionization and a
majority of employees covered by profit sharing). However, since this
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decline in sensitivity is never statistically significant, it is not a strong
result

Compensation Levels and Profit-sharing Effects on Stability
A clear prediction of the stability theory is that profit sharing will
have stabilizing effects only if the profit share substitutes (at least in
part) for regular fixed pay. If it does not, there is no difference in
employer views of the cost of maintaining profit-sharing and non
profit-sharing employees during business downturns.
Ideally one would have a measure of what total compensation levels
would have been for each profit-sharing firm in the absence of profit
sharing. Lacking this, there are two types of comparisons that can be
made. First, for the profit-sharing adopters, a longitudinal comparison
can be made between the preadoption and postadoption average com
pensation levels (adjusted for industry trends). Such a comparison in
table 4.3 showed that the median increase in compensation was almost
2 percent. Second, for the old profit-sharing firms, the only comparison
possible is a cross-sectional one with the non-profit-sharing firms. The
simple comparisons in table 4.3 show that the mean and median com
pensation levels are higher than industry averages among the old
profit-sharing firms.
Two methods are used here to examine the relationship of pay to sta
bilizing effects of profit sharing. First, an attempt is made to separate
companies in which profit sharing appears to substitute for base pay
from those in which it appears to add on to base pay. Second, to correct
for the effect that increased productivity may have on worker pay (if
the productivity theory applies), the potential stabilizing effects are
examined in relation to whether unit labor costs (labor expenses/out
put) have increased or decreased. These calculations are necessarily
restricted to the firms that reported labor expenses, and the resulting
small sample sizes imply that the results can only be seen as indicative.
There is no neat method of determining whether profit sharing sub
stitutes for other compensation, or is a pure add-on. The following
method should be seen as a rough approximation. For new profit-shar
ing companies, where the mean and median increases in compensation
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per employee (relative to the industry) were close to 2.0 percent, profit
sharing was designated as "substituting" for regular compensation if
the increase was less than 2.0 percent (and otherwise "adding" to regu
lar compensation). Since the median profit share as a percent of payroll
was 3.65 percent, compensation rises of less than 2 percent are likely
to represent a cut in other compensation, while rises of more than 2
percent represent little or no such cut.48 Such before/after comparisons
are not available for the old profit-sharing companies; therefore for
these companies the compensation ratio was averaged across all years
for which the company reported labor expenses, to create a measure of
whether a company, on average, paid better or worse than its industry.
If this figure indicated that a profit-sharing company exceeded industry
averages by more than 2 percent, then the profit sharing was desig
nated to be "substituting" for regular compensation (and otherwise
"adding" to regular compensation).49
The results of using this approximation of whether profit sharing
substitutes or adds on to regular pay are summarized in columns 1 and
2 of table 4.7.50 Some support for the stability theory is provided by the
results for new profit-sharing companies, though not for old profitsharing companies. Focusing on the new profit-sharing companies,
those in which profit sharing "substituted" for base pay had employ
ment decreases of only 0.1 percent after adoption, compared to 0.4 per
cent before adoption, in response to a 1 percent sales decline (column
2, rows 3 and 4 of table 4.7). The postadoption response is significantly
different from the non-profit-sharing employment response (0.7 per
cent decline), but the pre/post difference is not statistically significant.
The corresponding figures for companies where the profit share was
more likely to be an add-on are a 0.8 percent decline prior to adoption,
and a 0.9 percent decline after adoption. The pattern for old profit-shar
ing firms is the opposite: in response to a 1 percent sales decline, those
that paid less than 102 percent of the industry average pay had slightly
stronger employment responses (0.8 percent decline) than the higherpaying profit-sharing firms (0.5 percent decline) (lines 2 and 5 of col
umn 2). Neither of these responses, though, was significantly different
from the non-profit-sharing response.
Some support for the stability theory is therefore provided by the
pattern of responses to negative shocks for new profit-sharing firms,
though not for old profit-sharing firms. A flaw in looking at pay levels
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Table 4.7

Summary Results on Compensation Levels and Employment

______Changes_______________________________
Numbers represent estimated change in company employment for a 1 percent change
in company sales.
By whether profit-sharing By whether profit sharing
"substitutes" or is "added "substitutes" or is "added
on" to regular pay per
on" to regular pay in
relation to output6
employee8
1 percent
1 percent
1 percent
1 percent
increase in decrease in increase in decrease in
sales
sales
sales
sales
(3)
(4)
(1)
(2)
(percent)
(percent)
-0.7
-0.7
1. Non-profit sharing
0.5
0.5
Profit-sharing "substitutes"
for regular pay
0.9**
0.9**
-0.8
-0.6
2. Old profit sharing
New profit sharing
-0.4
-0.9
3. Preadoption
0.3
0.3
-0.1**
-0.1**
0.4
4. Postadoption
0.3
Profit sharing "added on"
to regular pay
5. Old profit sharing
New profit sharing
6. Preadoption
7. Postadoption

0.5

-0.5

0.7

-0.8

0.3
0.2**

-0.8
-0.9

0.4
0.0**

-0.4
-0.6

NOTES: **Significantly different from non-profit-sharing response at the 95 percent level,
a. Based on column 1 of appendix table A4.8. Profit sharing assumed to "substitute" for regular
pay if average compensation in old PS firm is less than 102 percent of industry average, or if
average compensation in new PS firm went up by less than 2 percent. Profit sharing assumed to
"add on" to regular pay if these conditions do not hold. The ratio of company to industry com
pensation per employee is determined for each year, and the ratio is averaged across all years for
old PS companies. For adopters, it is averaged across all preadopdon, and then across postadoption years, to determine if average compensation increased.
b. Based on column 2 of appendix table A4.8. Profit sharing assumed to "substitute" for regular
pay in relation to output if average unit labor costs in old PS firm are lower than industry aver
age, or if average unit labor costs in new PS firm, relative to industry, declined. Profit sharing
assumed to "add on" to regular pay if these conditions do not hold. The ratio of company to
industry unit labor costs is determined for each year, and the ratio is averaged across all years for
old PS companies. For adopters, it is averaged across all preadoption, and then across postadoption, year, to determine if average unit labor costs increased. Unit labor costs are measured as
(labor expenses)/(sales+inventory change). See text for further discussion.
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is that they are plausibly related to worker productivity if there is a
positive productivity effect of profit sharing (as explored in chapter 3),
this should increase worker pay. An increase in worker pay after the
adoption of profit sharing may not indicate that profit sharing is simply
"gravy" on top of base pay; instead, it may reflect a return to increased
effort and productivity by the workers. The appropriate measure is not
necessarily pay per worker, but pay per unit of worker performance
(either quantity or quality of work). Even if overall pay (base pay plus
profit share) per worker has increased, the increased performance may
mean that base pay relative to worker performance has declined. To
use a simple illustration: if worker performance has increased by 10
percent, and has helped create a 10 percent profit-sharing bonus on top
of base pay, the worker's base pay in relation to his or her performance
has declined. Therefore the profit share is "substituting" for fixed pay
in relation to the worker's performance. In this case, profit sharing may
still have a stabilizing effect: the employer would have a strong incen
tive to maintain the workforce under a decline in product demand (pro
vided the higher performance is maintained).
This means that the productivity and stability theories are not neces
sarily at odds with each other. If profit sharing does increase productiv
ity and pay levels, the stability theory may still apply. In looking at
whether profit sharing substitutes for base pay, how can one control for
the effects of higher productivity on pay? One method is to calculate
labor expenses as a proportion of the value of output (producing a mea
sure of unit labor costs). Profit sharing may increase productivity (out
put per employee) as well as pay (compensation per employee), but
unit labor costs (compensation/output) will only increase if the pay
increase exceeds the productivity increase. Therefore the change in
unit labor costs is a separate measure of whether profit sharing is sub
stituting for, or adding onto, base pay.51
Support for the stability theory is stronger when pay substitution is
measured in this way (table 4.7, columns 3 and 4). Where profit shar
ing appears to have substituted for base pay in relation to output, the
employment response to negative shocks were much better after adop
tion than before. The preadoption response to a 1 percent sales decline
was -0.9 percent (compared to -0.7 percent for non-profit-sharing
firms), and after adoption was only -0.1 percent, with the change being
statistically significant (lines 1, 3, and 4 of column 4). For the old
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profit-sharing firms, the response to negative shocks was insignifi
cantly lower, but to positive shocks was significantly higher, compared
to non-profit-sharing firms (line 2). In contrast, where profit sharing
appears to have added on to regular pay in relation to output, there are
no significant differences between profit-sharing and non-profit-shar
ing employment responses (except for a much lower postadoption
response to positive shocks, as shown in line 7).
It definitely appears that compensation is an important variable in
the stability effects of profit sharing. Both methods indicated that,
when profit shares appear to partially substitute for base compensation,
profit-sharing adopters had smaller employment cutbacks after adop
tion than before in response to negative demand shocks.52 This was not
true of companies where the profit share appeared to add on to regular
compensation. While consistent with the stability theory, this result
should only be seen as indicative due to the small number of firms
reporting sufficient compensation data.

Stability Effects of Cash and Deferred Plans, Different Plan
Formulas, and Occupational Participation

Several other features of profit sharing may make a difference in the
stability effects, including the type of plan and the type of employees
covered.
There may be differences in the stabilizing effects of profit sharing
according to how the profit share is distributed. Since deferred profit
sharing is a form of pension plan, employers may see contributions to
such plans as more of a company obligation to ensure retirement secu
rity, so that they are less likely to be cut in business downturns.53
Profit-sharing plans were divided into those that have a cash compo
nent (including combination plans where a portion may be deferred),
and those with totally deferred payments. The results (in appendix
table A4.9) do not paint a clear picture of stabilizing effects for either
type of plan. There is no consistent pattern for old cash or deferred
plans of greater or less responsiveness to negative shocks. For new
plans, adoption of deferred plans is associated with significant declines
in responsiveness to negative aggregate shocks in two of the specifica-
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tions (consistent with my results for deferred plans in Kruse 1991a),
but there was no significant change in responsiveness associated with
sales changes or with cash plans.
The formula that a profit-sharing company uses to determine the
profit share may have a strong relation to the potential stability effects.
The stability theory that Weitzman developed assumes that the profit
share is based on a prespecified percent of company profits. It may also
be argued to apply when the profit share is discretionary, since a discre
tionary contribution should not be seen by employers as part of the
short-run marginal cost of labor (but may be seen by employers and
employees as part of long-run expected compensation). The stability
theory clearly does not apply when the profit share is a fixed percent of
participants' pay, since in this case the profit share is viewed as part of
the marginal cost of labor.
As for the productivity specifications, companies reporting plan for
mulas were divided into several groups: percent-of-profits, discretion
ary, percent-of-pay, and "other" formula. Results for the stabilizing
effects of each type of plan are reported in appendix table A4.10,54 and
are weakly consistent with the stability theory. Only for percent-ofprofits plans do the estimates consistently indicate smaller employment
responses to negative shocks (line 4). The one estimate where sam
pling error may (weakly) be ruled out indicates that firms with such
plans have a predicted employment cutback of only 0.4 percent, com
pared to 0.7 percent for non-profit-sharing firms, in response to a 1 per
cent decrease in sales Qines 2 and 4, column 6). For no other plan
formulas are there significant estimates of profit-sharing effects on
employment responses, or consistent patterns across the various esti
mates. The story with respect to positive shocks is similar: the esti
mates for percent-of-profits plans all indicate greater employment
responses to positive shocks (but none where sampling error can be
ruled out), while the estimates for other formulas show no consistent
pattern of higher or lower responsiveness. Overall, the more favorable
results for percent-of-profits plans is consistent with the stability the
ory, although the results are not strong.55
Finally, what is the relation between occupational composition and
the stability effects of profit sharing? The survey asked companies to
break their employees into three categories: clerical and technical
(nonexempt), production and service (nonexempt), and professional
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and administrative (exempt). They were further asked for the propor
tion of employees covered by profit sharing within each group, and the
overall numbers show that coverage was lowest among production and
service workers (table 1.3).56 The proportions of employees in each
occupation group, and these proportions interacted with the proportion
covered by profit sharing, were separately examined for their relation
ship to positive and negative shocks.57 The results (in appendix table
A4.11) show less sensitivity to decreases in GNP for each occupational
group between the pre-and postadoption periods (where sampling error
can be ruled out for the professional/administrative employees); also,
they show less sensitivity to decreases in company sales for all but pro
fessional/administrative workers (but sampling error cannot be ruled
out for any of the differences). Therefore there is no strong evidence
that profit sharing is particularly good or bad for any occupational
group.58
Summary and conclusions regarding these tests of the stability the
ory will be presented in the final chapter.
NOTES
1. For a discussion of wage flexibility in the United States, see Mitchell (1985).
2. For example, the Senate Finance Subcommittee report asserted that, "When wages remain
rigid, the flexibility necessary to effect a balance between selling prices and consumer buying is
missing and our economic system is stalemated" (U.S. Senate 1939: 63).
3. This simple model elides the complications introduced by firm-specific skills, firm insur
ance of risk-averse workers, and incomplete supervision.
4. Firms maximize profits by setting the MRP of labor equal to the marginal cost (MC) of
labor. In graph 1 of figure 4.1, the MC of labor is simply the wage, so the firm maximizes profits
at the point where the two curves intersect. In graph 2, the MC of labor lies between the w' and
MRP lines (since workers share in the profits, or the difference between MRP and w"), and inter
sects those two lines at point B. Unlike in the fixed-wage firm, the MC curve slopes downward,
reflecting the decreased labor cost per employee as more employees are hired and the profit share
is split among a larger number.
5. For further discussion and theoretical treatment, see Burton (1986); Blinder (1986a,
1986b); Nuti (1987); Mitchell (1987); Cooper (1988); Fitzroy (1988); Fung (1989); John (1991);
Bensaid and Gary-Bobo (1991); Eckalbar (1992); and LaCivita and Pirog (1992). For a practitio
ner's view see Parks (1990).
6. This review is based on all published studies that could be located in books or in econom
ics, personnel, and business journals (using searches up through June 1993 of the Business Peri
odicals Index and the computerized databases ABI/INFORM, UNCOVER, ProQuest, and
Business Dateline), and on unpublished studies made available by colleagues.
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7. Each extra dollar of bonus was associated with higher compensation of $1.24 and $.39 per
hour for nonoffice and office workers, respectively, and with higher straight-time wages of $.83
and $.27.
8. The profit share added $.43 to average compensation in manufacturing firms, and $.47 in
nonmanufacturing firms.
9. There were 133 contracts with, and 1,666 contracts without, profit sharing. The prevalence
of cost-of-living-adjustment freezes or eliminations were also higher among contracts with profit
sharing (Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler 1990: 25).
10. Wage concessions were defined as nominal wage freezes or declines in the first year of the
contract. For further information on their data see table 1.1 and the accompanying text and notes
in chapter 1. Also, Florkowski and Shastri (1992) find that among 45 announced union contracts
with profit-sharing provisions over the 1979-88 period, 60 percent were accompanied by
announced wage reductions.
11. One additional piece of evidence on the relationship of profit sharing to unionization
comes from Cardinal and Helburn (1986), who find that a variety of fringe benefits are equally
likely to be offered in unionized and nonunion profit-sharing firms.
12. Company average compensation was defined as (labor expenses)/(totaI employees), while
industry average compensation was defined as (total compensation)/(total full-time and part-time
employees) from the National Income and Product Accounts tables 6.4 and 6.6. Both include pay
roll taxes. Note that differences between company and industry average yearly pay may be due to
differences in pay per hour, or to the proportion of part-time workers (e.g., a company paying only
80 percent of industry average yearly pay may simply be hiring a higher proportion of part-time
workers.
13. The profit share in the industry average cannot be excluded, due to lack of data.

14. The upper and lower 1 percent of values, across the entire sample, have been excluded to
eliminate the potential influence of outliers.
15. This slight rise in compensation would be expected if profit sharing is accompanied by
higher productivity, as explored in chapter 3. This measure of the difference between average preand postadoption compensation levels gives equal weight to each of the 42 companies, while the
numbers on lines 6-8 represent total observations, giving greater weight to companies that
reported labor expenses more often.
16. The regressions used company labor expenses per employee divided by industry average
compensation per employee as the dependent variable. To fully control for industry effects, the
independent variables should also be adjusted for mean industry values. The limited number of
observations, however, prevents this.
Regressions were also run using the occupational composition of the workforce to explain
average compensation levels, using a smaller sample size due to nonresponse on occupational
composition. One of these is presented in column 3 of appendix table A4.1. The results for the
variables of interest were very similar.
17. See Katz and Meltz (1991) for comparison of auto workers' pay in the United States
(where profit sharing was negotiated as part of wage concessions) and Canada (where it was not).
18. Due in large part to the small sample size, very few of the estimates are significantly dif
ferent from zero at conventional levels. In the full results presented in appendix table A4.1, the
only significant coefficient in regression 3 is a surprising negative coefficient on the adoption of a
defined benefit plan (implying a 5 percent compensation cut), but this should be discounted
because it is based on only four companies which adopted such plans in this period. For summa
ries of evidence on the relationship between pay and pensions, see Gustman and Mitchell (1992)
and Gunderson, Hyatt, and Pesando (1992).
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19. The estimated associations between productivity growth and profit-sharing adoption were
similar between the full sample and this restricted subsample.
20. Just as it is possible that profit shares may act like fixed wages in affecting employment,
wages may have an element of profit sharing by being affected by company profitability (as pos
ited by rent-sharing theories in labor economics). For a review and some evidence, see Blanchflower, Oswald, and Sanfey (1992).
21. The labor demand function estimated here is:
ln(L) = po + p^lnOv) -i- p2*(bAv) + &*Q + PV*
where
L = employment level
w = base wage
b = size of profit-sharing bonus
Q = measure of company's output
X = other explanatory variables.
The coefficient PJ measures the conventional wage elasticity of labor demand, while the coef
ficient p2 measures the responsiveness of employment to bonus payments, holding wages con
stant. If P2 is negative, and equal to or greater than pj in magnitude, then profit-sharing payments
would appear to behave like wages in affecting labor demanded; whereas if P2 is positive, or neg
ative but smaller in magnitude than P], then profit-sharing payments would not appear to have the
same negative effects as wages. The other explanatory variables would include the costs of other
inputs, particularly the cost of capital. To be valid, this specification must account for the potential
endogeneity of profit-sharing payments; such payments are likely to be influenced by factors that
also affect labor demand. This study uses the above equation in first-difference form to exploit the
panel data by removing any constant firm effects.
22. A complication is introduced by the fact that CompuStat reports only total labor expenses,
so that this must be divided by total employment to arrive at an average compensation figure.
However, any measurement error in employment will bias the coefficient, since the change in
employment is the dependent variable. To correct for this, average compensation is instrumented
on average industry compensation (from the National Income Product Accounts) for the current
and two prior years (as in Kruse 1991b).
23. To correct for the endogeneity of the profit-sharing variable, it was instrumented on the
variables from regression 5 of appendix table A2.2, excluding the profit margin and stock price
variables (due to concerns about their exogeneity). As will be discussed, the results were sensitive
to the choice of instruments.
24. Several experiments were made with cost-of-capital measures, following Kruse (199Ib).
As in the previous study, the coefficients on these measures were never significantly different
from zero, and their inclusion made negligible difference in the parameters of interest. To main
tain the highest sample size, these measures were omitted from the final results presented.
25. In Kruse (1991b), I used industry benefits as a percent of industry wages and salaries (cur
rent and two lagged values) as instruments for employer contributions to deferred profit-sharing
plans; the results generally supported the stability theory. When the same instruments were used
here they produced generally negative coefficients for the profit-sharing variable in this sample.
Such instruments may not be applicable because cash profit-sharing payments are not included as
part of the definition of benefits at the industry level; even so, the result makes a firm conclusion
impossible. The sample here is too small to separate meaningfully profit sharing by type of plan;
to maintain the highest response rate, firms were not asked to distinguish the size of cash vs.
deferred contributions.
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An additional instrument used in Kruse (1991b) was the percentage of company employees in
deferred profit sharing in a given year, as reported on the Form 5500 for years 1980-86. Since
year-to-year variation in percentage covered was not collected for this study, the variable was not
used here to predict yearly changes in profit-sharing payments.
26. The 1975 cutoff has the advantage that preadoption employment behavior is analyzed both
for years of expanding economic activity (1971-73) and contracting economic activity (1973-75).
Experiments were made using other cutoffs in the 1970s and 1980 (in part, to account for misreporting of plan age, as discussed in chapter 3), but the results were not sensitive. Misreporting of
plan age is not likely to be as large a problem here as for the productivity specifications, since the
primary productivity estimates focused on immediate effects in adoption year, whereas the stabil
ity estimates do not.
27. Variability is defined as each company's standard deviation of yearly change in ^(employ
ment), which may be interpreted as the dispersion of employment around a growth trend.
28. One alternative would be to include all firms and measure profit sharing as proportion of
employees covered. This assumes, however, that if the stability theory is correct, a firm with 50
percent of employees covered would show twice the stability of a firm with 25 percent covered.
Such an assumption is risky, since the variation among noncovered employees could easily be
larger in the former firm. To avoid this, the sample was restricted to firms with all or nearly all
employees in profit sharing. For 16 firms which did not report the percentage covered, the per
centage was imputed from predictions based on age of plan, unionization, and industry member
ship; this added four firms to the 90 percent* sample. Results excluding these firms were very
similar.
29. The industry controls comprise 25 industry dummies and separate time trends.
30. As with the productivity specifications, several inverse Mill's ratios were tested and found
to have insignificant coefficients and negligible effects on the coefficients of interest. The reported
results include no selection terms.
31. Prior to trimming, the range of the yearly employment change variable (change in
ln(employment)) was -4.77 to 4.64, implying, at the extremes, 100-fold changes in employment
between years. The potentially stabilizing effects of profit sharing are likely to be swamped by the
massive transformations which an organization is undergoing during such a time, and it is
desirable to test the influence of profit sharing during more typical business fluctuations. Use of
robust regression techniques on the basic specifications resulted in weights of zero or close to zero
being given to the extreme values. For computational simplicity, two levels of trimming were
tested for all specifications: eliminating five extreme values (restricting the dependent variable
range to -2.04 to 1.87), and eliminating the upper 1 percent and lower 1 percent of employment
changes (restricting the dependent variable range to -.53 to .53). There were no noteworthy
differences in the results; results for the larger sample (with only five values trimmed) are
presented here.
32. The GNP and sales figures were first deflated by the GNP deflator, and natural logarithms
were taken so that changes would represent cumulative percentage changes. The In(GNP) mea
sure was regressed on a simple time trend, and the residual from this regression was used as the
demand shock measure (with positive and negative residuals representing positive and negative
shocks). The unemployment rate measure was specified as the change in ln(l - civilian unemploy
ment rate), with positive shocks representing decreases in unemployment (i.e., increases in this
measure). Estimates were also made with nominal company sales, and with deflated company
sales using the CPI for retail firms and industry inflation measures for manufacturing firms (at the
3-digit SIC level, from the NBER Trade and Immigration Dataset). There were no notable differ
ences in results.
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33. This distinguishes the stability theory from "labor hoarding" theories, in which firms may
retain employees under negative shocks to maintain firm-specific skills and avoid turnover costs.
34. This is estimated as follows. The coefficient on In(sales) in a labor demand equation is the
elasticity of employment with respect to sales, or %6I/%6Sales which is %&L/(%8P + %50
(where 5 is the difference operator, L = employment, P = price, and Q = physical output). Under
the assumption of imperfect competition and constant elasticity of product demand, price is a
fixed markup over marginal cost. Let the production function be Q = A(L -f), where A is a techni
cal coefficient and/is nonproduction labor. This has a constant marginal cost of output which is
w/A, so that p = (WA)(<l>/(<t> -1)) where O = product demand elasticity, and w = compensation per
worker.
Under these assumptions, an inward shift of the demand curve, provided it does not change
the demand elasticity, will not affect P for a fixed-wage firm, and the entire %6Sales will repre
sent output changes. Under the production function Q = A(L - /), the coefficient on In(sales) will
equal %8L/%&Q = 1 - (flL). As will be seen, empirical estimates of this coefficient are close to .5,
which under the maintained assumptions implies thatj7L = .5.
For a profit-sharing firm, the relevant marginal cost of labor after a negative demand shift is
the base wage w' (assuming the demand shift is large enough to eliminate excess demand for
labor). In this case the marginal cost of output is w'lA, the new price is P1 = (w'/AXO/O-l)), and
the %&P = (w - c)lc (where c = total compensation per worker, following notation in figure 4.1).
The coefficient on ln(sales), assuming as before that %8Z/%8g = 1 -flL, will be %6X/%5L/(1 flL) + (wf - eye). Assume (a) a profit share which substitutes for regular compensation and aver
ages 3.6 percent of compensation (the median of profit shares from companies reporting profit
share), (b)J7L = .5 (from above paragraph), and (c) a sales decrease of 6 percent (the median fig
ure for sales decreases across all companies and years). Under these assumptions, the predicted
change in employment for a non-profit-sharing firm would be -3.0 percent, and for a profit-shar
ing firm would be -1.2 percent (or only 40 percent of the non-profit-sharing cut in employment).
Therefore under these assumptions about product demand curves and cost structures with
imperfect competition, the non-profit-sharing firms would respond to a typical sales decrease by
maintaining prices and cutting employment, while the profit-sharing firms would respond by cut
ting prices and reducing employment by only roughly half as much. These calculations are obvi
ously sensitive to the particular assumptions; without any direct measure of price changes in the
firms, it is impossible to fully evaluate this model.
35. All references to increases and decreases in GNP refer to changes in constant-dollar GNP
relative to a time trend over 1970-91.
36. The estimated effects on line 1 of table 4.6 represent the antilogs of the (coefficient * .01)
on lines 1 and 2 of appendix table A4.5. Hie positive coefficients on negative shocks (line 2, table
4.13) indicate that employment moves in the same direction as the shock, so the estimated effects
are given as negative in columns 3, 4,7, and 8 of table 4.6.
37. These effects are estimated by adding the coefficients on lines 1 and 3 of appendix table
A4.S, and then calculating the effect as described in previous footnote. The conclusion that the
responses are not significantly different is based on the low /-statistics of the interaction coeffi
cients (lines 3 and 4).
38. The paired results do not include an estimate for non-profit-sharing firms (line 1), since
these are the base group for the paired differences. Since there is no base effect of demand shocks
in the paired difference, the illustration of paired results in table 4.6 (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8) uses
the non-profit-sharing effect from the preceding column as the base effect.
39. Reflecting the results from lines 1 to 3, column 3, table 4.6.
40. In using paired data, all comparisons are relative to the non-profit-sharing group, which is
why there is no growth trend reflected for this group (i.e., it hovers around 100 percent). The
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paired regression results do not show sensitivity to GNP changes for the baseline non-profitsharing group, but only differential sensitivity compared to the profit-sharing pairs. For purposes
of illustration, figure 4.3 borrows the coefficients on baseline sensitivity from regression 3 of
appendix table A4.6.
41. Reflecting the numbers on lines 2, 3, and 4 of column 4, table 4.6.
42. As discussed there, these estimates are based only upon company sales changes as demand
shock measures, because of the difficulty of distinguishing what would constitute a "large" and
"small" shock for an individual firm from the aggregate measures.
43. The hypothesis that employment responses are equal between the two types of firms was
rejected at the 95 percent level for regressions 2 and 4 (using F-tests), but not for the smaller sam
ples in regressions 3 and 5.
44. Prior negative shock was defined as a decrease in (deflated) sales last year. These estimates
are on lines 1 to 4 of appendix table A4.6.
45. In particular, the coefficients on line 3 were more positive for PS firms in three of the four
regressions, indicating a larger cushion of employees who are retained under large negative
shocks. Also, the coefficients on line 4 are smaller or more negative for the PS firms, indicating a
smaller likelihood and magnitude of layoffs under small demand shocks. For a discussion of the
theoretical expectations under the small and large shocks, see appendix 4.
46. This is seen in particular by comparing the PS and NPS coefficients on rows 7 and 8 with
their theoretical expectation in column 1. In each case the PS firm had more hiring than the NPS
firm. While this does not fit the theoretical expectation of behavior under a prior negative shock, it
is nonetheless "favorable" behavior of greater willingness to hire by PS firms.
47. If unionization affects employment changes, obviously the proportion unionized will vary
between years. If each year's proportion were used, this would introduce a substantial problem of
simultaneity between employment changes and proportion unionized, biasing the coefficients.
The use of 1991 proportion unionized as an "instrument" for proportion unionized across the time
period will correct this bias (while introducing some measurement error since the proportion
unionized may have changed since the beginning of the period).
48 The results were not sensitive to the use of other cutoff points, including a 0 percent cut-off
(implying that the profit share must fully substitute for regular compensation). Even if profit shar
ing fully substitutes for regular compensation, the total compensation per employee may, on aver
age, be higher because of a risk premium for the variability from profit-sharing compensation.
As noted previously, the limited information on labor expenses restricts the sample for these
tests. These results are based on only 14 profit-sharing adopters that reported more than one year
of labor expense data in both the pre- and postadoption periods, and had 90 percent or more of
employees covered.
49. This cutoff was chosen for the same reason expressed above. Again, results were not sen
sitive to other cutoff points.
50. Since less than half of the companies reported labor expenses, there were too few observa
tions for paired results within industry. Lacking within-industry comparisons of responses to
aggregate demand shocks, only the company sales changes are used as demand shocks here.
51. This is clearly not an ideal measure for two reasons. First, changes in unit labor costs will
reflect changes in productivity occurring from other sources, while the marginal cost of employ
ing labor may have stayed constant. Second, total labor expenses as reported in CompuStat
include the profit share so that even if unit labor costs show a small increase, the profit share
may still be partially substituting for regular fixed pay. For these reasons, the change in unit labor
costs used here is not a clear indicator of whether the perceived cost of employing labor has
changed following profit-sharing adoption; rather, an increase in unit labor cost is treated simply
as indicating a greater likelihood of the profit share being an add-on.
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Each firm's (labor expenses/sales) was calculated, the (2-digit) industry mean for that year was
subtracted, and the within-company mean of the result (across years) was calculated. Old profitsharing companies were divided according to whether this within-company mean was positive or
negative (with a positive value representing a higher likelihood of profit sharing adding on to
pay), while new profit-sharing companies were divided according to whether this mean increased
or decreased after adoption (with an increase representing a higher likelihood of profit sharing
adding on to pay). As with the previous estimates in table 4.7, the limited information on labor
expenses restricts the sample size: only 14 profit-sharing adopters could be found that reported
two or more years of labor expense data in both the pre- and postadoption periods (with six hav
ing a decrease in average unit labor costs).
52. The two measures of substitution did not classify the same adopters as "substituting" or
"adding on" to base pay, with only six of the fourteen firms having the same status in both sam
ples.
53. Results on motives for maintaining profit-sharing plans (from table 2.2) showed, not sur
prisingly, that providing for retirement security was a higher priority for firms maintaining only
deferred plans.
54. The presented results do not divide old profit-sharing companies from new adopters; when
this is done, the small number of observations in several categories produces very unreliable esti
mates. The pattern of results in the unreported regressions provided no clear indication of greater
or lesser stability after adoption for any of the plan formulas.
55. The weak results may in part be due to the small sample size, since the question on formu
las was on the mail portion of the survey and only half of profit-sharing companies responded.
56. Estimates of occupational composition by industry class showed roughly similar composi
tion among the major classes, except for retail trade. Production and service workers constituted
an average 41-53 percent of workers in all major industries except retail trade, where it was 80
percent. Similarly, professional/administrative workers constituted a mean of 22-37 percent of
employees, and clerical/technical workers constituted a mean of 16-31 percent of employees
across industries, except for retail trade (with means of 11 percent and 10 percent, respectively).
57. As with the estimate of union coverage, occupational composition was asked only as of
the survey year (1991). This value was imputed back through the sample period to estimate the
relationship of occupational composition to demand shocks. If each year's proportion were used,
this would introduce a substantial problem of simultaneity between employment changes and
occupational composition, biasing the coefficients. The use of 1991 proportions as "instruments"
across the time period will correct this bias (while introducing some measurement error since the
composition may have changed since the beginning of the period).
Including each occupation proportion with its demand shock interaction in a regression will
lead to high multicollinearity and high standard errors, since the demand shocks are identical. The
presented results were done separately for each occupation group.
58. The results in appendix table A4.ll are only for unpaired data, reflecting both betweenindustry and within-industry effects. The occupational composition tends to be very similar
within an industry, so that paired within-industry differences were small and failed to produce
reliable estimates of the relationship between occupation and demand shocks. Separate estimation
of stability effects by industry class (using both 8-category and 25-category definitions) did not
show greater or smaller stability effects in any industry.

Summary, Conclusions,
and Policy Implications
Profit sharing with employees has existed since the earliest days of
the United States. A major source of support has been ideological:
profit sharing has been seen as a way to strengthen support for capital
ism by tying worker rewards more explicitly to the health of the firms.
There have been two main theories about the effects of profit sharing.
One is tied to employee incentives: profit sharing has long been advo
cated on the grounds that it can improve business performance by
encouraging worker effort, cooperation, and sharing of ideas and infor
mation (the "productivity theory"). A second, more recent, theory is
tied to employer incentives: profit sharing has been theorized to change
incentives to hire and retain employees, leading to greater employment
and output stability for firms and the economy as a whole (the "stabil
ity theory").

Overview of Trends

Is there enough practice of profit sharing to make it even worthy of
study? The disparate sources of evidence, summarized in chapter 1,
indicate that roughly one-sixth to one-fourth of American businesses
and employees participate in some form of profit sharing. The preva
lence does not appear to vary greatly by occupational status or by firm
size, but does appear to be more common among companies with pub
lic stock, and less common among unionized employees. This no doubt
reflects a long history of suspicion of profit sharing by unions,
although the incidence of profit sharing for unionized employees
increased in the 1980s (often tied to wage concessions). Internation
ally, there has been substantial interest in profit sharing in Europe and
elsewhere, but little data on actual incidence (Blanchflower 1991; Florkowski 1991; Uvalic 1990).
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This study reports on a new database on profit sharing in U.S. com
panies with public stock. The survey found that 40.7 percent of such
companies reported having a profit-sharing plan for employees other
than top management, a figure very much in line with other data
sources for U.S. public companies. Data were collected on profit-shar
ing coverage, types, and formulas, as well as on other personnel poli
cies that may compete or interact with profit sharing in affecting firm
behavior. A telephone survey was done of 500 public companies half
with profit sharing and half without, for purposes of comparison. To
maximize comparability, an attempt was made to find for each firm a
same-industry pair with the opposite profit-sharing status for exam
ple, for each profit-sharing food processor, an attempt was made to find
a non-profit-sharing food processor for comparison (resulting in pairs
for 410 of the firms). To provide evidence on the productivity and sta
bility theories of profit sharing, the survey data were matched with
publicly available data from public companies on company character
istics and performance over the 1970-91 period.

Predicting Adoption of Profit Sharing

What factors influence the adoption of profit-sharing plans? Prior
research has mostly relied on cross-sectional data to examine the corre
lates of company and industry variables with the presence of profitsharing plans (11 studies summarized in table 2.1). While it has pro
duced no clear consistent findings, some of the variables highlighted
by this research as potentially important are: unionization, firm size,
employee composition, firm growth, capital intensity, and industry
variability.
In contrast to most previous research, the analysis presented here
focused on what factors predict the adoption of profit sharing, relying
mainly on changes in variables in the two years preceding the decision
to adopt. Such analysis provides a better indication of the causality
between company characteristics and the presence of profit sharing. It
was difficult, however, to find strong predictors of adoption.
Improvements in profit margins and stock prices appear to increase
the chance of profit-sharing adoption (consistent with British data from
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Poole 1989). When profits, or expected profits, increase, a profit-shar
ing plan may be an attractive means of increasing compensation with
out obligating the company to a fixed amount each year. Growth in the
profit margin over the two preceding years appears to be most impor
tant for predicting adoption of cash plans, while increases in the clos
ing stock price appear to be most important for deferred plan adoption
(as summarized in table 2.3). 1 The explanation offered here is that
deferred plans represent a longer-term commitment (with higher start
up and shutdown costs), so that a longer-term increase in profitability
(reflected in the stock price) favors deferred plans.
This finding, while interesting in itself, also serves to cast doubt on
cross-sectional analyses of profit sharing, in which profit-sharing and
non-profit-sharing companies are compared on measures of perfor
mance. If higher profits in fact help predict the adoption of profit shar
ing, then it is not surprising to find that profit-sharing companies score
higher on profitability and other performance measures.2
The theory that increased variability of company sales or profits
helps predict profit-sharing adoption receives some very weak support.
The pattern of estimates indicates that this is primarily a betweenindustry, rather than within-industry, effect that is, higher variability
in one's industry during the past five years favors the adoption of profit
sharing, while higher variability compared to industry competitors
does not strongly favor this (although even here, the estimate signs
support this story). Also, comparison of cash and deferred adoption
indicates that increased variability may predict adoption of deferred
plans, but does not predict adoption of cash plans.
The only other factor that may predict profit-sharing adoption is the
presence of a union. Over the period of this study (1970-1990), union
contracts were increasingly likely to include profit-sharing provisions
(Bell and Neumark 1993). Union presence showed up in several esti
mates as a predictor of profit-sharing adoption, particularly for cash
plans where it roughly doubled the chance of adoption in the sample
period.
Just as noteworthy are the factors that do not predict adoption of
profit-sharing plans. Deferred profit-sharing plans offer a potentially
attractive source of capital for firms, since the assets of such plans may
be heavily invested in employer securities. However, changes in two
measures of the reliance on outside capital debt/equity and interest
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payments did not predict adoption of either type of plan. Changes in
company and industry labor costs per employee did not predict adop
tion of profit sharing. The firm's expenditure on research and develop
ment was also hypothesized to be a potential predictor of profit
sharing, since this is an area in which supervision costs and the value
of cooperation may be higher. However, neither levels nor changes in
R&D expenditures were significant predictors of profit-sharing adop
tion. Likewise, recent growth in sales and capital intensity did not pre
dict adoption.
Finally, several company characteristics were addressed that predict
participation by union employees and different occupational groups in
profit sharing. Because such data were not easily available for the time
at which profit sharing was adopted, this analysis relied on 1990 data
in profit-sharing companies to examine the correlates of current cover
age by union employees and occupational groups.
The age of profit sharing, and the share of professional/administra
tive employees within a company were significant predictors of
employee coverage within profit-sharing plans. Higher union density
predicts lower coverage in each of the three main occupational groups
(professional/administrative, production/service, and clerical/techni
cal), although a greater likelihood that a majority of union members
participate. Overall, a 10 percentage point increase in unionization
within a firm is associated with a 2.2 percentage point decline in
employee coverage within a profit-sharing firm. Therefore, while
unions have become more likely to participate in profit sharing in the
past 20 years, their members are still less likely than nonunion employ
ees to be covered.

The Productivity Theory
Does profit sharing improve company performance? For over a
century there have been claims that it does, by encouraging workers to
cooperate with each other and management, share ideas and informa
tion, and monitor co-workers. This theory has received new attention
in the past two decades, given the slowdown in productivity growth in
the United States (which averaged only 1.2 percent per year in the
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1970s and 1980s, following growth of almost 3.0 percent per year
between World War II and 1970) (Economic Report of the President
1992: table B-44).
The main argument against positive effects of profit sharing is the
weak connection between individual effort and reward in group incen
tive systems; it is possible that this may be overcome by some form of
cooperative agreement among employees, fostered by appropriate pol
icies and climate in the firm. Other theoretical issues include employee
self-selection into or out of profit-sharing companies, and the possibil
ity of weaker incentives for managerial supervision and capital invest
ment.
Research in the past 15 years supports the idea that profit sharing
can improve corporate performance. Across 26 econometric studies
summarized in table 3.1, a majority of estimated associations (57.4
percent) between profit sharing and productivity measures have been
positive and strong enough that random sampling error can be ruled
out as an explanation. The majority of these studies, though, have not
compared companies before and after the adoption of profit sharing.
This leaves open the question of causality: higher productivity may
lead companies to adopt profit-sharing plans, rather than vice versa.
This possibility is made more plausible by the finding in chapter 2 that
increases in profitability help predict the adoption of profit-sharing
plans.
A variety of methods and variables was employed in attempting to
gauge the relationship between productivity and profit-sharing adop
tion and presence. As with most previous research, the estimates were
based on a production function with capital and labor inputs. The avail
ability of panel data made it possible to compare pre- and postadoption
performance on the adopters, and remove the influence of any constant
factors that make one firm more productive than another (such as mar
ket placement or managerial quality). Two productivity measures were
used (value-added per employee and sales per employee). Estimates
were made using all firms (controlling for broad industry and year
effects), and using paired differences between firms in the same indus
try. The estimates also accounted for union presence and the adoption
and presence of ESOPs and defined benefit pension plans.
The adoption of a profit-sharing plan within the sample period was
associated with a 3.5 to 5 percent increase in productivity, with no con-
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sistent estimate of an upward or downward productivity trend after
adoption (summarized in table 3.3, and illustrated in figure 3.1). Ran
dom sampling error could be ruled out for most of the adoption effects.
When profit sharing is measured as proportion of employees covered
rather than a simple dummy variable, the results are slightly weaker.3
The estimated effect sizes are very much in line with those from other
studies, where a meta-analysis indicated that the median productivity
difference associated with profit sharing was 4.4 percent (Weitzman
and Kruse 1990: 138-9). Simply adopting profit sharing, though, was
not found to be automatically associated with productivity increases;
across various estimates, between one-fourth and one-third of the
adopters had no productivity increase beyond that predicted by other
company characteristics (in fact, outcomes were just as dispersed for
adopters as for nonadopters, but were on average shifted in a more pos
itive direction for the adopters).
A variety of factors are commonly believed to influence the motiva
tional value of profit sharing. First, cash plans are generally seen as
better motivators than deferred plans, due to the immediacy of the
reward. When broken down by plan type, the results are generally con
sistent with this belief; adoption of cash plans is associated with larger
productivity increases in all estimates. Second, plans that explicitly tie
contributions to profits as opposed to a percentage of pay, a discre
tionary amount, or another method are believed to be better motiva
tors. The inferiority of percent-of-pay plans is generally confirmed by
the estimates, although the results were more favorable for adoption of
discretionary plans than for percent-of-profits plans. The estimated
relationship between changes in profits and profit-sharing contribu
tions is actually slightly higher for discretionary plans than for percentof-profit plans (and much larger than for percent-of-pay plans). While
discretionary plans are not generally viewed as good motivators, it was
noted that such plans may be more effectively used to reward
employee performance (subtracting out the "noise" from other influ
ences on profits) in an atmosphere of high employee trust that better
employee performance will be recognized and rewarded.
Company size is strongly expected to be a factor in the effect of
profit sharing on performance, since individual incentives should grow
weaker as the number of employees who share in profits grows larger.
Analysis of profit-sharing effects in five size classes gives anomalous
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results (summarized in table 3.4). The productivity effects of profitsharing adoption are in fact largest in the smallest size class (less than
775 employees). However, estimated productivity effects in the largest
size class (more than 17,000 employees), while smaller in size, are also
strong enough to rule out random sampling error. This is hard to recon
cile with considerations of individual incentives, though it may indi
cate that the presence of profit sharing is as important as the size of the
performance-pay link, and large companies may be able to develop a
"corporate culture" in which profit sharing is most effective.
The size of the profit share in relation to employee compensation is
also commonly believed to be an important factor in its motivational
potential. The profit-sharing sample was split into "high-contribution"
and "low-contribution" groups based on the average contribution as a
percentage of payroll (to attempt a measure of company policy regard
ing contributions and minimize obvious problems of higher perfor
mance leading to higher contributions in any year). The estimates
(table 3.4) indicated more positive effects for adoption and presence of
high-contribution plans.
Finally, this study addressed the questions of whether profit sharing
may simply be a proxy for other personnel policies, and whether profit
sharing interacts with information-sharing and other policies designed
to make better use of employee ideas and skills. When the adoption
and presence of seven other personnel policies were accounted for, the
profit-sharing estimates were virtually unchanged, indicating that profit
sharing is unlikely to be a proxy for these other policies. When profitsharing adoption and presence were interacted with three types of
information-sharing, and with coverage of profit-sharing participants
by the seven personnel policies, there were no clear indications that
these policies enhance or detract from the effect of profit sharing. The
one possible exception is for employee involvement programs cover
ing profit-sharing participants, where the pattern of results was posi
tive. To more fully explore this question, profit-sharing companies
were also asked whether the adoption of profit sharing was accompa
nied by significant changes in other compensation or policies. Onesixth replied in the affirmative, and these companies had generally
higher increases in productivity in the year of adoption (table 3.6).
Examination of open-ended responses about the type of changes,
though, gives no clear indication of what policies may interact with
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profit sharing: nearly half said that other incentive plans had been
revised or dropped, and nearly half said there had been other changes
in wages or benefits. Only one company reported a change in a person
nel policy other than compensation (a new training program).
What is the verdict on whether profit sharing improves perfor
mance? Different conclusions may reasonably be drawn from the array
of data presented here.
On the positive side, arguments in favor of profit sharing may be
marshalled as follows: Adoption of profit sharing is statistically associ
ated with significant productivity increases, with no negative postadoption trend (arguing against a simple "Hawthorne effect" from the
novelty of an innovation). The productivity differentials are very much
in line with results from previous studies. In line with expectations
about the effect of profit sharing, these increases are found to be largest
for cash plans, for small companies, and for plans with high average
contributions, and nonexistent for percent-of-pay plans where the rela
tionship to profits is the weakest. In addition, the positive results
remain when accounting for other policies to solicit employee ideas,
decisionmaking skills, and commitment; therefore prior positive
results on profit sharing do not appear to be simply reflecting such pol
icies. There was some weak evidence that profit sharing combines with
employee involvement programs to positively affect productivity. A
variety of techniques to control for statistical bias from company selfselection into profit sharing did not weaken the results.
On the negative side, skeptics of profit sharing may make the fol
lowing arguments: It is difficult to believe that profit sharing causes a
single immediate upward jump in productivity before employees have
had a chance to become familiar with it. It takes time for people to
learn how to work together cooperatively to improve performance,
implying that the productivity effects should be more gradual. The
great dispersion in outcomes is noteworthy, with a substantial number
of adopters experiencing no productivity increase. The existence of
significant upward jumps in productivity even in the largest size class
is very suspicious: it strains credulity to think that 17,000 or more
employees could be inspired to increase productivity when the individ
ual incentive in such large companies is so weak. It is very possible
that a profit-sharing plan is simply being used to share with employees
some of the benefits from increased productivity (occurring for other

Summary, Conclusions, and Policy Implications

155

reasons), without increasing fixed compensation levels. Discretionary
plans should not be good motivators for employees, and the favorable
results for them casts further doubt on the results. There is little clue as
to what makes profit sharing "work": there was little evidence of pat
terns of interactions between profit sharing, information-sharing, and
personnel policies. Finally, if profit sharing really caused upward
jumps in productivity, it should be more widespread by now.
Much as it is tempting to offer a verdict on profit sharing and pro
ductivity, no definite one is possible. It is quite striking that, on aver
age, companies adopting profit sharing have an upward jump in
productivity relative to their peers, but it is not clear why this happens.
This study has employed more detailed data surrounding the adoption
and presence of profit sharing than have past studies, and has identified
several features of plans that are associated with higher productivity,
but it has not identified company characteristics that help profit sharing
"work." The issue of causality has not been resolved. If profit sharing
is in fact partly responsible for the productivity increases, it may be
that the conditions that engender positive effects of profit sharing are
highly specific to each workplace. "Corporate culture," trust in man
agement, and history of employee relations are examples of situational
factors that may determine how employees receive and respond to
profit sharing (discussed further in the section on implications for com
panies).

The Stability Theory

Does profit sharing increase the stability of employment by chang
ing the incentives of employers to hire and fire workers? This theory
received much attention in the 1980s as a possible source of a cure for
economic instability in capitalist economies. There have been 15 stud
ies of profit sharing and employment stability (summarized in table
4.1). Most of the studies that directly measure stability have found
some association between profit sharing and greater stability, though
the studies on how the profit share is treated in employment decisions
are more mixed.
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One feature of the stability theory is that the profit share must sub
stitute for other forms of regular fixed pay in order to alter employer
views of the cost of hiring new workers and of maintaining workers
during periods of decreased demand. If it does not, no stabilizing
effects of profit sharing are expected. This question was approached in
several ways in this study. For companies reporting labor expenses and
profit-sharing contribution in a given year, the average compensation
with and without the profit share was calculated as a percentage of
industry average compensation. Results in this limited sample were
consistent with a trade-off: mean and median values of these profitsharing firms are slightly above industry averages for all compensa
tion, but below industry averages for compensation excluding the
profit share.
A second method to address the trade-off issue was to examine
compensation levels and growth for all companies reporting labor
expenses (table 4.3). This revealed a striking difference between com
panies that had adopted profit sharing prior to 1975 and those who
adopted after that time. The "old" profit-sharing companies had mean
compensation levels that were substantially higher than industry aver
ages, while the "new" profit-sharing companies had mean compensa
tion levels that were at or below industry averages. For the adopters
with labor expense data both before and after adoption, the compensa
tion levels showed small gains after adoption (with a mean of 0.9 per
cent, and median of 1.9 percent).
A third method was to predict compensation levels and growth
using data on profit-sharing, unionization, defined benefit pensions,
and ESOPs (summarized in table 4.4). The estimate sizes indicated that
compensation levels for old profit-sharing companies were higher than
for non-profit-sharing and new profit-sharing companies. The profitsharing adopters were estimated to have slight initial decreases in com
pensation when profit sharing is adopted, followed by positive trends
so that, on average, pay is higher after adoption than before.
Does profit sharing substitute for regular compensation? This
appears to be unlikely for old profit-sharing firms, since they had com
pensation levels higher than industry averages and compensation
growth at or above industry averages. Therefore the profit share is
likely to be more of an "add-on" than a substitute for regular compen
sation among old profit-sharing firms (consistent with the 1974 finding
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of higher base pay among profit-sharing firms, in Mitchell, Lewin, and
Lawler 1990). In contrast, the profit share appears more likely to sub
stitute for fixed compensation among some of the new profit-sharing
adopters, since the average increase in total compensation is smaller
than the typical profit share.
A second feature of the stability theory is that employers do not
treat profit-sharing payments and fixed wages in the same way when
setting employment levels: unlike wages, profit-sharing payments
should not be seen as part of the obligatory cost of a labor hour (the
short-run marginal cost of labor). Rather, employers should essentially
ignore the profit share when hiring and retaining employees. The esti
mated employment effects of wages and profit-sharing payments were
generally consistent with this idea. The results were sensitive, though,
to the choice of variables designed to remove bias from the effect of
company performance upon the profit share, and no firm conclusion
was drawn regarding this proposition.
A key prediction of the stability theory is that profit sharing should
lead to employment stability. While this theory was developed at a
macroeconomic level, it is based on firm-level incentives that in princi
ple allow tests of the theory using firm-level data. This study compared
the employment responses of profit-sharing firms under two types of
economywide demand shocks (changes in the unemployment rate and
in GNP, with the paired results accounting for industry differences),
and under firm-specific demand shocks represented by sales changes.
Sales changes were not used exclusively because the stability theory
predicts greater stability in physical output as well as employment, and
if sales changes are primarily reflecting physical output changes they
would not provide an appropriate measure of a demand shock. The
employment behavior of old profit-sharing companies was analyzed
separately from that of new profit-sharing companies; this allowed
comparison of the pre- and postadoption behavior of profit-sharing
adopters, and separate analysis of the old profit-sharing adopters where
profit sharing appears unlikely to substitute for regular pay.
The stability theory does not predict a simple and direct relationship
between profit sharing and employment changes. Rather, it predicts a
discontinuous relationship (discussed in appendix 4) that depends on
the size of the demand shock, whether the shock is positive or nega
tive, the extent to which the profit share substitutes for regular pay, the
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sensitivity of company employment to wage changes, and whether the
demand shock follows upon a prior negative shock that may have elim
inated the theorized excess demand for labor. A full test of the stability
theory would require these data. An approximation to such a test was
made with several assumptions about demand shocks and limited data
on profit share sizes. The results indicated that: (1) The employment
behavior of profit-sharing firms in response to demand shocks does
appear to differ from that of non-profit-sharing firms; (2) The profitsharing employment response to demand shocks was favorable (com
pared to non-profit-sharing firms), when firms were not recovering
from a prior negative shock, and the pattern was generally favorable to
the stability theory; and (3) The situation was more mixed when firms
were recovering from prior negative shocks, with profit-sharing firms
having a favorable smaller response to further negative shocks, and
generally equal or larger responses to positive shocks, though this lat
ter finding does not fit the theory since the theorized response should
have been smaller (because the firm should have laid off fewer workers
during the prior negative shock).
Following previous research, a simpler and more direct technique
was used for the majority of tests of the employment behavior of
profit-sharing firms (due to the difficulty of finding appropriate data for
the full test). The employment responses of profit-sharing firms to pos
itive and negative shocks were compared with those of non- and preprofit-sharing firms, with emphasis on the negative shocks since the
predictions are clearest with respect to employment cutbacks.
Did profit sharing lead to more employment stability in this period?
The direct tests indicated that, comparing pre- and postadoption behav
ior, profit-sharing adopters had smaller cutbacks in response to GNP
decreases after adoption (though sampling error could be ruled out
only in the nonpaired data). The predicted employment paths in figures
4.2 and 4.3, showed higher growth for new adopters and old profitsharing firms, relative to non-profit-sharing firms. For a firm that
adopted profit sharing between the two recessions of the period (197375 and 1980-82), the employment cutback is relatively smaller during
the later recession. However, there were no estimated differences in
response to company sales decreases. The remainder of chapter 4
explored how different characteristics of profit sharing might relate to
the theorized stability effects.
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Does unionization make a difference? Higher unionization was gen
erally associated with unfavorable employment behavior smaller
employment responses to positive shocks, and larger responses to neg
ative shocks. Participation in profit sharing by a majority of union
members was found to be associated with a slight decrease in responsiveness to negative shocks, but no estimates were found where sam
pling error could be ruled out.
Do compensation changes and levels make a difference? The theory
is clear that profit sharing should only have a positive effect on stabil
ity if it substitutes, at least in part, for regular fixed pay. This does not
mean that fixed pay levels must go down: as discussed in chapter 4, if
the productivity theory is correct and workers put forth extra effort to
raise productivity thereby raising profit and pay the stability theory
may still apply if fixed pay is a smaller portion of worker output (and
workers are being rewarded for their extra effort largely through the
profit share). Two tests were made of whether the profit share substi
tuted in part for regular fixed pay: one which looked at changes in
average pay per employee, and a second which looked at changes in
pay in relation to output. Both tests indicated that firms in which profit
sharing appeared to substitute for regular pay had much lower responsiveness to negative shocks after adoption. Due to the small number of
firms reporting sufficient labor expense data, these results should only
be taken as indicative.
Finally, what is the relation of employment stability to cash and
deferred profit sharing, different formulas, and participation by differ
ent occupations? Several estimates indicated that adoption of deferred
plans was associated with lower responsiveness to negative aggregate
shocks, but there were no consistent patterns for cash plans or for
deferred plans under company sales shocks. Among plan formulas, the
percent-of-profit plans had the only consistent estimates of lower
responsiveness to negative shocks (consistent with the stability theory,
though sampling error could be weakly ruled out only for one estimate)
and of higher responsiveness to positive shocks. Looking at the profitsharing participation of three occupational groups, adoption of profit
sharing was associated with decreased responsiveness to GNP declines
for all three groups, and decreased responsiveness to sales declines for
clerical/technical and production/service workers, but not for profes-
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sional/administrative employees (and sampling error could not be
ruled out for most of these differences).
What is the verdict on the stability theory? The mix of evidence
does not support a clear conclusion. The positive and negative argu
ments may be marshalled as follows.
On the positive side, the approximation of a full test of the stability
theory found that the theorized patterns appeared to fit employment
behavior when firms were not recovering from negative shocks. The
generally higher responses to positive shocks by profit-sharing firms
when they were recovering from negative shocks, which does not fit
the theory, may simply illustrate that these firms are hungry for labor,
as generally predicted by the stability theory. The simpler tests showed
improvements in responsiveness to aggregate shocks after adoption.
Adoption of profit-sharing plans in which a majority of union members
participated showed a pattern of lower responsiveness to negative
shocks. Both tests of the relation between the profit share and regular
fixed pay were consistent with theory: the results were more favorable
where profit sharing appeared to substitute for regular fixed pay.
Finally, the results on plan formulas indicated that percent-of-profits
plans, in line with theory, appear to be associated with the most favor
able employment behavior. The tremendous variety of forms of profit
sharing in the United States rarely match up with the pure form in the
stability theory. Many employers may treat "profit-sharing" payments
as regular wages. Given this, it is not surprising that the "grab bag" of
what is called profit sharing in the United States does not produce
strong results, and study of more relevant kinds of profit sharing is
likely to be fruitful.
On the negative side, skeptics may note that there is no strong evi
dence for favorable effects of profit sharing on employment stability,
and several pieces of the pattern are unfavorable (such as several esti
mates of profit-sharing companies, particularly old ones, having larger
employment cutbacks in response to negative shocks). Several favor
able results are based on distant aggregate shocks, or on small samples
(in the case of the compensation results), and sampling error often can
not be ruled out. Even among percent-of-profits plans, where the the
ory should most directly apply, only one of the favorable results allows
sampling error to be weakly ruled out. All in all, detractors may con-
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elude, profit sharing has not been shown to produce any notable differ
ences in employment behavior.
While no definite verdict is possible, the results indicate several
ways in which profit sharing appears to affect employment behavior,
and clearly leave the stability theory open for further research. This
study has illustrated the complexity of the empirical issues in assessing
the stability theory. As noted by Mitchell, empirical research in incon
clusive on even such a basic issue of economic theory as the employ
ment effects of the minimum wage, raising the question, "If we cannot
settle that issue empirically, what hope is there for convincingly and
definitively demonstrating (or refuting) the macro effects of particular
pay systems?" (1993: 22). Recognizing that convincing and definitive
empirical tests of the stability theory may be very unlikely, further
research can nonetheless shed substantial light on the actual behavior
of profit-sharing companies, and create a foundation for future policy
debates and theoretical development.
The results from this study have several implications for future
research. First, these results have highlighted the importance of exam
ining compensation levels, and whether the profit share trades off
against base compensation. Future research certainly needs to address
this, to examine whether the perceived cost of hiring or retaining
profit-sharing employees differs from that of non-profit-sharing
employees (recognizing and taking into account the effects productiv
ity may have on pay, requiring measures other than simple pay levels).
Measurement of demand shocks also deserves more attention, both to
take account of the theorized greater stability of physical output (which
is a potentially serious limit on the applicability of sales measures),
and to distinguish the point at which demand shocks should exhaust
the theorized excess demand for labor (which requires measures of
typical profit shares and the relationship of demand shocks to employ
ment levels). Finally, while this study analyzed a broad spectrum of
what is called "profit sharing" by U.S. companies, future research
should focus more intensively on plans where profit shares are strongly
linked to profitability.
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Implications for Companies
What implications do these findings have for companies consider
ing the use of profit sharing? The adoption of profit sharing was found
to be associated with, on average, an increase in productivity, but the
dispersion in outcomes was very large, and a number of adopters had
decreases in productivity. This implies that, if profit sharing does in
fact affect productivity, the effects are very likely to depend on a num
ber of conditions and characteristics of a firm, its plan design, and its
implementation. Such a conclusion is strongly echoed in the literature
on case studies and the design of group incentive programs. Following
is a brief review of the factors most often mentioned in the prescriptive
literature on the design of group incentives, with several references to
the results from this study.4
The prescriptive literature emphasizes, first, that a number of fac
tors need to be assessed prior to installing a group incentive plan.
These include (1) the hierarchical structure of decisionmaking in the
firm (a centrally organized vs. decentralized "flat" structure); (2) cur
rent systems of accountability and performance measurement, and pay
sensitivity to those measurements; (3) pay practices in the relevant
industry or geographical area; (4) the presence of unions and history of
union-management relations; (5) employee demographics that influ
ence risk preferences, turnover probabilities, and training needs; (6)
the ways in which the type of work, job responsibilities, and past man
agement practice support an individual or team orientation; and (7)
several interrelated elements that reflect the history of employment
relations and company "culture," including the presence and structure
of formal and informal employee involvement, communication and
information-sharing, employee trust in and commitment to the com
pany, and the pressure for performance. If employee involvement,
trust, and commitment do not exist when a plan is installed, the pre
scriptive literature emphasizes that they will not automatically be cre
ated by a new plan.5 Plan success in this case will depend on
thoroughgoing efforts to create new management styles, communica
tion, and processes for employee input to change the work structure
and environment.
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If a group incentive is deemed worthwhile, the literature recom
mends paying attention to the following elements of plan design and
implementation: (1) which employee groups to include; (2) a formula
that creates a "line of sight" from employee behavior to plan outcomes
(possibly blending the plan with operational measures); (3) anticipated
size of average contributions to ensure that the contribution is a signif
icant portion of employee pay; (4) cash or deferred payouts; (5)
employee involvement in plan design to meet employee needs and
engender strong employee support; and (6) ensuring support at all lev
els of management to integrate the plan into management philosophy.
Results from this study are relevant to several of these points. There
were larger productivity increases with the adoption of plans with high
average contributions, and with the adoption of cash plans.6 Somewhat
surprisingly, the results also indicated the most positive effects for
plans where the contribution is discretionary, with no set formula it is
possible that a discretionary plan may be used to more accurately
reflect the contribution of employees to improved performance (sub
tracting much of the "noise" in profits which is due to other factors),
but this would appear to require a high level of employee trust that the
discretion will not be abused. The finding that productivity increases
were largest in small firms is consistent with the prescription to keep
the basis for payoff within the "line of sight" of employees. There was
no strong support for the recommendation that profit sharing works
best when combined with information-sharing and programs encourag
ing employee involvement. Given the strong prescription that these are
very important for profit sharing to have motivational effects, this find
ing may either: (1) cast doubt on the conclusion that profit sharing is
responsible for the average performance improvement observed here,
or (2) cast doubt on the broad measures of information-sharing and
employee involvement used here, suggesting that more detailed mea
sures or company-specific analysis should be used.
What implications does the stability theory have for companies?
The stability theory is oriented toward the economywide benefits of
broad profit sharing rather than the benefits that one firm may reap by
adopting profit sharing. While there are many ways in which firms may
gain through employment stabilization strategies (e.g., by retaining
employee skills in which the firm has invested, and by increasing
employee commitment which can lead to a more motivated and flexi-
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ble workforce),7 the theory predicts that individual firms will not have
sufficient incentive to adopt profit sharing since many of the theorized
benefits from stability do not accrue directly to the firm. In fact, there
may be some disincentives for individual firms to adopt profit sharing,
such as employee aversion to fluctuating income. For firms that would
like to pursue employment stabilization strategies, though, profit shar
ing may be a useful complement to such efforts. It may do this by add
ing flexibility to one element of labor costs: when the firm is hit with
decreases in product demand, the profit share should be ignored by
profit-maximizing managers as a cost of retaining employees (accord
ing to theory). Employee concerns about fluctuating income may be
balanced by increased employment security, and by the prospect of
higher income if company performance improves (whether or not due
to higher employee productivity, as predicted by the productivity the
ory). Therefore profit sharing may prove useful in helping to stabilize
employment at the firm level; once again, though, the major benefit in
theory would be to the economy as a whole when profit sharing is
widespread, with lower unemployment and a smaller or nonexistent
business cycle. Whether such benefits are likely remains an important
research question, given that there are several supportive findings but
no strong support for the stability theory in the results presented here.

Implications for Unions
Unionized employees are less b'kely than nonunion employees to be
participants in profit-sharing plans, though there has been an increase
in profit-sharing provisions in union contracts in the 1980s (as
described in chapter 1). While few unions have ever opposed profit
sharing outright (Zalusky 1986: 177), the traditional union strategy has
emphasized fixed wages and benefits,8 and firms are less likely to
maintain profit sharing after successful union drives (Freeman and
Kleiner 1990; Czarnecki 1969).9
The distrust of profit sharing by unionists may be traced to three
sources. First, profit sharing has been used by some employers as an
antiunion tool (National Civic Federation 1920; Lindop 1989; Zalusky
1986). In this study, survey respondents indicated that "reducing likeli-
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hood of unionization" was, on average, one of the least important rea
sons for maintaining profit sharing, yet it was still listed as "very
important" by a small percentage (see table 2.2).
Second, industrial unions have traditionally been committed to
establishing uniform fixed wages and benefits in an industry to "take
wages out of competition" creating income stability, strengthening
worker solidarity, and forcing management to compete on "its ability
and innovation" (Zalusky 1986: 179). Profit sharing represents a chal
lenge to this approach since it may increase variability of income,
wage dispersion among workers, and worker competition between
firms (Mitchell 1987). As shown by the experience of Ford and Gen
eral Motors in the 1980s, differences in formulas and company perfor
mance can lead to very different worker payouts (Kruger 1986). Such
differences can provide lessons about the types of formulas and con
tract provisions that can most benefit workers; still, they also illustrate
the potential of profit sharing to increase wage dispersion and income
variability (balanced against greater job security, if the stability theory
is correct).
A third source of union concern is that, compared to fixed wages
and benefits, compliance with contract provisions regarding profit
sharing is more difficult to monitor. If a profit-sharing plan is part of a
union contract, labor law gives unions legal access to company records
to verify contract compliance. Such records may be easier to verify in
companies with public stock, where stockholders and the Securities
and Exchange Commission also monitor the information, than in pri
vate companies. One would expect the monitoring problem to lead
unions away from plans where the profit-sharing contribution is wholly
discretionary; in this context, it is noteworthy that discretionary plans,
while slightly less prevalent in unionized profit-sharing firms, nonethe
less represent almost half of the plans in unionized firms (though it is
unclear whether these plans are negotiated in union contracts) (Cardi
nal and Helburn 1986: 169).
Can profit sharing be useful to unions? While not part of the tradi
tional union strategy, profit sharing did figure into concession bargain
ing in the 1980s: "Profit sharing became part of a trade an investment
of current wages for a promise of a share of future returns" (Zalusky
1986: 180). Over the 1981-88 period, 17.1 percent of the union con
tracts involving first-year wage cuts also included profit-sharing provi-
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sions.10 In this context, the concessions are designed to save jobs, while
profit sharing provides potential for workers to automatically share in
any recovery. The stability theory holds that this method of sharing in
recovery rather than through increases in fixed wages and benefits
will make future layoffs less likely. The evidence from this study on
union participation in profit sharing (summarized in table 4.6) is mildly
favorable to this idea for a given demand shock, postadoption layoffs
tend to be smaller than preadoption layoffs but the variability in out
comes does not allow one to reject the possibility that there is no dif
ference in behavior.11
Is the productivity theory applicable in unionized settings? It is
clear that most instances of profit sharing in union contracts are not the
result of efforts to improve productivity (Zalusky 1986, 1990). If it is
applied in a unionized setting, there is no clear prediction on how
unions will affect the results. As discussed by Cooke (1993), unions
may enhance the effects of group-based pay incentives and employee
participation through providing additional information channels,
greater employment security, narrower pay and status differentials, and
greater worker cohesion; they may instead detract from such effects
through an adversarial stance against management, limiting efforts to
reorganize work, and restricting employee monitoring and sanctions
against those not cooperating in team-based activities. Unions clearly
add to the complex interplay of factors that determine the performance
of profit sharing in a particular setting. While there is potential for
profit sharing to positively affect performance in a union setting, too
little is known to make general conclusions. 12
Both the stability and productivity theories imply advantages for
workers and unions, through the potential for fewer layoffs under
adverse conditions and the potential for higher pay from better perfor
mance. This study provides some limited support for both theories, but
realizing these potentials (and whether they may be worth the costs of
wage concessions when such a choice is presented) undoubtedly
depends greatly on circumstances unique to each setting. 13
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Implications for Public Policy

Is there a role for public policy to play in the development of profit
sharing? The issue has been a subject of policy debates, proposals, and
legislation in a number of countries (Uvalic 1990; Florkowski 1991;
D'Art 1992). 14 Current approaches by national governments, as noted
by Florkowski (1991), can be divided into four categories: some form
of mandatory profit sharing (in 13 countries, although enforcement is
unclear), tax incentives (in four countries), advisory institutions (in one
country Denmark),15 and nonintervention (in 29 countries). The
United States has tax incentives only for deferred profit-sharing plans,
but this incentive is not specific to profit sharing since it exists for other
types of pensions. Great Britain, in contrast, established tax incentives
in 1987 specifically targeted to cash profit sharing (motivated in large
part by its potential to decrease high unemployment levels). 16
Is there a role for public policy in the productivity theory? There is
no obvious role. The gains from productivity improvement accrue to
the company and the employees, so if profit sharing improves produc
tivity, there should be sufficient private incentives for profit-sharing
adoption. Tax incentives are likely inappropriate under this theory,
since they are potentially costly and likely to encourage cosmetic
schemes in workplaces where profit sharing is unlikely to have a posi
tive impact. 17 The most appropriate government role under the produc
tivity theory would be to gather and disseminate information on how
profit sharing can be used to increase productivity. Such an approach
recognizes that this information may have a "public good" nature, cre
ating a potential role for government similar to its dissemination of
information through the agricultural extension system and sponsorship
of research on alternative energy sources. 18 As noted by Mitchell, the
rationale for this approach is weakened when there is substantial infor
mation available from private sources, so that
the argument for government dissemination of pay system information
must be ...that the incentives for "reliable" information spreading are
insufficient and that, because government is 'neutral,1 its reports and
conferences will be seen as more credible (better) than those of poten
tially- biased private disseminators (or possibly of fuzzy-headed aca
demics left on their own). (1993: 10)
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The approach that government should have a role in actively dis
seminating information is embodied in the recommendation by the
Cuomo Commission on Competitiveness to create a "National Center
for Employee Participation and Ownership." This would encourage a
"new, more participatory type of American capitalism" by assisting
companies considering or implementing participative systems such as
profit sharing and employee ownership (Kaden and Smith 1992: 105).
Florkowski recommends the creation of
a national commission of government, business, and labor representa
tives. This body could act as a short-term catalyst by mobilizing exper
tise, serving as an information clearinghouse, and engaging in
research roles similar to those performed by the National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health. As Denmark's experience demon
strates, this policy choice will not by itself directly facilitate a share
economy, but it will promote better quality information for decision
making and solutions that are acceptable to all parties. (1991: 111)

He goes on to point out how, with or without such a commission, the
U.S. federal government could redesign employer questionnaires "to
gather data about the presence and structural features of profit-sharing
plans and their outcomes," and could disseminate information through
agencies such as the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service or the
(now defunct) Bureau of Labor Management Cooperation. Given the
remarkable strength of associations between profit sharing and produc
tivity, and given that productivity growth rates have been slow in the
United States, such attention seems warranted.
Is there a role for public policy under the stability theory? Yes,
because the gains to employment stability do not accrue only to the
profit-sharing firm and employees, but to the entire economy (as
worker purchasing power is maintained without unemployment insur
ance or government assistance)."The external benefits to government
and the economy, if the stability theory is correct, would be justifica
tion for appropriate tax incentives (which was a large part of the ratio
nale for Great Britain's adoption of tax incentives for cash profit
sharing in 1987). The accumulated empirical evidence does not yet
make a strong case for tax incentives, as may be true for many public
policies and programs, but definitely makes a case for the attention of a
commission as recommended above.
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In line with several dozen studies over the past decade, this one has
found higher productivity associated with profit sharing, and differ
ences in employment behavior associated with certain kinds of profit
sharing. Most fundamentally, there clearly are links between profit
sharing, performance, pay, and employment that are remarkably
intriguing and worthy of more analysis. A safe conclusion is the tradi
tional call for further research to determine if, and under what condi
tions, profit sharing aids productivity and employment stability and
such a call is made here.20 Future studies can provide a more solid
foundation for policy debates, informed decisions by companies and
unions, and future theoretical development (even if, as is true in most
areas of inquiry, the conclusions are disparate).
There are high stakes in exploring the potential of profit sharing,
since the issues addressed by the profit-sharing theories productivity,
unemployment, and macroeconomic stability are central to economic
performance, security, and the standard of living.
NOTES
1. As discussed in the chapter, it cannot be ruled out that the stock price increase may have
been due to the announcement of a profit-sharing plan.
2. This does not invalidate results of cross-sectional studies, particularly where researchers
have made corrections for the endogeneity of profit sharing (e.g., Fitzroy and Kraft 1987), or
where the effects are found to be labor-embodied (Shepard 1986).
3. If profit sharing is at all responsible for the productivity increases, the stronger results for
the dummy variable may reflect the targeting of key employees in firms with less than 100 percent
coverage.
4. Numerous journal, magazine, and newspaper articles describing successful and unsuccess
ful case studies, along with more general literature mentioning profit sharing, were obtained
through searches of the ABI/INFORM, UNCOVER, ProQuest, and Business Dateline computer
ized databases, and the Business Periodicals Index up through June 1993. The following review is
based on a small sample of the prescriptive literature on group incentives, drawing from the fol
lowing books and articles: Belcher (1991); Cooper, Dyck; and Frohlich (1992); Gross (1989);
Gross and Bacher (1993); Hubbartt (1991); May (1991); McAdams and Hawk (1992); Nickel
(1990); Nichols (1989); Ost (1989); and Tomer (1987). Extended treatments are available in
Belcher (1991) and Schuster and Zingheim (1992).
5. Employee trust in management of Fortune 500 firms appears to have declined in the 1980s
(Denton 1991). Profit sharing may be a poor method of increasing trust, and may in fact have the
opposite effect. In a survey of Michigan employers, a large majority viewed profit sharing by
itself as having a negative effect on employee trust (Mishra and Morrissey 1990). A review of
studies of employee attitudes under profit sharing, employee ownership, quality circles, and
autonomous work groups also makes it clear that employee attitudes will not automatically
improve with these workplace innovations (Kelly and Kelly 1991).
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6. It remains possible, however, that deferred plans have some delayed advantage in reducing
turnover.
7. See Dyer, Foltman, and Milkovich (1985); Osterman (1987); and Ichniowski (1992).
8. Exceptions include the "progress sharing" provision in the United Auto Workers-American
Motors contract in 1961, and a number of negotiated profit-sharing plans in the 1980s (particu
larly in the automobile industry). See Zalusky (1986) for other examples and a discussion.
9. In the absence of formal contractual profit sharing, unions nonetheless affect firm profits,
and in some sense may "share" in them by negotiating higher fixed wages and benefits in profit
able companies. For evidence on the union-profit relationship, see Becker and Olson (1992).
10. Calculated from table 1 of Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler. (1990: 25). Overall, 133 contracts
included profit sharing, representing 7.4 percent of the contracts identified in this period. In con
tracts where cost-of-living allowances were frozen or eliminated, 17.6 percent and 12.3 percent
(respectively) included profit sharing, again clearly suggesting a higher incidence of profit sharing
in concession situations than in nonconcession situations.
11. The favorable but statistically insignificant results for union participation in profit sharing
are comparable to those of Bell and Neumark (1993).
12. Limited existing evidence indicates that union participation can have positive effects.
Cooke (1993) finds positive interactions of unions and profit/gainsharing on three performance
measures in a sample of Michigan manufacturing firms (though the most positive interactions
come from unions and employee participation). While the productivity effects of union participa
tion in profit sharing were not a focus of the present study, a cursory examination of the profitsharing adoptions in chapter 3 revealed positive but smaller and insignificant estimates on adop
tions of plans in which a majority of union members participate (with a substantial dispersion in
outcomes, indicating a number of positive and negative productivity outcomes).
13. When profit-sharing plans are negotiated, Kruger emphasizes that: "[Management and
their unions must commit themselves to the plan if it is to be effective. For a plan to have credibil
ity, it must have the complete support of management, unions, and employees. A key factor is the
employees. They must be fully informed of the purposes and goals of the new plan. The features
must be thoroughly explained, and they must be convinced or persuaded of its direct benefit"
(1986:153-4).
14. For a related discussion of policy options for employee ownership in the United States, see
Blasi and Kruse (1993).
15. For a discussion of the history and debates in Denmark over public policy on profit sharing
and employee stock ownership, see chapter 5 in D'Art (1992). Similar discussion for Sweden and
Ireland are provided in chapters 4 and 6.
16. For a brief overview of the current status, see Singleton-Green (1992).
17. Tax incentives might, though, be used to encourage experimentation, as temporary incen
tives have sometimes been designed to encourage development and diffusion of new technolo
gies. Also, it is possible that there are market failures acting against the combination of profit
sharing with other participative arrangements, which may also justify tax incentives. See, e.g.,
Levine and D'Andrea Tyson (1990); and Levine (1992b).
18. If there are valuable lessons on productivity to be learned from company experiments in
profit sharing, these "positive externalities" create a stronger case for active government encour
agement of profit sharing.
19. This "macro rationale" for profit sharing is further discussed in Mitchell (1993). He also
notes that public policy intervention can be based on a "social transformation rationale" (where
the practice being encouraged is part of a desired social transformation, such as labor law or civil
rights legislation) or on a "merit goods rationale" (where the government takes the lead in encour-
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aging citizens to do what is in their long-term interest, such as encouraging retirement security by
subsidizing private pension plans).
20. Whether government should sponsor such research, possibly through a commission as
described above, is a question better left to those with less self-interest in the answer.

Appendix 1
Construction of Dataset and Analysis of Response

To test adequately the profit-sharing theories requires company perfor
mance and employment data over a number of years. The problem with pick
ing companies with the most years of information is that they will be the
oldest companies, and perhaps clustered in particular industries; this presents
external validity problems in generalizing the results to younger and middleaged companies and to other industries. The selection rule employed in con
structing the sample frame was to identify those companies with at least eight
years of employment data over the 1980s (1980-89), since employment data
are crucial in testing both profit-sharing theories.
Past evidence indicates that fewer than 50 percent of U.S. companies have
profit-sharing plans for employees other than top management. Profit-sharing
firms were oversampled to increase their representation in the final dataset.
Additionally, to increase the quality of industry controls, an attempt was made
to find, for each company, a matched pair within the same (2-digit SIC) indus
try with the opposite profit-sharing status. For example, for each profit-sharing
food processor, an attempt was made to find a non-profit-sharing food proces
sor to act as a paired control.
The initial sample, drawn from the 1990 Standard and Poor's CompuStat at
Rutgers University, included 1,085 companies. These were ordered by indus
try, and a systematic sample was drawn to ensure a representative distribution
across industries. The Eagleton Institute at Rutgers, which conducted the sur
vey, employed five interviewers to contact and complete interviews with 250
companies, asking for the Vice-President for Human Resources (if not, then
"the person in the company who is most familiar with the employee benefits
your company offers").1 The interviews were completed between May and
July of 1991 and took an average of 6.16 minutes. After the initial 250 suc
cessful contacts, the process of finding same-industry matched pairs began.
For many firms the initial random sample produced matched pairs in the same
industry, so that further systematic sampling could be done. Where a sameindustry matched pair was needed, firms in that industry were contacted until
one with the opposite profit-sharing status could be interviewed. The search
for a matched pair was not successful in each industry, which led to the pro-
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duction of a larger sample frame. In those industries the standard was lowered
to 7 out of 10 years of employment data in the 1980s, producing an additional
89 companies in the sample frame. Such choice-based sampling produces a
final sample which is not representative of the population. This does not pro
duce a bias in fixed-effects estimation (Heckman and Robb 1985: 219). For
the sample selection terms and the few specifications that did not use fixed
effects, variables were reweighted to reflect the choice-based sampling (Manski and Lerman 1977).2
Of the 1,174 companies in the final sample frame, at least one attempt was
made to contact 906 of them. Of these, three had gone out of business at the
time of the survey, and 36 could not be reached due to disconnected phone
numbers, leaving 867 that were contacted. In the course of finding paired con
trols for the initial systematic sample, two profit-sharing and 53 non-profitsharing firms were excluded because they could not serve as a paired control.
Of the remaining 812 contacted firms, interviews were completed with 500,
for a response rate among contacted firms of 61.6 percent. Unsuccessful con
tacts included 115 refusals and 197 cases where repeated attempts to locate
and talk to the appropriate person were unsuccessful.
The information from non-profit-sharing firms was obtained entirely by
phone. For profit-sharing firms, the respondents were asked at the end of the
phone interview whether they would answer several further questions in a fol
low-up mail survey. The primary reason for doing so was that the desired
information would generally require looking up records relevant to the plan.
In particular, information was desired on what share of participants' pay was
represented by profit sharing in each of the years 1975 to 1990. In addition,
the questions on the profit-sharing formula, and whether profit-sharing adop
tion was accompanied by changes in management personnel, were reserved
for the mail survey. Mail surveys were sent to the 253 profit-sharing partici
pants, and after several call-backs to nonrespondents, were received com
pleted by 124 respondents (a response rate of 49 percent on the mail portion).
The telephone and mail survey forms are reproduced in this appendix. At
the beginning of the telephone survey, the confidentiality promise was made
explicit for respondents who hesitated or inquired about the survey: "All your
responses will be kept totally confidential no one will know how you
responded to any particular question. The results of the survey are presented in
a statistical report and will not single out anyone in particular."
Appendix table A 1.1 shows a comparison of the firms interviewed in the
phone portion of the survey with the other firms that were contacted but not
interviewed. As can be seen by comparisons of the mean values, the respon
dents on average had significantly lower sales, employment, and net assets in
1990 relative to the nonrespondents, but similar averages in profit margins and
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other financial measures. These measures were used in probit regressions pre
dicting response. Regression 1 uses 1990 measures, and, to determine whether
recent trends in these variables affect response, regression 2 uses both 1989
and 1990 measures. Few significant differences in size or financial measures
appear in the regressions. In regression 1, at the 10 percent level of statistical
significance, respondents appear to have higher capital intensity and lower
debt/equity ratios. Recent changes in these variables appear not to matter, as
indicated by the insignificance of these variables or their lags in regression
2 the only financial or size measure reaching significance at the 10 percent
level is 1989 sales/invested capital. A variety of other measures was used with
no greater success in predicting response. Selection corrections using inverse
Mill's ratios were included with the subsequent regressions reported in chap
ters 2, 3, and 4.
NOTES
1. The distribution of respondents was as follows: 60 Vice-Presidents/Directors of Human
Resources, 247 Directors/Managers of Employee Benefits, 33 other Vice-Presidents or Corporate
Officers, with most of the remainder representing compensation or benefits analysts, or personnel/
employee services staff.
2. The reweighting caused very minor changes in the results, largely due to the high incidence
of profit sharing (40.7 percent) in the random sample, which did not vary greatly by broad indus
try.

Table Al.l

Self-Selection of Respondents
Mean values
respondents
Yes

No
1990 values
In(sales)
In(employees)
ln(net assets)
Debt/equity
Profit margin
Interest/assets
Depreciation/assets
Sales/invested capital
Stock price change
Net assets (000,000s)
Sales (000,000s)
Employees (OOOs)
1989 values
ln(sales
In(employees)
ln(net assets)
Debt/equity
Profit margin
Interest/assets

Probit regressions
(Dep. var. = 1 if respondent, 0 if not)
(2)
(1)

6.237
1.255
5.196
0.383
0.166
0.058
0.180
1.842
0.188
1236.823
2381.144
16.657

**
**
**

6.159
1.252
5.070
0.415
0.167
0.062

**
**
**

*

6.782
1.663
5.728
0.352
0.156
0.051
0.136
1.843
0.179
1718.667
3623.414
19.590
6.682
1.635
5.651
0.385
0.165
0.119

0.049
-0.161
0.180*
-0.388*
-0.316
-0.147
1.164
0.009
0.030

(0.14)
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.23)
(0.58)
(1.12)
(0.80)
(0.05)
(0.09)

0.116
0.310
-0.214
-0.683
-0.615
0.590
0.641
-0.171
-0.023

(0.51)
(0.50)
(0.43)
(0.48)
(1.30)
(2.82)
(1.53)
(0.11)
(0.11)

-0.042
-0.509
0.413
0.305
0.550
-1.521

(0.50)
(0.50)
(0.43)
(0.45)
(1.40)
(3.03)

Depreciation/assets
Sales/invested capital
Stock price change
Net assets (000,000s)
Sales (000,000s)
Employees (OOOs)
Industry
Mining/construction
Nondurable manufacturing
Durable manufacturing
Communications
Utilities
Wholesale
Retail
FIRE
Service (omitted)
Constant
N
Log-likelihood

0.134
0.178
2.027
1.870
0.159
0.330
1596.169
1135.984
3309.635
**
2129.009
19.328
15.814
Number of companies
20
21
153
83
157
87
17
13
74
43
18
9
25
17
22
20
14
19
312

500

0.076
0.616**
0.662**
0.248
0.396
0.920**
0.647*
0.272
-1.248
711
^51.985

(0.35)
(0.27)
(0.26)
(0.35)
(0.32)
(0.42)
(0.33)
(0.41)
(0.50)

0.603
0.141*
-0.052

(1.69)
(0.08)
(0.07)

0.246
0.622**
0.779**

(0.39)
(0.31)
(0.30)
(0.37)
(0.35)
(0.47)
(0.37)
(0.46)

0.228
0.365
1.096**
0.760**
0.303
-1.418
662
-413.052

(0.56)

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses.
*For mean values, respondents and nonrespondents are significantly different at p <.10. For regressions, coefficient is significantly different from zero at
p<.10 **p<.05.
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PROFIT SHARING--TELEPHONE SURVEY

___
RESP ID
105-107

QIC91
101-104

_!__
DECK
108

TIME BEGAN:.

SCREENING QUESTIONS

Introduction for Receptionist.Hello, I'd like to speak with the Vice President for Hunan Resources.
Interviewer Note;
Other possible titles are! Chief Operating Officer; Vice President for Industrial
Relations or Personnel; Manager of Operations; Director of Employee Benefits.
Description of Position: I'd Uka to speak with the person In the company who is
most familiar with the employee benefits your company offers.
When appropriate person Is on the teleahonf;
Hello, my name 1s—————————————————(first and last name). I'm on the
staff of the Eagleton Institute at Rutgers University. We have randomly selected
companies nationwide to conduct a survey on employee benefits. I'd like to ask you
few questions about your company.
To begin, does your company have a profit sharing plan for employees other
than too management?

1.
109-

|1.

YES
NO

2.

r

ASK Q. 2
GO TO Q.8, P.3

Do you have one or more than one profit-sharing plan?
1 ASK: How many plans do you have?)
110-

I. ONE PLAN
2. TWO PLANS
3. THREE PLANS
4. FOUR PLANS
5. MORE THAN FOUR PLANS
9. DON'T KNOW

2A.

What 1s the nan«(s) of the plan(s}?

111-

PLAN 1: __________________

112-

PLAN 2: ___________________

113-

PLAN 3: __________________

114-

PLAN 4: __________________

(PROBE:

IF ."ORE TK;N

180

3-

Cou1 r^rL,?IeUS tcl1 me "h*1 th1s ( the«) pUn(s) 1$ (are)?
(INTERVIEWER CODE EACH PLAN NAMED UNDER A SPECIFIC PLAN)
PUN 2
». Cash pUn (with payment!
directly to employed)
b. Pension plan (with payments
to a pension trust)

4.

115-

1

n*.

2

PLAN A

PUN?
117.

i

,

,
l

.„
"•

•»

•>

2

c. Combination of cash and pension plan

3333

d. Other (Specify-) ____________

*

4

4

4

e. Other (Specify;) ___________

5

5

5

<

F. Don't Know/Refused

9999

Could you please tell me about how many years the plan (each of these plans)
have been In existence?
(INTERVIEWER: IF MORE THAN ONE PLAN, ASK FOR EACH PLAN NAMED IN Q.3)

119-120

PLAN 1:

_________________

121-122

PLAN 2:

__________________

123-124

PLAN 3:

__________________

125-126

PLAN 4:

_________________

(DON'T KNOW - 99)

5.

When the (any) profit sharing plan(s) was (were) established, were any
significant changes nadt in personnel policies or other conpensation? (IF
"YES," ASK: Please describe these changes.)

127-

1. YES /
2. NO

/ /________________________________
128 129

—————————————————————————————————————————

9. DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

Approximately, what percentage of your company employees, excluding ton
. is covered by the profit sharing plan(s)?
130 • 132
7.

Abo«t what percentage of all (nane each type of employee) at the company are
covered by the pUn(s)7
(999-OON'T KNOW/REFUSED)

______X

133-135 a. Production/service employees (non-exempt)
136-138 b. Clerical/technical employees (non-exenpt)

_____*

139-141 c. Professional/administrative employees (exempt)

______*

181

ASK EVERYONE

Now just some general questions about your company.
8.

JBlI
(99-OON'T KNOW/REFUScD)

142-143

Production/service (non-exempt)
Clerical/technical (non-exempt)
Professional/administrative (exempt)

144-145
146-147

(INTERVIEWER NOTE:

_
_
_

THIS SHOULD ADO TO 100%)

Are any of your employees covered under a union contract?
.48-

1.

- r>|

YES

2. NO
9. DON'T KNOW

ASK q. 10
{

— _y

GO TO Q.

(IF -YES* TO Q. 9, ASK:)

10.

What is the approximate percentage of all employees covered by a
union contract?
(OON'T KNOW/REFUSED • 999)

149 - 151

(ASK ONLY If HAVE PBOPIT SHAR1N61

11.
152-

2.

Do a majority of union employees participate in the
profit-sharing plan(s)?
1. YES, MAJORITY PARTICIPATES
2. NO, MAJORITY DOES MOT PARTICIPATE
9. DON'T KNOW

About how many corporation employees, excluding top management, are
routinely provide* with (READ ITEM BELOW)--nont, some, about half, most, or
None
0%

Information about ttw
compcny's ov*n* operating
on buvntM
pJaraand goals
i on cofnpcdton'
rtictfvt pwfofTnanc*

153-

Some
1-40%

'About

Halt
41-aO%

Uo*t
61-09%

All
100%

Don't
"no*
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Now I'm going to read a list of programs or policies. For each, just tall
If your
me how many years your company has had that program or policy. AT
company does not have It, just say so. First, how about (START
DESIGNATED POINT) ...

13.

Number of
Years Had

Do Not
Have This
98

98

1<8-L59

98
160-161

98

162-163

Some
(M0%)

About
Hilf

Msa

U&)

Dei
**

( ) a. Attitude Survey Feedback
-Corporate employees
-•Union employees
"Members of the
profit-sharing plan

209- 1
210- 1
211- 1

2
2
2

1
3
3

4
4
4

5

5

9
9
9

( ) b. Suggestion System
-•Corporate employees
"Union employees
-Members of the
profit-sharing plan

212- 1
213- 1
214- 1

»
i

2

3
3
3

4
4
4

<
<
<

9
9
9

( ) c. Job Enrichment or Redesign
-Corporate employees
-*Unioa employees
-Members of the
profit-sharing plan

215- 1
216- 1
217- 1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

5

5
5

9
9
9

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

9
9
9

( ) d. Employee Involvement groups,
such as, Quality Circles or other
formal committees
218- 1
-Corporate employees
219- 1
~Umon employees
220- 1
--Members of the
profit-sharing plan

98

( ) e. Self-Manned work teams
"Corporate employees
-Union employees
"Members of the
profit-sharing plan

221- 1
222- 1
223- 1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

9
9
9

98

( ) f. Employment Security
"Corporate employees
.•Union employees
-Members of the
profit-sharing plan

224. 1
225- 1
226. 1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

9
9
9

98

3*»
( ) f> Prodactmry-JUtattd Group Bonuea
227- 1
-Corporate employees
228- 1
--Union employees
229- 1
-Members of the
profit-sharing plan

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

9
9
9

164-165

166-167

168-169

Sort
0%

READ THIS QUESTION FOR EACH PROGRAM/POLICY THE COMPANY HAS;

\

about how many (TY
14. Now, thinking about your company's (STAXT AT DESIGNATED POINT),
OF EMPLOYEE) participate in this plan-none, SOM, about half, most or all.
NOTE: ONLY ASX A00OT 'NEWER* OF PROFIT-SHAMNfi PLAN' IF CONPANY HAS PROFIT SHARIM
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FOR COMPANIES WITH PROFIT SHARING.
Thank you vary much for your cooperation

ForfK ! «h!JiS ""There S 1milty^? ?»rt| cular1 y Interested 1n companies that have
profit-sharing. There are some additional questions we would like you to answer on a
8h°
P
'
°Ul l lM$e hav* y°Ur name ' »<""» Jn pomon
om?
to ser
l
o
you this follow-up
questionnaire
In the nail?
NAME:
ADDRESS:

POSITION:.

230-231

FOR COMPANIES WITHOUT PROFIT SHARING:

Could I please have your name, address and position.
NAME:
ADDRESS: .

POSITION:

zn
MTI: /_

as

Mil *MB:

as

23*

a?7

265-

._____I
O»

240

HI

IP HATCHEBi

H1BVIBI LOET1I

ne

i /

/
Z**

/
«»

rlet

'•»«

26C

/

/
Bl

MATCHED FILE NUMBER:

/

Z*7

2. rouu

/

/

/ / /
2*4

«« 2«- i. MU
lUTIt ^

I. PRIMARY
2. MATCHED

231

INTERVIEWER! L

If
2Si
»J

I
I
•
I
2M 2S» 260 241

I
3U

I
M3

267

1
1**

I

268
270

269
/
271

J
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*l'>K^B 0l W I

101-104

O8Sb*/AT>6N*
108-106

DECK
108

PROFIT SHARING SURVEY
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO TELEPHONE SURVEY

According to the telephone interview we had with you. the following are the profit sharing plans
fou offer to employees (other than top management):
YEARS PLAN HAS
BEEN IN EXISTENCE

TYPE OF PLAN
3LAN1
3 LAN?
3LAN3
'LAN 4

\s we described on the telephone, there is some additional Information we would like to have
about these plans.
I.

For each plan you have, circle the number '1 * next to the option(s) that describes
what your company's contribution to the plan is based upon?

Sotnoanv Contribution Qptlona
L

Specific percentage of profits

(Please write In what percent)
>.

Specific percentage of profits in excess
of amount reserved for dividends or
retained earnings
(Please write In what percent:)

Ham
110- 1

11M13

114- 1

115-117

PUna

*
izfia
12S- 1

__%

127-129

Plans
134-

1

135-137

138-

1

%
139-141

Plan 4
148-

1

147-149

130-

1

131-153

:.

Fully discretionary

118- 1

130-1

142-

I

154.

1

L

Specific percentage of profits plus
discretionary amount

m 1

131-1

143.

1

185-

1

Specific percentage of participants' pay

120. 1

132.1

144.

1

158-

1

Other (please describe: ________

121. 1

149-

1

157-

1

•,

185

Was the profit-sharing plan adopted following a change in management personnel?
56-

1. YES
2. NO
IF YES. ON THE LINES BELOW. BREIFLY DESCRIBE THE CHANGES:

$9-160

_______________________________________________________________

What was the company's contribution to the profit-sharing plan(s) as a percent of the
total payroll for participants in each of the following years?
(NOTE: THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE PLANS FOR TOP MANAGEMENT)
(If fiscal year basis, indicate beginning month:

__)
18M62

1975 ___ %

1979 ___ %

%

1976

KIP. 175-180

31-208

209

1987

%

1988

%

1989

*

1990

222-224

1984
223-227

213-215

*

1961

%

1982

180-171

1978

%

1980

168-168

1977

1983 ____ %

210-212

163-165

%

1985

%

1986

216-218

228-230

234-236

237-239

240242

186

Each of the following are reasons for maintaining the profit-sharing plan(s). Please
use the five point scale to indicate how important each is for maintaining the profitsharing plan(s) in your company.

\.

Vary
Important

Not
Important

M.

a. Providing a source of retirement Inconw

1

234

5

17.

b. Recruiting and retaining personnel

1

234

5

»

c. Motivating existing employees

t

234

5

19-

d. Reducing likelihood of unionization

1

234

5

so-

e. Reducing the probablfty or size of layoffs

1

234

5

n-

f. Stabllzing corporate cash flow

i

234

5

Please list any other reasons for maintaining the profit-sharing plan(s) on the lines
below and indicate the Importance of each:
Very
Important

Not
Important

1

234

5

1

234

5

1

234

5

se the lines below for any comments you have about why your company ma'ntains the profitlaring plan(s).
M61
J-263

.EASE RETURN IN THE ENCLOSED PASTAGE PAID ENVELOPE TO:

Center for Public Interest Polling
Eagleton Institute of Politics
Rutgers University

Wood Lawn - Neilson Campus

90 Clifton Avenue

New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1568

Appendix 2
Econometric Specification of Prediction Equations

The prediction of profit-sharing adoption was done with both linear proba
bility and binomial logit models. The linear probability model was specified
as:
(1) PSJ, = alwhere
= dummy for existence of profit sharing in firm /, year t
PS
= firm-specific intercept term
a/
pi and P2= coefficient vectors
%i, t - 1 = vector of explanatory variables in firm /, year t - 1
Xf, t-2 = vector of explanatory variables in firm i, year t - 2
= error term.
ex

The firm-specific intercept a, was removed through using deviations from
firm-specific means for all variables, and an AR(1) correction was done to
adjust for autocorrelation. The binomial logit model was based on first-differ
enced data, with the dependent variable PS,, - PSJr ,. i and independent vari
ables Xj t . i - Xk , _ 2- For both models, lagged independent variables were
chosen to avoid simultaneity problems. The logit specification was chosen
since this transformation will produce consistent estimates of the parameters
of interest (unlike probits, where there is not a consistent estimator with panel
data) (Hsiao 1986: 163). Because the firm intercept is removed by both proce
dures, the value of the dependent variable varies only when profit sharing is
adopted—therefore these regressions involve prediction of profit-sharing
adoption rather than the presence of profit sharing.
For both of these procedures, the regressions were done with the full sam
ple, and then using only the paired sample, with the difference between each
pair representing a single observation.
Results are presented in appendix tables A2.2 and A2.3, with descriptive
statistics and variable definitions in appendix table A2.1.

187

Table A2.1

Descriptive Statistics and Definitions for Appendix Tables A2.2 and A2.3
Linear Prob.

First differences8
Definition

Mean

(s.d.)

Mean

(s.d.)

0.314

(0.46)

0.024

(0.15)

Presence of profit-sharing plan in year ta

Cash

0.010

(0.10)

Adoption of plan with cash elements in year t

Deferred

0.008

(0.09)

Adoption of deferred-only plan in year t

PS

Salesvar

0.025

(0.06)

0.000

(0.05)

Variance of change in In(sales) over t - 5 to t - 1

PMvar

0.127

(0.51)

0.004

(0.23)

Variance of change in ln(profit margin) over f - 5 to / - 1

PM (-1)

0.162

(0.10)

-0.001

(0.03)

Profit margin in / - 1

PM (-2)

0.162

(0.11)

Sales (-1)

6.323

(1.65)

Sales (-2)

6.228

(1.66)

Price (-1)

18.234

(20.00)

Price (-2)

16.840

(18.13)

KL(-l)

3.592

(1.46)

KL(-2)

3.514

(1.47)

Debt/eq. (-1)

0.326

(0.24)

Debt/eq. (-2)

0.333

(0.68)

Profit margin in / - 2
0.085

(0.16)

Ln(total sales) in t - 1
Ln(total sales) in t - 2

0.183

(0.39)

Closing stock price in / - 1
Closing stock price in t - 2
(first-differenced value is percentage change in price)

0.077

(0.18)

Ln(net assets/employees) in f - 1
Ln(net assets/employees) in / - 2

-0.010

(0.71)

Debt/equity ratio in t - 1
Debt/equity ratio in t - 2

Interest (-1)

0.035

(0.05)

Interest (-2)

0.035

(0.04)

Union trend

61.713

(36.11)

0.000

(0.02)

Interest payments as percent of sales in t - 1
Interest payments as percent of sales in t - 2

0.782

(0.41)

Time trend for unionized companies

NOTES: For the paired differences in appendix tables A2.2 and A2.3, the value of each variable in a nonprofit-sharing company was subtracted from the
value for its paired profit-sharing company. Each observation represents a matched pair.
a. For first-differenced PS (including cash and deferred), variable value is profit-sharing dummy in t minus value in t - 1. For other first-differenced data,
variable equals / - 1 minus 1-1 value (except for price change, which is percentage change in price from / - 2 to t - 1).

Table A2.2 Prediction of Profit-Sharing Adoption
Firm-intercepts, linear probability
dummy for presence of profit sharing in year /
Paired differences
Independent
variable
(4)
(1)
(2)
(3)

Salesvar

0.074*
(0.04)

PMvar
PM (-1)
PM (-2)
Sales (-1)
Sales (-2)
Price (-1)
Price (-2)
KL(-l)

0.090*
(0.05)
0.031
(0.05)
0.021*
(0.01)
-0.010
(0.01)
2E-04
(0.0002)
4E-04*
(0.0002)
-0.009
(0.01)

0.118
(0.09)

0.015**
0.013
(0.01)
(0.01)
0.087*
0.225**
0.268**
(0.05)
(0.10)
(0.11)
0.011
0.011
0.049
(0.05)
(0.11)
(0.12)
0.058**
0.017
0.059**
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.02)
-0.027
-0.014
-0.006
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
3E-04
IE -04
IE - 04
(0.0002)
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
-2E-04
-IE -04
OE + 00
(0.0002)
(0.0005)
(0.0005)
-0.015
-0.004
-0.004
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)

Independent
variables
Change from 1 - 2
to t - 1 in:
Salesvar

First-differences, logits
dummy for adoption of profit sharing in year t*
Paired differences
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

0.572
(2.20)

0.655
(1.95)

PMvar
PM

1.983
(3.05)

0.626*
(0.33)
1.140
(3.16)

Sales

0.935
(0.62)

0.763
(0.66)

0.143
(0.78)

0.255
(0.83)

Price

0.827**
(0.20)

0.924**
(0.21)

0.457*
(0.26)

0.422
(0.27)

KL

-0.462
(0.48)

-0.361
(0.50)

0.399
(0.68)

0.236
(0.72)

5.753*
(3.37)

0.133
(0.23)
7.134**
(3.60)

KL(-2)
Debt/eq. (-1)
Debt/eq. (-2)
Interest (-1)
Interest (-2)
Union trend
Year squared
Year
AR(1)
correction
N
R-squared

-0.004
(0.01)
-0.001
(0.01)
-0.001
(0.00)
-0.051
(0.11)
-0.074
(0.11)
0.005**
(0.00)
0.001**
(0.00)
-0.070**
(0.03)

-0.010
(0.01)
0.004
(0.02)
-0.003
(0.02)
-0.002
(0.12)
0.000
(0.13)
0.006**
(0.00)
0.000**
(0.00)
-0.055**
(0.03)

-0.007
(0.02)
0.001
(0.02)
-0.001
(0.00)
-0.146
(0.23)
-0.180
(0.23)
0.000
(0.00)

Yes
6276
0.930

Yes
6056
0.930

Yes
2093
0.816

-0.006
(0.02)
-0.004
(0.04)
0.048
(0.04)
-0.251
(0.24)
-0.180
(0.25)
0.001
(0.00)

Debt/eq.

0.252
(0.48)

0.801
(0.86)

-1.393
(1.40)

-1.359
(1.54)

Interest

0.198
(6.23)

-0.800
(6.36)

-3.679
(11.97)

-5.118
(12.01)

0.336*
(0.28)
0.045**
(0.01)
-11.335
(2.11)

0.277
(0.29)
0.041**
(0.01)
-10.621
(2.20)

-0.158
(0.26)

-0.279
(0.27)

-2.153
(0.13)

-2.178
(0.14)

4084
^49.310

3912
-419.147

619
-222.045

619
-205.947

Union trend
Year squared
Constant

Yes
1969
0.814

N
Log-likelihood

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. See appendix table A2.1 for definitions and descnptive statistics,
a. Logit sample restricted to firms which did not have profit sharing in/- 1.
*Significantly different from zero at p < 10 **p <.05.

Table A2.3 Prediction of Cash and Deferred Plan Adoption

Independent variable
Change from t - 2 to f - 1 in:
Salesvar

(1)

Sales
Price
KL
Debt/eq.
Interest
Union trend
Year squared

(5)

-3.217
(2.90)

3.598
(2.83)

-2.190
(1.82)

PMvar
PM

Cash plans
Paired differences
(4)
(3)
(2)

0.478
(4.49)
-0.211
(0.95)
0.793***
(0.29)
-0.257
(0.84)
0.180
(0.72)
5.857
(9.24)
0.996**
(0.49)
-0.559***
(0.84)

0.181
(0.55)
2.601
(4.44)
-0.131
(0.95)
0.873**
(0.35)
-0.401
(0.79)
0.395
(1-23)
3.397
(9.91)
0.826**
(0.49)
0.082***
(0.02)

7.552*
(4.24)
-0.349
(1.00)
0.162
(0.38)
0.441
(0.92)
-0.130
(1.26)
-9.708
(11.48)
0.621*
(0.36)

-0.191
(0.58)
8.957**
(4.35)
-0.587
(1.08)
0.012
(0.45)
0.483
(0.97)
0.158
(1.61)
-11.449
(11.90)
0.482
(0.38)

-2.931
(4.40)
0.356
(0.76)
0.836***
(0.25)
-0.961*
(0.54)
0.123
(0.81)
-0.832
(8.13)
0.302
(0.37)
0.010
(0.02)

Deferred plans
Paired differences
(8)
(7)
(6)
2.157
(2.34)
0.523**
(0.25)
-3.980
(4.50)
0.404
(0.89)
0.956**
(0.28)
-1.000
(0.56)
0.374
(1.57)
-2.227
(7.86)
0.314
(0.37)
0.013
(0.02)

2.636
(3.98)
-0.313
(0.84)
0.714***
(0.27)
-1.067
(0.70)
-0.098
(0.39)
0.365
(6.53)
-0.228
(0.30)

0.178
(0.25)
3.230
(4.19)
-0.206
(0.90)
0.867***
(0.31)
-1.056
(0.77)
-1.207
(1.41)
2.844
(5.19)
-0.241
(0.32)

VO
to

Constant
N
Log-likelihood

-19.253
(3.41)
5443
-254.170

-18.890
(3.59)
5203
-230.626

-4.123
(0.20)
1742
-150.160

-4.108
(0.20)
1640
-141.265

NOTES: See appendix table A2.1 fa- variable definitions and descriptive statistics.
*Statistically significant at p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.

-6.269
(2.89)
5199
-265.215

-6.634
(2.92)
4961
-261.653

-3.637
(0.18)
1420
-183.139

-3.682
(0.19)
1318
-167.679

Table A2.4 Participation in Profit Sharing by Union and Occupational Status

Independent
variable
Prof7admin. share

Probit
Dummy for
majority of
union
members
participating
(1)
0.014
(0.01)

OLS
OLS
OLS
OLS
Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of
professional/ production/ Percentage of
clerical/
service
all
admin,
technical
Means
workers
employees
workers
(s.d.) for
workers
participating participating participating participating
col. 1
(5)
(6)
(4)
(2)
(3)
0.439**
1.049**
0.636**
0.311
25.952
(0.21)
(0.41)
(0.28)
(0.30)
(14.09)

Prod/service share

0.000
(0.01)

52.424
(19.33)

KL

0.288
(0.26)
0.098
(0.10)
-1.705
(2.41)
0.016**
(0.01)
-0.006
(0.01)
Yes

4.107
(1.21)
1.634
(1.77)
0.138
(0.10)
37.894
(24.52)
13.518
(11.58)

Ln(employment)
Profit margin
Percent in union
PS age
Seven industry
dummies
Constant

-1.562
(1.55)

0.402**
(0.20)

0.563**
(0.19)

Means
(s.d.) for
cols. 3-5
(7)
25.440
(13.56)

0.492*
(0.27)

0.082
(0.15)

48.060
(22.22)
3.953
(1.27)
1.311
(1.73)
0.141
(0.12)
24.870
(26.87)
15.930
(12.15)

1.505
(4.42)
0.646
(1.79)
31.071
(41.93)
-0.148
(0.12)
0.156
(0.27)
Yes

-0.369
(4.13)
0.490
(1.68)
31.072
(39.23)
-0.194*
(0.11)
0.465*
(0.26)
Yes

1.569
(5.95)
-0.179
(2.42)
7.547
(56.53)
-0.376**
(0.16)
0.300
(0.37)
Yes

0.064
(3.54)
-1.535
(1.43)
-4.068
(33.60)
-0.221**
(0.09)
0.421**
(0.18)
Yes

3.498
(31.81)

-3.342
(29.75)

-14.377
(42.87)

51.575
(21.34)

Brief definition
Percent of employees in
professional or
administrative (exempt)
jobs
Percent of employees in
production or service
(nonexempt)jobs
Ln(net assets/employees),
1990
Ln (employment), 1990
Profit margin, 1990
Percent of employees in
union
Age of oldest profitsharing plan

N
Log-likelihood
R-squared
Dependent var. mean

85
-48.71

100

100

100

124

0.216
0.226
0.227
0.222
80.355
87.320
71.010
85.410
0.435
(26.80)
(25.96)
(38.58)
(28.55)
(0.50)
columns 3 to 6 are restricted to profit-sharing firms.
in
samples
the
while
NOTES: The sample in column 1 is restricted to profit-sharing firms with unions,
Standard errors in parentheses for coefficients, and standard deviations in parentheses for means.
"Significantly different from zero at p < 10 * p <.05.

Appendix 3
Econometric Specification and Selection Corrections

The estimating equation is based upon the first terms of a translogarithmic
production function (Christensen, Jorgensen, and Lau 1975):
ln(0 = P!*ln(L) + P^hX/O + pn *ln(L)*ln(L) +
pVln(K)*ln(K) + PJtl *ln(L)*ln(/0
where
Q = output, alternatively measured as sales and as value-added
L = total employees
K = capital stock
Pi» Pk' Pn» PA*» P*i = coefficients representing the relationship of these
factors to output.
In the analysis presented here, this function is augmented to include: profit
sharing, defined benefit plan, and ESOP variables alone and interacted with
time trends, year dummies, and industry time trends. In addition, a union trend
variable has been included due to the possibility that union presence affected
productivity growth over this time period (Hirsch 1991). Ln(L) was subtracted
from both sides to make the dependent variable the natural logarithm of output
per worker (identical to the measure used in the simple comparisons of table
3.2). (While measurement error in ln(L) will bias coefficients on the indepen
dent variables using ln(L), the results for profit sharing were found to be
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nearly identical when ln(L) is not subtracted from both sides.) The resulting
specification, where the subscript / indicates company and t indicates year, is:
,) = (PrD*ln(LlV)

P/PSft + P/,,*(AgeofPS) +
P/DB,, +P^*(AgeofDB) +
Pe*ESOPit + Pe,*(Age of ESOP) +
Pu*(Union*time) + (industry time trends)
+ (year dummies) + a/ + e#
where
PS = profit-sharing plan
DB = defined benefit pension plan
ESOP = Employee Stock Ownership Plan
Union = union presence
a,- = firm-specific fixed effect
e,-r = error term.
To remove the effects of any unobserved variables that may be in the firm-spe
cific fixed effect (a,), this equation is first-differenced so that all measured val
ues represent the difference between t and / - I.1 This results in the estimated
equation, where 8 is the first-difference operator and the / subscripts have been
suppressed:
(1)
P H *8[ln(L)*ln(L)]

P/8PS +Pp,*PS,+ P
Pe*8ESOP + pe,*ESOP, + pM*Union +
(industry dummies) + (year dummies) + e.
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The key parameters of interest for this study are $p and $pt. These can be
interpreted in two equivalent ways: as measures of profit-sharing presence and
trend effects on productivity levels; or as measures of profit-sharing adoption
and profit-sharing presence on productivity growth. The same interpretations
can be applied to the coefficients on defined benefit (pj and P<#), ESOP ($e
and pg/) and union (pa) variables.2
A variety of experiments with alternative lag structures for the production
function terms made little difference in the estimated effects of profit sharing,
so only the first-differenced results are presented here.
The reported results have had the upper 1 percent and lower 1 percent of
productivity changes trimmed to remove any undue influence these outliers
may have upon the results. Prior to trimming, the minimum (maximum) value
of 8ln(j2/L) was -5.71 (4.35) when Q was measured as sales per employee,
and -4.60 (4.47) when Q was measured as value-added per employee. These
extremes imply productivity changes on the order of 100-fold, and it is con
sidered unlikely that profit sharing will be a key influence in such extreme
circumstances. After trimming the upper and lower 1 percent, the minimum
(maximum) value of &ln(Q/L) was -.40 (.56) when Q was measured as sales
per employee, and -.40 (.51) when Q was measured as value-added per
employee, implying productivity changes of no more than -33 percent to 75
percent. The basic results in appendix table A3.2 are not substantially
affected by inclusion of the outliers, or by use of a robust regression tech
nique (as packaged in the Stata statistical package) that gives smaller weight
to outliers (Rousseeuw and Leroy 1987).3 The productivity specifications
were also run with the upper 1 percent and lower 1 percent of 8ln(L) and
§ln(K) trimmed (restricting the range of 8ln(L) to -.536 to .526, and the range
of 8ln(£) to -.489 to .746), with very similar results for the profit-sharing
coefficients.
Adoption of profit sharing may be accompanied by accounting changes
and/or company mergers or acquisitions, either of which could impart a bias to
the estimated profit-sharing effects. Both events were less common in adop
tion years than in the sample as a whole: for the sample used in regression 1 of
table A3.2, an accounting change was reported in 2.4 percent of the adoption
years compared to 2.5 percent of all observations, while a merger or acquisi
tion was reported in 6.1 percent of adoption years compared to 12.4 percent of
all observations. Tests were made alternatively excluding these observations,
and including them with variables representing the events, and the results
were nearly identical to those reported in table A3.2.
As discussed in chapter 3, the above framework may be tainted by selec
tion bias (see, e.g., Maddala 1983; Heckman and Robb 1985; Heckman and
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Hotz 1989). There may be factors that predict profit-sharing status and,
through correlation between profit-sharing status and the distribution of the
error term, violate standard assumptions about the error term in equation (1).
While self-selection may create a bias, it does not necessarily do so. Heckman and Robb (1985: 216-223) review several models using panel data in
which a bias does not exist under certain decision rules and error processes.
In the presence of selection bias, there are two standard procedures for
removing the correlation between the variable of interest and the error term:
instrumental variables to predict profit-sharing variables that are uncorrelated
with the error term, and the addition of a selection term to correct for the dis
tribution of the error. Both techniques were tested for the correction of selec
tion bias caused by systematic choice of adoption and maintenance of profitsharing plans. The results employing a selection term (inverse Mill's ratio) are
presented here since extensive use of instrumental variable techniques failed
to produce credible estimates. A sampling of those estimates will be briefly
described here.
Instrumental variable estimates were attempted using both linear probabil
ity and probit techniques to predict both profit-sharing adoption and profitsharing maintenance. When adoption and maintenance are separately pre
dicted using exogenous variables and the lagged variables represented in table
2.3, and the predicted 8PS and PS, are inserted in equation (1), the estimated
Pp and Ppr are 2.226 and .209 when the dependent variable is 8ln(sales/
employees), and 3.367 and .217 when the dependent variable is 8ln(valueadded/employees). These coefficients, which are all highly statistically signif
icant (at p <.01), imply productivity increases of more than eightfold when
profit sharing is adopted, and more than 20 percent each year it is in place.
When probits are used to predict 6PS and PS^ the estimated coefficients for pp
and $pt are .329 and .468 when ln(sales/employees) is used, and .785 and .534
when ln(value-added/employees) is used. These are again highly statistically
significant and imply adoption effects of 40-120 percent and trend effects of
60-70 percent per year. A variety of other instrumental variable techniques
produced results that were similarly not credible; such results argue for the use
of other techniques for the correction of selection bias.
The bias created by self-selection into a program may be corrected by the
inclusion of a selection correction term in the estimated equation. Construc
tion of a term relies on prediction of profit-sharing status (with variables Zfand coefficients t), then creation of a normal density function y(tZ/) and cumu
lative density function F(iZ,-) using those estimates. One method to correct for
the distribution of the error term under sample selection, based on Heckman
(1979), is to create a variable yCtZjO/fXiZ,-) where the profit-sharing status
equals one, and -f(iZ^I(\ - F(xZ,)) where it equals zero. A second method
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allowing different coefficients between the profit-sharing and non-profit-shar
ing samples uses, in addition to the common explanatory variables, the values
of these variables multiplied by F(iZ,), as well as /(tZ,-) as an independent
regressor (Maddala 1983: 227). A third method tested here is to predict what
the expected outcome would be if the non-profit-sharing firms decided to
adopt profit sharing, by using the coefficients on the non-profit-sharing sample
with the additional selection term /(TZ^/FCtZ,-), and comparing the predicted
productivity change with the actual productivity change for the profit-sharing
firms (Maddala 1983: 261).
In addition, two alternative methods, developed to assess the effect of train
ing programs on worker earnings, were tested to correct for selection bias. The
first is based on a control function developed by Heckman and Robb (1985:
224-5) that removes the correlation between the error term and program par
ticipation. This control function relies on prediction of program participation
using preprogram error terms. For this study, the prediction was done using an
unrestricted process for the four error terms prior to profit-sharing adoption. A
second method employed is based on Bassi (1984), who uses a transformation
of the equation designed to purge the correlation between program participa
tion and the error terms.
Two variables that predicted profit-sharing adoption and raised a strong
possibility of selection bias were the change in the stock price, and change in
the profit margin, from / - 2 to / - l.To examine the influence of these vari
ables, the profit-sharing adopters were divided into two groups—those that
had positive and negative values on these variables (relative to industry means
for that year)—and separate productivity effects were calculated for compari
son with columns 1 to 4 of appendix table A3.2. The coefficients on profitsharing adoption were of similar magnitude between the two groups, and nei
ther group had consistently larger or smaller coefficients.
The tests on these alternative sample selection correction techniques did
not produce noteworthy differences in the results. For example, looking at the
profit-sharing adoption coefficient in the full sample with ln(sales/employee)
as the dependent variable (comparable to column 1 of appendix table A3.2)
gave the following results. Estimation of the model assuming different coeffi
cients between profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing firms (Maddala 1983:
227) gives a coefficient of .040 (t = 3.58). Estimation of the model which pre
dicts the outcome if non-profit-sharing firms were to adopt profit sharing
(Maddala 1983: 261) produces a coefficient of .042 (t = 3.29). Use of the con
trol function based on preprogram error terms (Heckman and Robb 1985: 2245) produces a coefficient of .045 (/ = 3.49) when all firms are included, and
.066 (t = 3.42) when only adopters are included. Finally, use of Bassi's tech-
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nique produces an average coefficient of .044 over the first three postadoption
years.
Since these techniques did not produce noteworthy differences, only the
results from the first method are presented here (with common production
parameters across the sample). Specifically, because the productivity regres
sions primarily indicate a profit-sharing adoption effect, and the selection bias
is likely to be strongest among adopters, the selection term used the specifica
tion from regression 5 of appendix table A2.1 to predict profit-sharing adop
tion (excluding the change in stock price, due to concerns about its
exogeneity). Once the adoption had been made, the adopters maintained the
selection term from the time of adoption. Old profit-sharing companies that
had no preadoption values were simply assigned the mean postadoption selec
tion term from the adopters. Separate selection terms were created for cash
and deferred plans (appendix table A3.3), type of formula (appendix table
A3.4), and size of employer contribution (appendix table A3.6). The coeffi
cients on the selection terms are not presented here since they were never dis
tinguishable from zero and had no pattern of positive and negative
coefficients. Experiments with a number of other specifications of the selec
tion term (including prediction of profit-sharing presence as well as adoption)
failed to produce any consistent patterns or substantial effects on the results.
This indicates that sample selection is unlikely to be an important factor in the
productivity effects.
A separate form of selection bias may be present with missing observations
on incomplete panel data (see, e.g., Hausman and Wise 1979; Ridder 1990;
Verbeek 1990). The selection rule on when observations are reported may be
related to the variable of interest. There was, however, no discernible relation
ship between the pattern of profit-sharing adoption and missing observations
in the panel. The possibility of bias was checked and discounted with the vari
able addition test and comparison of random effects estimators from the bal
anced and unbalanced panels (Verbeek and Nijman 1992).

NOTES
1. A random effects model, in which oq is treated as a random variable, was also estimated
(Hsiao 1986:32-47). Consistency of results depends on orthogonality between the random effects
and other regressors, which was strongly rejected by the data. When using random effects specifi
cations, the results indicated much larger effects of profit-sharing adoption (e.g., using sales per
employee as the dependent variable on the full sample, the coefficient on profit-sharing adoption
was .112 with a /-statistic of 6.29).
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2. The survey collected data on union presence and proportion unionized as of the survey date,
but not over the entire sample period. For this reason, equation (1) does not attempt to measure
the effects of changes in union presence or proportion unionized in the period. While proportion
unionized may have varied across this period, the assumption made here is that union presence is
unlikely to have varied, and any variations are unlikely to have been correlated with profit-sharing
status. The same regressions were run without the union variable and showed equivalent results.
3. When all observations are included in the specifications reported in columns 1 to 4 of
appendix table A3.2, the estimated effects of profit-sharing adoption with equally weighted obser
vations are slightly larger (between .034 and .055), and with robust regressions are slightly
smaller (between .032 and .037), and all are statistically significant at the 95 percent or 99 percent
levels.

Table A3.1

Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for Productivity Regressions

0.015
(0.120)

Means (s.d.) for variables in appendix table A3.2
(6)
(7)
(5)
(4)
(3)
(2)
-0.007
0.067
-0.007
(0.117) (0.150)
(0.150)
0.064
-0.005
0.064
(0.111)
(0.111) (0.145)
0.009
0.024
0.010
0.029
0.014
0.033
(0.179) (0.118) (0.168) (0.091) (0.142) (0.088)

-0.005
(0.145)
0.021
(0.130)

PS trend

0.310
(0.462)

0.719
(0.449)

0.341
(0.474)

0.748
(0.434)

0.235
(0.391)

0.553
(0.434)

0.258
(0.402)

0.582
(0.427)

DB adoption

0.004
(0.066)

-0.001
(0.088)

0.005
(0.070)

-0.002
(0.100)

0.001
(0.028)

-0.001
(0.032)

0.002
(0.029)

-0.002
(0.043)

DB trend

0.752
(0.432)

-0.020
(0.632)

0.742
(0.437)

-0.025
(0.632)

0.329
(0.321)

-0.015
(0.426)

0.277
(0.279)

-0.010
(0.387)

ESOP adoption

0.016
(0.127)

0.003
(0.181)

0.017
(0.130)

0.006
(0.184)

0.005
(0.056)

0.002
(0.081)

0.005
(0.052)

0.004
(0.078)

ESOP trend

0.426
(0.495)

0.069
(0.6%)

0.386
(0.487)

0.100
(0.705)

0.142
(0.278)

0.036
(0.324)

0.084
(0.192)

0.045
(0.264)

Union trend

0.753
(0.431)

-0.068
(0.537)

0.723
(0.448)

-0.066
(0.546)

0.756
(0.430)

-0.057
(0.523)

0.726
(0.446)

-0.054
(0.530)

Regressions
5ln(sales/L)
Oln(valueadded/L)
PS adoption

(1)
0.067
(0.116)

(8)

Definitions
from t - 1
ln(sales/employees)
in
Change
tor
Change in ln(value-added/employees)
from t - 1 to r*
Change in presence of profit-sharing plan
from t- I lot (measured as dummy in
cols., 1-4, proportion covered in 5-8)
Presence of profit sharing in t (measured
as dummy in cols. 1-4, proportion
covered in 5-8)
Change in presence of defined benefit
plan from / -1 to t (measured as dummy
in cols., 1-4, proportion covered in 5-8)
Presence of defined benefit plan in t
(measured as dummy in cols. 1-4,
proportion covered in 5-8)
Change in presence of ESOP from t -1 to
/ (measured as dummy in cols. 1-4,
proportion covered in 5-8)
Presence of ESOP in t (measured as
dummy in cols. 1-4, proportion covered
in 5-8)
Union presence in t

0.010
0.007
0.011
0.008
0.014
0.007
0.012 Change in In(employees) from t - 1 to t
0.008
(0.142) (0.192) (0.150) (0.197) (0.084) (0.192) (0.150) (0.1%)
0.084
0.011
0.089
0.015
0.010
0.087
0.012 Change in ln(net assets) from t - 1 to t
8ln(K)
0.085
(0.177) (0.239) (0.195) (0.264) (0.176) (0.237) (0.195) (0.258)
0.018
-0.002
0.022
0.003
0.022
0.012
0.016
0.003 Change in square of In(employees) from
8ln(L)ln(L)
(0.573) (0.760) (0.627) (0.838) (0.570) (0.750) (0.625) (0.824) t - 1 to /
8ln(tf) ln(AO
0.882
0.880
0.898
0.001
0.899
0.037
-0.017
0.005 Change in square of ln(net assets) from
(1.802) (2.474) (1.939) (2.656) (1.796) (2.398) (1.934) (2.552) / - 1 to t
8ln(L) ln(tf)
0.003
0.185
0.188
0.014
0.197
0.032
0.178
0.014 Change in (ln(net assets) times
(0.976) (1.288) (1.033) (1.361) (0.970) (1.257) (1.027) (1.316) In(employees)) from t - 1 to t
5499
5652
1807
4673
1510
1725
4533
1428
N
NOTE: Labor expense was instrumented as described in text.
a. Value-added was calculated from CompuStat as (sales - (cost of goods sold - labor expenses - rental expense)).
Oln(I)

Table A3.2 Productivity Growth and Profit-Sharing Adoption and Presence

Dependent variable
PS adoption
PS trend
DB adoption
DB trend
ESOP adoption
ESOP trend
Union trend
6ln(L)
8ln(tf)
8ln(L)ln(L)

5ln(Sales/L)

6ln(Value-added/L)

6ln(Sales/L)

5ln(Value-added/L)

Dummies
Paired
Unpaired
(2)
(1)
0.042**
0.043***
(0.018)
(0.014)
0.008
0.002
(0.019)
(0.010)
0.023
0.011
(0.037)
(0.021)
-0.004
-0.001
(0.005)
(0.003)
0.003
0.014
(0.018)
(0.011)
0.001
-0.001
(0.005)
(0.003)
-0.008
-0.004
(0.006)
(0.004)
-0.387*** -0.394***
(0.048)
(0.027)
0.098***
0.058**
(0.024)
(0.043)
-0.019*** -0.031***
(0.009)
(0.005)

Dummies
Paired
Unpaired
(4)
(3)
0.049***
0.034*
(0.020)
(0.014)
0.019
0.010
(0.021)
(0.010)
0.026
0.009
(0.034)
(0.020)
-0.009
-0.006
(0.006)
(0.004)
0.011
0.008
(0.019)
(0.011)
-0.001
0.000
(0.005)
(0.003)
-0.001
0.001
(0.004)
(0.006)
-0.395*** -0.334***
(0.027)
(0.048)
0.005
0.026
(0.024)
(0.043)
-0.004
-0.009
(0.006)
(0.010)

Proportion covered
Paired
Unpaired
(6)
(5)
0.035**
0.035
(0.026)
(0.017)
-0.012
-0.005
(0.013)
(0.008)
0.018
0.025
(0.103)
(0.050)
-0.007
-0.004
(0.005)
(0.008)
-0.011
0.023
(0.042)
(0.025)
0.006
0.001
(0.006)
(0.011)
-0.010
-0.004
(0.004)
(0.007)
-0.387*** -0.382***
(0.028)
(0.048)
0.060**
0.120***
(0.025)
(0.044)
-0.020*** -0.032***
(0.005)
(0.009)

Proportion covered
Unpaired
Paired
(7)
(8)
0.046***
0.064**
(0.017)
(0.029)
-0.004
0.006
(0.008)
(0.013)
0.035
0.088
(0.050)
(0.082)
-0.017*
-0.010
(0.005)
(0.009)
-0.006
0.004
(0.046)
(0.029)
0.005
0.005
(0.014)
(0.008)
-0.001
0.001
(0.007)
(0.004)
-0.391*** -0.319***
(0.049)
(0.027)
0.010
0.024
(0.045)
(0.025)
-0.010*
-0.007
(0.011)
(0.006)

8
ON

O]n(K) ln(K)
5ln(L) ln(K)
Year dummies
25 industry dummies
R-squared
N

0.006**
(0.003)
0.008
(0.007)
Yes
Yes
0.245
5652

0.000
(0.006)
0.019
(0.012)

0.178
1807

0.010**
(0.003)
0.002
(0.008)
Yes
Yes
0.259
4673

0.016**
(0.006)
-0.013
(0.014)

0.211
1510

NOTE: See appendix table A3.1 for variable definitions and descriptive statistics.
*Statistically significant at p <.10 ** p <.05 ***p <.01.

0.006*
(0.003)
0.008
(0.007)
Yes
Yes
0.246
5499

-0.003
(0.006)
0.017
(0.013)

0.178
1725

0.011***
(0.003)
0.001
(0.008)
Yes
Yes
0.259
4533

0.014**
(0.006)
-0.014
(0.015)

0.218
1428

Table A3.3 Cash and Deferred Profit Sharing and Productivity Growth

Dependent variable
Cash PS adoption
Cash PS presence
Deferred PS adoption
Deferred PS presence
DB adoption
DB presence
ESOP adoption
ESOP presence
Union presence
Translog terms
Year dummies

Regression coefficients (s.e.)
5ln(Sales/L)
6ln(Value-added/L)
Unpaired
Paired
Unpaired
Paired
(4)
(2)
(3)
(1)
0.063**
0.035**
0.034**
0.042
(0.032)
(0.029)
(0.017)
(0.016)
0.008
-0.003
0.005
0.008
(0.017)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.018)
0.009
0.014
0.018
-0.011
(0.030)
(0.020)
(0.018)
(0.035)
0.035***
0.025
0.002
0.027
(0.015)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.019)
0.054
-0.011
-0.009
0.024
(0.041)
(0.020)
(0.020)
(0.040)
0.001
-0.005
0.000
-0.001
(0.004)
(0.006)
(0.003)
(0.007)
0.009
0.011
0.010
0.019
(0.019)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.021)
-0.001
0.001
-0.002
-0.004
(0.006)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.006)
0.000
0.002
-0.006
0.010
(0.007)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.008)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Descriptive statistics
Means (s.d.)

(la)
0.008
(0.089)
0.116
(0.320)
0.006
(0.078)
0.173
(0.378)
0.004
(0.067)
0.759
(0.428)
0.017
(0.128)
0.434
(0.496)
0.769
(0.421)

(2a)
0.020
(0.140)
0.281
(0.450)
0.021
(0.145)
0.269
(0.443)
-0.002
(0.087)
-0.021
(0.635)
0.004
(0.186)
0.035
(0.702)
-0.078
(0.526)

(3a)
0.008
(0.089)
0.132
(0.338)
0.006
(0.075)
0.184
(0.388)
0.005
(0.070)
0.749
(0.433)
0.017
(0.131)
0.394
(0.489)
0.742
(0.438)

(4a)
0.019
(0.136)
0.316
(0.465)
0.019
(0.136)
0.248
(0.432)
-0.003
(0.097)
-0.028
(0.632)
0.009
(0.190)
0.069
(0.712)
-0.079
(0.532)

25 industry dummies
Dependent variable

Yes

R-squared
N

0.247
5608

Yes

0.214
1443

0.257
4638

0.216
1160

0.069
(0.115)

-0.007
(0.151)

0.065
(0.111)

-0.003
(0.149)

5608

1443

4638

1160

NOTES: See appendix table A3.1 for variable definitions. Cash PS represents those with any cash element, while deferred PS represents those which are
only deferred.
'Statistically significant at p <.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.

Table A3.4 Profit-Sharing Formulas and Productivity Growth

Dependent variable
Percent-of-profits formula
Plan adoption
Subsequent trend
Discretionary
Plan adoption
Subseqent trend
Petcent-of-pay formula
Plan adoption
Subsequent trend
Other formula
Plan adoption
Subsequent trend

Regression coefficients (s.e.)
6ln(Value-added/L)
5ln(Sales/L)
Paired
Unpaired
Paired
Unpaired
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)

Descriptive statistics
Means (s.d.)

———————

(la)

(2a)

(3a)

(4a)

0.047
(0.030)
-0.002
(0.012)

0.022
(0.046)
0.036
(0.057)

0.076**
(0.035)
-0.025
(0.023)

0.014
(0.047)
0.005
(0.060)

0.003
(0.051)
0.047
(0.211)

0.009
(0.096)
0.136
(0.343)

0.003
(0.052)
0.054
(0.225)

0.009
(0.094)
0.145
(0.352)

0.074**
(0.037)
-0.004
(0.012)

0.037
(0.051)
0.034
(0.026)

0.088**
(0.038)
0.021
(0.012)

0.100**
(0.050)
0.049*
(0.026)

0.002
(0.042)
0.036
(0.186)

0.007
(0.086)
0.096
(0.294)

0.002
(0.043)
0.041
(0.198)

0.008
(0.088)
0.102
(0.302)

0.022
(0.033)
-0.017
(0.017)

0.032
(0.051)
0.024
(0.026)

-0.016
(0.037)
-0.028
(0.018)

0.043
(0.058)
-0.052*
(0.030)

0.002
(0.047)
0.044
(0.206)

0.007
(0.086)
0.154
(0.361)

0.002
(0.043)
0.046
(0.210)

0.006
(0.075)
0.151
(0.358)

0.016
(0.023)
-0.001
(0.018)

0.029
(0.034)
-0.009
(0.021)

0.007
(0.023)
-0.004
(0.020)

0.016
(0.035)
-0.012
(0.022)

0.005
(0.068)
0.087
(0.282)

0.017
(0.128)
0.258
(0.438)

0.005
(0.069)
0.099
(0.299)

0.016
(0.124)
0.275
(0.447)

to
1—>

o

Dependent variable
R-squared
N

0.247
4565

0.173
1077

0.278
3711

0.334
959

0.068
(0.115)

-0.004
(0.150)

0.064
(0.112)

-0.007
(0.146)

4587

1077

3711

896

NOTES: Variable definitions: Percent-of-profits plan: company contribution based on fixed percent of profits (may include discretionary element in addi
tion). Discretionary plan: company contribution wholly discretionary. Percent-of-pay plan: company contribution based on fixed percent of participants'
pay. Other: company contribution based on formula other than above three. All regressions include variables listed in appendix table A3.2 (except for PS
adoption and presence), plus separate inverse Mill's selection terms for each of the four classes of formula. See appendix table A3.1 for other variable
definitions and descriptive statistics.
'Statistically significant at p <.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.

Table A3.5 Profit Sharing and Productivity by Employment Size Class

Analysis of profit-sharing effects by five size classes, representing the smallest 10 percent, 10-25 percent, 25-50 percent, 50-75 percent,
and 75-100 percent classes of employment size at time profit sharing was adopted.
Mean (s.d.)
5ln(Value-added/L)
8ln(Sales/L)
(2a)
(la)
(2)
(1)
Size class
Empl. <775
PS adoption
PS trend
775 < = Empl. <1681
PS adoption
PS trend
1681 < = Empl. <4599
PS adoption
PS trend
4599 < = Empl. <17,000
PS adoption
PS trend

0.105***
(0.037)
-0.007
(0.014)

0.159***
(0.040)
0.001
(0.014)

0.001
(0.038)
0.027
(0.161)

0.001
(0.036)
0.029
(0.167)

-0.015
(0.029)
-0.003
(0.013)

0.060
(0.037)
0.011
(0.013)

0.002
(0.048)
0.043
(0.202)

0.001
(0.039)
0.047
(0.211)

0.041*
(0.024)
0.002
(0.011)

-0.034
(0.026)
0.022*
(0.011)

0.004
(0.059)
0.071
(0.257)

0.003
(0.057)
0.077
(0.267)

0.022
(0.024)
0.001
(0.011)

0.029
(0.025)
0.012
(0.011)

0.003
(0.058)
0.090
(0.286)

0.003
(0.058)
0.095
(0.294)

Empl. > = 17,000
PS adoption
PS trend
R-squared
N

0.067***
(0.022)
0.001
(0.011)
0.251
5652

0.056***
(0.021)
0.008
(0.011)
0.269
4672

0.004
(0.062)
0.094
(0.292)

0.005
(0.069)
0.108
(0.310)

5652

4672

NOTES: The regressions include variables from regressions 1 and 3 of appendix table A3.2 (translog terms, year dummies, 25 industry dummies, and
DB, ESOP, and union terms). Translog production terms have been fully interacted with the five size classes.
*Statistically significant at p <. 10 **p <.05 ** *p <.01.

Table A3.6 Productivity Growth and Size of Employer Contribution

For those reporting profit-sharing contribution as a percentage of participant payroll (n=71), the mean figure for each company was
calculated. The median of these figures was 3.62 percent. A mean contribution less (greater) than 3.62 percent was designated as a "low"
("high") mean employer contribution.
Means (s.d.)
6ln(Value-added/L)
6ln(Sales/L)
Paired
Unpaired
Paired
Unpaired
(4a)
(3a)
(2a)
(la)
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)
Dependent variable
PS plans with low mean
employer contributions
0.018
0.002
0.023
0.002
-0.019
0.021
-0.019
0.014
Adoption
(0.134)
(0.042)
(0.151)
(0.047)
(0.060)
(0.047)
(0.048)
(0.038)
0.257
0.046
0.304
0.047
-0.033
0.008
-0.014
0.008
Presence
(0.438)
(0.210)
(0.461)
(0.213)
(0.033)
(0.015)
(0.028)
(0.013)
PS plans with high mean
employer contributions
0.070*
0.102*
0.123***
0.014
0.002
0.020
0.002
0.095
Adoption
(0.120)
(0.046)
(0.141)
(0.047)
(0.069)
(0.041)
(0.053)
(0.037)
0.043**
-0.011*
0.547
0.076
0.499
0.065
0.029
-0.003
Presence
(0.499)
(0.265)
(0.501)
(0.247)
(0.018)
(0.035)
(0.029)
(0.018)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Translog terms
Yes
Yes
Year dummies
Yes
Yes
25 industry dummies
-0.005
0.065
-0.008
0.068
Dependent var. mean
(0.154)
(0.1 14f
(0.146)
(0.116)

R-squared
0.265
N_________________3598

0.305
345

0.287
2861

0.399
276

3598

345

2861

276

NOTES: All regressions include variables from regressions reported in appendix table A3.2, plus separate inverse Mill's terms for the high- and low-con
tribution plans.
*Statistically significant at p <.10 **p <.05 ***p <.01.

Table A3.7 Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for Personnel Policy Variables in Appendix Table A3.8

(1)

0.011
(0.103)

Means (s.d.)
(5)
0.007
0.000
(0.146) (0.074)

(6)
0.001
(0.114)

0.006
(0.068)

(8)
0.001
(0.105)

Survey adoption

0.012
(0.107)

(2)
0.001
(0.152)

Survey trend

0.128
(0.334)

0.026
(0.475)

0.119
(0.324)

0.036
(0.469)

0.082
(0.252)

0.023
(0.339)

0.070
(0.232)

0.040
(0.308)

Job enrichment
adoption

0.008
(0.087)

0.003
(0.127)

0.008
(0.089)

0.002
(0.134)

0.002
(0.037)

0.002
(0.053)

0.003
(0.041)

0.002
(0.059)

Job enrichment
trend

0.147
(0.354)

0.066
(0.432)

0.152
(0.359)

0.040
(0.435)

0.055
(0.198)

0.067
(0.269)

0.052
(0.192)

0.064
(0.278)

Autonomous
workteam
adoption

0.008
(0.087)

0.002
(0.097)

0.008
(0.090)

0.003
(0.106)

0.003
(0.042)

0.001
(0.034)

0.003
(0.044)

0.002
(0.038)

Autonomous
workteam trend

0.100
(0.300)

0.052
(0.329)

0.096
(0.295)

0.055
(0.350)

0.032
(0.147)

0.019
(0.212)

0.034
(0.151)

0.012
(0.217)

Employee
involvement
adoption

0.019
(0.138)

-0.002
(0.185)

0.019
(0.137)

0.001
(0.187)

0.009
(0.076)

0.000
(0.091)

0.008
(0.073)

0.001
(0.086)

Employee
involvement
trend

0.063
(0.243)

0.051
(0.480)

0.070
(0.254)

0.047
(0.484)

(3)

(4)

0.058
(0.194)

0.028
(0.256)

(7)

0.056
(0.187)

0.021
(0.239)

Definitions
Change in presence of attitude survey
feedback from t - 1 to t (measured as dummy
in cols. 1-4, proportion covered in 5-8)
Presence of attitude survey feedback in t
(measured as dummy in cols. 1-4,
proportion covered in 5-8)
Change in presence of job enrichment or
redesign from t-1 tot (measured as dummy
in cols. 1-4, proportion covered in 5-8)
Presence of job enrichment or redesign in t
(measured as dummy in cols. 1-4,
proportion covered in 5-8)
Change in presence of autonomous
workteams from / -1 to / (measured as
dummy in cols. 1-4, proportion covered in
5-8)
Presence of autonomous workteams in t
(measured as dummy in cols. 1-4,
proportion covered in 5-8)
Change in presence of employee
involvement from t - \ to t (measured as
dummy in cols. 1-4, proportion covered in
5-9)
Presence of employee involvement in t
(measured as dummy in cols. 1-4,
proportion covered in 5-8)

Employment
security
adoption
Employment
security trend

0.002
(0.050)

-0.001
(0.058)

0.002
(0.044)

-0.001
(0.051)

0.002
(0.042)

-0.001
(0.054)

0.002
(0.040)

-0.001
(0.051)

0.069
(0.253)

0.040
(0.355)

0.058
(0.233)

0.051
(0.327)

0.052
(0.215)

0.052
(0.329)

0.040
(0.193)

0.060
(0.309)

Suggestion
system
adoption
Suggestion
system trend

0.011
(0.102)

0.001
(0.133)

0.010
(0.098)

-0.002
(0.129)

0.003
(0.038)

0.001
(0.033)

0.003
(0.035)

0.001
(0.035)

0.235
(0.424)

-0.015
(0.625)

0.217
(0.412)

-0.048
(0.618)

0.088
(0.224)

-0.010
(0.300)

0.075
(0.207)

-0.018
(0.287)

Gainsharing
adoption

0.010
(0.100)

0.001
(0.137)

0.010
(0.100)

0.001
(0.139)

0.005
(0.066)

0.000
(0.098)

0.005
(0.062)

0.001
(0.089)

Gainsharing
trend

0.138
(0.345)

0.018
(0.477)

0.159
(0.365)

0.021
(0.500)

0.061
(0.200)

0.028
(0.311)

0.069
(0.210)

0.043
(0.321)

Change in presence of employment security
policy from t - 1 to t (measured as dummy in
cols. 1-4, proportion covered in 5-8)
Presence of employment security policy in t
(measured as dummy in cols. 1-4,
proportion covered in 5-8)
Change in presence of suggestion system
from t- 1 lot (measured as dummy in cols.
1-4, proportion covered in 5-8)
Presence of suggestion system in t
(measured as dummy in cols. 1-4,
proportion covered in 5-8)
Change in presence of gainsharing from
t - 1 to t (measured as dummy in cols., 1-4,
proportion covered in 5-8)
Presenced of gainsharing in t (measured as
dummy in cols. 1-4, proportion covered in
5-8)

1024
4621
3776
1262
1510
4673
1807
5652
N
NOTES: Definitions and descriptive statistics for other regression variables are in appendix table A3.1. Personnel policies are defined in table 3.5. See
table 1.3 for comparisons of personnel policies between profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing companies.

Table A3.8 Productivity Growth and Personnel Policies

Dependent variable
PS adoption
PS trend
Personnel policies
Survey adoption
Survey trend
Job enrichment adoption
Job enrichment trend
Autonomous workteam
adoption
Autonomous workteam
trend
Employee involvement
adoption
Employee involvement
trend

6ln(Sales/L)
Dummies
Paired
Unpaired
(2)
(1)
0.041**
0.043***
(0.018)
(0.014)
0.009
0.003
(0.019)
(0.010)
-0.012
(0.013)
0.004
(0.005)
-0.018
(0.017)
0.000
(0.005)
0.018
(0.017)
0.002
(0.006)
0.012
(0.011)
0.001
(0.005)

-0.001
(0.022)
0.003
(0.008)
-0.026
(0.027)
-0.004
(0.009)
0.022
(0.036)
0.014
(0.012)
0.010
(0.019)
0.011
(0.008)

6ln(Value-added/L)
Dummies
Paired
Unpaired
(4)
(3)
0.033*
0.050***
(0.020)
(0.014)
0.019
0.011
(0.022)
(0.010)
-0.016
(0.014)
0.004
(0.005)
-0.032
(0.017)
0.000
(0.006)
0.013
(0.017)
0.004
(0.006)
0.005
(0.011)
0.002
(0.005)

-0.013
(0.024)
0.007
(0.008)
-0.039**
(0.027)
-0.002
(0.010)
-0.056
(0.035)
0.009
(0.012)
-0.001
(0.019)
0.012
(0.008)

6ln(Sales/L)
Proportion covered
Paired
Unpaired
(«)
(5)
0.033*
0.020
(0.031)
(0.018)
-0.011
-0.004
(0.016)
(0.009)
-0.020
(0.021)
0.007
(0.007)
-0.030
(0.042)
0.000
(0.008)
-0.001
(0.040)
0.001
(0.012)
-0.012
(0.023)
0.002
(0.009)

-0.061
(0.038)
0.010
(0.014)
-0.050
(0.078)
-0.013
(0.017)
0.021
(0.121)
0.014
(0.023)
0.055
(0.048)
0.018
(0.019)

6ln(Value-added/L)
Proportion covered
Paired
Unpaired
(8)
(7)
0.034*
0.049
(0.036)
(0.019)
0.015
0.002
(0.017)
(0.009)
-0.042*
(0.025)
0.007
(0.008)
-0.069*
(0.041)
0.000
(0.009)
0.024
(0.041)
0.012
(0.012)
0.000
(0.025)
-0.001
(0.010)

-0.084
(0.043)
0.021
(0.016)
-0.113
(0.074)
-0.009
(0.016)
-0.146
(0.117)
-0.013
(0.026)
0.075
(0.054)
0.013
(0.022)

Employment security
adoption
Employment security
trend
Suggestion system
adoption
Suggestion system trend
Gainsharing adoption
Gainsharing trend
R-squared
N

0.012
(0.028)
-0.004
(0.006)
-0.017
(0.014)
-0.003
(0.004)
0.014
(0.014)
0.001
(0.004)
0.247
5652

0.042
(0.057)
-0.006
(0.010)
-0.001
(0.025)
-0.001
(0.006)
0.000
(0.025)
-0.006
(0.008)
0.183
1807

0.011
(0.033)
-0.002
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.015)
-0.002
(0.004)
0.018
(0.015)
0.001
(0.004)
0.261
4672

0.039
(0.066)
0.003
(0.012)
0.010
(0.027)
0.001
(0.006)
0.024
(0.025)
-0.008
(0.008)
0.219
1510

-0.009
(0.037)
-0.008
(0.008)
-0.008
(0.040)
-0.007
(0.008)
-0.008
(0.024)
0.000
(0.009)
0.260
4620

-0.032
(0.075)
-0.012
(0.014)
0.060
(0.123)
-0.002
(0.015)
-0.031
(0.045)
-0.001
(0.015)
0.194
1261

-0.008
(0.041)
-0.001
(0.009)
0.007
(0.047)
0.001
(0.009)
0.033
(0.027)
0.005
(0.009)
0.268
3776

-0.025
(0.083)
0.012
(0.017)
0.145
(0.125)
0.008
(0.017)
-0.038
(0.052)
0.002
(0.015)
0.218
1024

NOTES: All regressions include variables from appendix table A3.2, and variables representing personnel policies of uncertain age (see text). See tables
3.5, appendix table A3.1, and appendix table A3.7 for variable definitions and descriptive statistics.
'Statistically significant at p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.
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Table A3.9 Profit Sharing and Information Sharing
Dependent variable
PS adoption
PS presence
Info-sharing on company
results interacted with
PS adoption
PS presence
Info-sharing on business
plans interacted with
PS adoption
PS presence
Info-sharing on competitors'
performance interacted with
PS adoption
PS presence

6ln(SaIes/L)
Unpaired
Paired
(1)
(2)
0.060*
0.049
(0.033)
(0.038)
0.003
0.002
(0.014)
(0.024)

6ln(Value-added/L)
Unpaired
Paired
(3)
(4)
0.016
0.032
(0.033)
(0.037)
-0.006
0.006
(0.014)
(0.026)

B

Means (s.d.)
(la)
0.014
(0.119)
0.313
(0.464)

(2a)
0.035
(0.183)
0.679
(0.467)

(3a)
0.014
(0.118)
0.348
(0.476)

(4a)
0.031
(0.173)
0.706
(0.456)

0.006
(0.049)
0.004
(0.011)

-0.017
(0.054)
-0.010
(0.012)

0.023
(0.048)
0.008
(0.011)

-0.021
(0.055)
-0.005
(0.013)

0.012
(0.104)
0.282
(0.434)

0.025
(0.155)
0.485
(0.500)

0.011
(0.101)
0.310
(0.444)

0.019
(0.138)
0.477
(0.500)

-0.062
(0.043)
-0.005
(0.008)

-0.060
(0.051)
0.012
(0.012)

0.010
(0.045)
0.002
(0.008)

-0.014
(0.060)
0.019
(0.013)

0.009
(0.086)
0.200
(0.360)

0.015
(0.120)
0.278
(0.448)

0.008
(0.081)
0.219
(0.372)

0.010
(0.098)
0.288
(0.453)

0.080*
(0.045)
0.002
(0.010)

0.200**
(0.088)
-0.018
(0.015)

0.014
(0.052)
0.000
(0.010)

0.090
(0.104)
-0.030
(0.016)

0.004
(0.045)
0.090
(0.217)

0.002
(0.047)
0.074
(0.262)

0.003
(0.043)
0.097
(0.219)

0.002
(0.042)
0.073
(0.260)

Dependent variable
R-squared
N

0.245
4970

0.189
1377

0.264
4073

0.233
1129

0.068
(0.116)

-0.009
(0.152)

0.064
(0.112)

-0.007
(0.148)

4970

1377

4073

1129

NOTES: All regressions include vanables from appendix table A3.2 (with definitions and descriptive statistics in appendix table A3.1). PS adoption and
presence are measured as dummy variables. Definitions of information-sharing variables: Respondents were asked: "About how many corporation
employees, excluding top management, are routinely provided with:
a. Information about the company's overall operating results?
b. Information on business plans and goals?
c. Information on competitors' relative performance?"
The proportionof employees provided with such information was interacted with PS adoption and presence. PS=profit sharing.
"Statistically significant at p <.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.

Table A3.10

Productivity Growth and Interaction of Profit Sharing with Personnel Policies

Dependent variable
PS adoption
PS trend
Personnel policy interactions:
Survey • PS
adoption
trend
Job enrichment • PS
adoption
trend
Autonomous workteam • PS
adoption
trend

6ln(Sales/L)
Paired
Unpaired
(2)
(1)
0.042***
0.033
(0.022)
(0.016)
0.008
0.000
(0.020)
(0.010)

6ln(Value-added/L)
Paired
Unpaired
(4)
(3)
0.053***
0.041*
(0.023)
(0.016)
0.018
0.009
(0.022)
(0.010)

Means (s.d.)

(la)
0.015
(0.120)
0.310
(0.462)

(2a)
0.033
(0.179)
0.719
(0.449)

(3a)
0.014
(0.118)
0.341
(0.474)

(4a)
0.029
(0.168)
0.748
(0.434)

0.014
(0.025)
0.000
(0.010)

0.006
(0.039)
-0.005
(0.015)

0.001
(0.027)
0.003
(0.010)

-0.013
(0.043)
0.007
(0.016)

0.004
(0.060)
0.036
(0.170)

0.010
(0.091)
0.092
(0.263)

0.004
(0.059)
0.039
(0.178)

0.008
(0.084)
0.097
(0.271)

0.009
(0.040)
0.003
(0.013)

0.022
(0.062)
0.001
(0.020)

-0.011
(0.040)
-0.008
(0.013)

0.003
(0.063)
-0.017
(0.020)

0.002
(0.037)
0.032
(0.134)

0.005
(0.057)
0.060
(0.191)

0.002
(0.039)
0.025
(0.129)

0.005
(0.060)
0.058
(0.189)

0.056
(0.047)
0.009
(0.014)

0.000
(0.108)
0.007
(0.021)

0.046
(0.046)
-0.007
(0.012)

-0.092
(0.102)
-0.010
(0.022)

0.002
(0.032)
0.028
(0.132)

0.002
(0.031)
0.045
(0.180)

0.002
(0.035)
0.021
(0.123)

0.003
(0.034)
0.046
(0.181)

Employee involvement • PS
adoption
trend
Employment security • PS
adoption
trend
Suggestion • PS
adoption
trend
Gainsbaring • PS
adoption
trend
R-squared
N

0.042
(0.031)
0.001
(0.012)

0.092*
(0.052)
0.006
(0.019)

0.016
(0.032)
0.008
(0.013)

0.066
(0.053)
0.015
(0.020)

0.004
(0.051)
0.024
(0.126)

0.008
(0.068)
0.064
(0.191)

0.004
(0.051)
0.031
(0.134)

0.008
(0.069)
0.067
(0.191)

-0.103**
(0.044)
0.003
(0.011)

-0.080
(0.066)
0.000
(0.018)

-0.113**
(0.049)
0.003
(0.011)

-0.099
(0.078)
0.013
(0.018)

0.001
(0.034)
0.019
(0.119)

0.003
(0.055)
0.052
(0.208)

0.001
(0.031)
0.024
(0.145)

0.002
(0.048)
0.057
(0.219)

-0.012
(0.036)
-0.005
(0.012)

0.064
(0.062)
0.015
(0.021)

-0.017
(0.036)
-0.007
(0.012)

0.025
(0.066)
-0.008
(0.021)

0.003
(0.043)
0.021
(0.136)

0.007
(0.059)
0.065
(0.181)

0.003
(0.044)
0.035
(0.143)

0.005
(0.056)
0.066
(0.186)

0.015
(0.031)
-0.001
(0.010)
0.246
5652

-0.032
(0.048)
0.007
(0.017)
0.183
1807

0.027
(0.032)
0.002
(0.010)
0.259
4673

-0.023
(0.052)
0.011
(0.016)
0.218
1510

0.003
(0.048)
0.033
(0.152)

0.007
(0.072)
0.068
(0.221)

0.003
(0.048)
0.038
(0.162)

0.007
(0.070)
0.076
(0.231)

5652

1807

4673

1510

NOTES: All regressions include variables from appendix table A3.2. See table 3.5 and appendix table A3.1 for personnel policy definitions.
*Statistically significant at p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.

Table A3.ll

Change in Other Policies When Profit Sharing is Adopted

Profit-sharing companies were asked, "When the profit-sharing plan was established, were any significant changes made in personnel
policies or other compensation?" "Yes" and "no" answers are interacted with PS adoption and presence.
Regression coefficients (s.e.)
6ln(Sales/L)
6ln(Value-added/L)
Means (s.d.)
Unpaired
Paired
Unpaired
Paired
(4)
Dependent variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(la)
(2a)
(3a)
(4a)
Other changes made:
0.059**
0.072**
0.070***
0.072*
0.004
PS adoption
0.011
0.004
0.011
(0.024)
(0.036)
(0.024)
(0.038)
(0.063)
(0.103)
(0.066)
(0.106)
0.007
0.063*
0.010*
0.067*
PS trend
0.047
0.127
0.057
0.150
(0.018)
(0.038)
(0.018)
(0.038)
(0.212)
(0.333)
(0.232)
(0.358)
Other changes not made:
0.036**
0.034**
0.022
0.008
PS adoption
0.011
0.029
0.011
0.024
(0.014)
(0.021)
(0.015)
(0.026)
(0.105)
(0.169)
(0.102)
(0.152)
PS trend
0.019
0.025
0.037
0.031
0.198
0.527
0.213
0.538
(0.024)
(0.022)
(0.025)
(0.028)
(0.499)
(0.499)
(0.398)
(0.410)
Dependent variable
0.068
-0.006
0.064
-0.006
(0.148)
(0.116)
(0.148)
(0.112)
R-squared
0.246
0.204
0.264
0.222
4077
N
5008
1137
1390
1137
5008
1390
4077
NOTES: All regressions include variables from regressions presented in appendix table A3.2, with descriptive statistics in appendix table A3.1. PS =
profit sharing.
'Statistically significant at p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.

Appendix 4
Stability Theory and Econometric Specifications
Theory

The basics of the stability theory of profit sharing can be illustrated as fol
lows. If profit shares are equally distributed among workers, each worker's
compensation is
c = w' + s[(R(L) - w'L)/L] = w'(l - s) + sR(L)/L
where
R(L) = one-input revenue function of the firm
s = share of profits going to workers collectively, set by firms in
advance
L = number of workers
w1 = base wage.
The firm's problem is to maximize profits, defined as revenue minus labor
costs:

Maximize R(L) - Lc = R(L) - L[w'(l - s) + sR(L)/L] = (1 - s)[R(L) - w'L].
With s fixed in the short-run, maximizing with respect to L leads to the firstorder condition that

R'(L) = w'
where R'(L) is the marginal revenue product (MRP) of labor (the first deriva
tive of revenue with respect to labor). In other words, the firm would hire
workers up to the point where the MRP of labor equals the base wage. The
profit share is essentially ignored—it acts as a form of "tax" on profits that is
irrelevant in the firm's calculations of maximizing revenues minus fixed obli
gations.
Firms in the long run will adjust their compensation parameters (s and w')
so that the expected c will equal R'(L) (Weitzman 1983). If c < R'(L), firms
will find it profitable to attract more workers by raising the values of the com
pensation parameters (s and/or w') to increase c. When c = /?'(L), firms will not
find it profitable to change the compensation parameters. Since w'< c, the
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firm's short-run first-order condition /?'(L) = w' cannot hold in long-run equi
librium; consequently R'(L) > w\ implying an excess demand for labor by the
firm. This excess demand is manifested in the firm's eagerness to hire workers
at the current compensation parameters and willingness to retain workers
when business conditions slump. A higher share component $, and lower base
wage w', will lower both the probability and extent of layoffs in a profit-shar
ing firm.
What employment changes are predicted by the stability theory? The the
ory does not predict a simple linear relationship between demand shocks and
amount of profit sharing. The prediction is that the profit-sharing firm will
have a "cushion" of employees, representing the theorized excess demand for
labor, who will be retained in a negative demand shock (as long as R'(L) > w').
Once the excess demand for labor is exhausted by a negative shock, the profitsharing firm will lay off workers just as readily as the non-profit-sharing firm.
When hiring workers under a positive demand shock, the firms will behave
similarly if the positive shock does not represent recovery from a previous
negative shock, but the profit-sharing firm will hire back fewer workers if it
does represent such a recovery (since the profit-sharing firm laid off fewer to
begin with). The complex, nonlinear relationship between employment and
profit sharing may be mapped out as follows.1 Theorized relationships
between profit sharing and demand shocks, ceteris paribus:
Definitions
8L
Dpos
Dneg
EDL

= change in employment
= positive demand shock (continuous)
= negative demand shock (continuous)
= excess demand for labor by a profit-sharing firm (always
positive; determined by labor demand elasticity and the
degree to which profit share substitutes for fixed compen
sation)
®tt+ and 0j_ = coefficients on positive and negative demand shocks
For a non-profit-sharing firm:
(1) SL = 0^+ *(Dpos) if demand shock is positive
= 0^.*(Dneg) if demand shock is negative.
For a profit-sharing firm:
If negative demand shock does not exhaust EDL,

(2) 8L = 0*(Dneg) = 0.
If negative demand shock does exhaust EDL,
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(3) 5L=e
If negative demand shock follows upon a prior negative shock that
exhausted EDL,
(4) 8L=erf_*(Dneg).
If firm has a positive demand shock starting from an equilibrium position
(i.e., not recovering from a prior negative shock),
(5) 8L=0<i+ *(Dpos).
If firm is recovering from a prior negative shock that did not exhaust its
EDL (relationship 2),
(6) 6X = 0*(Dpos) = 0.
If firm is recovering from a prior negative shock that exhausted its EDL
(relationship 3),
(7) 8ln(L) = 0d+ -"(Dpos) - EDL.
These seven relationships can be explained as follows. If profit-sharing firms
have an incentive to hire labor to the point where R'(L) = w', as described
above (i.e., to the point of LI in figure 4.1), the difference between the desired
and actual employment level (between LQ and L\} can be estimated in percent
age terms as the labor demand elasticity (the percentage change in desired
employment for a 1 percent change in wages) multiplied by the gap between
w' and c. If, for example, the labor demand elasticity is 0.5 and the gap
between w' and c is 3.6 percent of the wage (representing the median profitsharing contribution as a percent of wages, making the assumption that it fully
substitutes for base pay), the gap between desired and actual employment is
1.8 percent. This 1.8 percent becomes, in effect, a cushion for negative
demand shocks. As illustrated in the bottom of figure 4.1, a small negative
shock that causes a non-profit-sharing firm to lay off 1.8 percent of workers
(relationship 1 above) should lead the profit-sharing firm to lay off none (rela
tionship 2 above), while a large negative shock will cause both firms to lay off
workers, but the profit-sharing firm will lay off fewer workers (the amount
represented by EDL) (relationships 1 and 3 above).
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What are the theorized responses to positive demand shocks? If starting
from an initial equilibrium position, the responses should be the same between
the two types of firms, since labor would be available on the same conditions
(relationships 1 and 5 above). If the positive demand shock represents a recov
ery from a previous negative shock, however, the profit-sharing firm will hire
back fewer workers since it laid off fewer to begin with. If recovering from a
small shock, in which it laid off no workers (relationship 2), it will hire back
no workers (relationship 6). If recovering from a large negative shock, in
which the profit-sharing firm laid off 1.8 percent fewer workers (relationship
3), the profit-sharing firm will hire back fewer workers (relationship 7).
Complete empirical estimation of the stability theory therefore requires
several types of information: (1) the degree to which profit sharing substitutes
for fixed compensation (c - w'); (2) accurate measures of demand shocks,
allowing the calculation of the point at which a negative demand shock
exhausts the theorized excess demand for labor of the profit-sharing firm; (3) a
measure of demand shocks that distinguishes whether they follow upon a pre
vious negative shock that may have eliminated the theorized excess demand
for labor; and (4) the labor demand elasticity. Information on the first and third
of these types of information is particularly difficult to obtain, and the results
are likely to be sensitive to assumptions about their magnitudes. Attempts to
specify this full model, and the reliance on a simpler model, will be described
in the following discussion of econometric techniques.
Econometric Estimation of Stability Effects

Estimates of stability effects are based on the following first-difference
variant of a labor demand equation:
(8) 8ln(L) = 00 + 9w*8ln(w) + 0/8D + 0psd *PS*8D
where
L
w
D
PS
X

= employment level
= base wage
= measure of demand for firm's products
= dummy indicating presence of profit-sharing plan
= other explanatory variables (cost of capital, cost of other pro
duction inputs)
t = time trend
8 = first-difference operator (from t - 1 to /)
0 = coefficients.
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In this specification Qw measures the wage elasticity of labor demand, ©^
measures the employment response to changes in demand for the firm's prod
ucts, 0psd measures any differential in employment response for firms that
have profit-sharing plans in effect, and 0^ and 0^ measure any general dif
ference in growth rates (apart from demand shocks) associated with profit
sharing.
As described above, the stability theory predicts that the employment
response of profit-sharing firms will depend on the degree to which the profit
share substitutes for fixed compensation, the size of negative and positive
demand shocks, and whether the demand shocks were preceded by shocks that
eliminated the excess demand for labor. A specification that incorporates rela
tionships (1) to (7) above is the following:
(9)

8ln(L) =

+ *(Dposnps) + 0d_*(Dnegnps)
ens*(Dnegsmall)*PS
0^.*(Dneglaige)*PS + EDLlaige*PS +
%*(Dnegexhaust)*PS +
0<f+ *(Dposnew)*PS + 0rs*(Dpossmall(.1))*PS
- EDLlarge(.1)*PS +

0ps*PS + 0pst*PS*r + QX*X
where

= change in demand for NPS firm's products, if the change is
negative, and 0 otherwise
Dnegsman = change in demand for PS firm's products, if the change is
negative and small (i.e., does not exhaust EDL), and 0 oth
erwise
= change in demand for PS firm's products, if the change is
negative and large (i.e., does exhaust EDL), and 0 other
wise
5t = change in demand for PS firm's products, if the change is
negative and a prior negative shock exhausted the EDL,
and 0 otherwise
DposB
= change in demand for PS firm's products, if change is posi
tive and firm is not recovering from prior negative shock
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= change in demand for NFS firm's products, if the change is
positive, and 0 otherwise
Dp°ssmall(-i) = change in demand for PS firm's products, if the change is
positive and the firm is recovering from a prior negative
shock that was small (i.e., did not exhaust the EDL), and 0
otherwise
^P°slarge(-i) = change in demand for PS firm's products, if the change is
positive and the firm is recovering from a prior negative
shock that was large (i.e., did exhaust the EDL), and 0 oth
erwise
= excess demand for labor for PS firm, if firm was subject to
demand shock large enough to exhaust EDL
= excess demand for labor for PS firm, if prior negative
demand shock was large enough to exhaust EDL
Other variables defined above.
The Qd+ and 0^_ coefficients should be strongly positive, since employment is
expected to move in the same direction as the demand shock. The ©^ and 0rs
coefficients are expected to be close to zero, since they measure employment
adjustments within the profit-sharing firm's excess demand for labor. Several
experiments were made with cost-of-capital measures, but as these had incon
sistent signs and magnitudes and made no difference in the profit-sharing vari
ables (as in Kruse 199Ib), they were dropped from the final runs.
Equation (9) was estimated on the full sample, and on a restricted sample
comprising PS firms which reported at least three years of profit-sharing con
tribution data, with NPS firms from the same industries (with unpaired and
paired results for both samples). For this test, it was necessary to determine
the size of the demand shock that would be expected to exhaust the theorized
excess demand for labor. This was estimated as follows. In the restricted sam
ple, for profit-sharing firms which reported profit-sharing contributions as a
percentage of participant payroll, the mean value was calculated within the
company. It was alternatively assumed that this fully substituted for fixed pay
(representing c - w'), and that only half of it substituted for fixed pay. The
excess demand for labor was estimated by multiplying this mean value (or
half of the mean value) by an estimated labor demand elasticity of 0.5 for
fixed pay (obtained from estimates on non-profit-sharing firms). This was
multiplied by the coefficient on the estimated output elasticity of labor for
decreases in product demand (which equaled .642),2 to determine the size of a
negative demand shock that would be expected to eliminate this excess
demand for labor. The result is the estimated decrease in sales which is neces
sary to eliminate the EDL (and the corresponding increase in sales which is
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necessary to restore the EDL), which divides the demand shocks according to
whether they were "small" or "large." (The median of this measure was .030,
with a mean of .036 and a standard deviation of .025.)
It may be that non-profit-sharing firms will have different responses to
large and small demand shocks. Therefore, to compare the employment
responses of profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing firms, sales shocks for NPS
firms were divided into "large" and "small" according to whether they
exceeded, or failed to exceed, the above mean estimate for PS companies
(.036) of the demand shock sufficient to eliminate the EDL. Also, separate
coefficients were estimated for each situation facing the firms (i.e., the 64+
and 0</_ coefficients in equation (9) were not constrained to be equal across the
terms in which they appear). To take account of the terms including EDL,
dummy variables were specified to take a value of one for a large negative
shock (and zero otherwise), with the coefficient presumably reflecting the size
of the EDL (or more generally, any fixed employment response to a large neg
ative shock that does not vary with the size of the shock). The sample of PS
companies which reported sufficient contribution data were combined with
NPS firms in the same industries for the restricted sample estimates, reported
in columns 4 and 5 of appendix table A4.6.
For the full sample of PS and NPS firms, with results reported in columns
2 and 3, the EDL was assumed to be 1.8 percent for all PS firms (representing
the median profit share as a percent of payroll, multiplied by a labor demand
elasticity of 0.5). This was used to create measures of "small" and "large"
demand shocks for both PS and NPS firms, again by dividing this figure of
.018 by the coefficient on sales decreases (estimated as described above) in
order to determine the size of a demand shock which would be sufficient to
exhaust the EDL. In the full sample, unlike the restricted sample, the cutoff
between large and small was identical for all firms.
The results using discontinuous measures rely only upon sales changes as
demand shock measures. This is due to the great difficulty in trying to deter
mine for a firm what constitutes a large and small shock, and recovery from a
prior negative shock, from aggregate measures. The period saw two reces
sions, in 1973-75 and 1980-82, but there was no means of separating these
into large and small shocks, which is necessary for the tests being developed
here.
The changes in sales were deflated by the GNP deflator prior to estimation,
and "negative" shocks were defined as those in which the change in ln(deflated sales) was negative. Tests were also made using nominal data (since
declines in nominal sales represent obvious negative shocks), and deflated
data using more detailed inflation measures (comprising 3-digit industry infla
tion measures for manufacturing firms from the NBER Trade and Immigration
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Dataset, the CPI for retail firms, and the GNP deflator for all others); the meth
ods produced similar findings.
The results, presented in appendix table A4.6, do not show a clear pattern
with respect to the stability theory. Presented results assume the profit share
fully substituted for fixed compensation; results assuming that only half sub
stituted were very similar. When not recovering from a negative demand
shock, the employment responses of PS firms are larger than that of NPS firms
for sales increases (line 1), and are smaller than that of NPS firms for sales
decreases (lines 2 to 3, where positive values on line 3 can be interpreted as
companies retaining more employees during a big negative shock, and the
negative values on line 4 can be interpreted as slight increases in employment
when negative shocks occur). When recovering from a prior negative shock,
the PS firms continue to have smaller responses to further negative shocks
(line 5), have mixed results in response to big positive shocks (lines 6 and 7),
and have more positive responses to small positive shocks (line 8). The stabil
ity theory would predict that, because the PS firms laid off fewer employees to
begin with under the prior negative shock, the response to a subsequent posi
tive shock should not be as positive—a prediction which does not fit neatly
with these results, though it may indicate that PS firms are simply hungrier for
labor under most circumstances. As described in the main text, these results
give some support to the view that employment behavior differs between PS
and NPS firms. When not recovering from negative shocks, the behavior of PS
firms is favorable (lower responses to negative shocks, and higher responses
to positive shocks), and generally fits the stability theory. When recovering
from negath shocks, the behavior of PS firms is likewise favorable in that
there is less response to negative shocks and a more positive response to small
positive shocks, though this latter result does not fit the theory, and the mixed
results with respect to large positive shocks provide no clear guide.
As noted, these estimates make strong assumptions about the size of the
excess demand for labor, and whether a firm is experiencing or recovering
from a large or small negative demand shock. On top of this, the stability the
ory predicts that profit-sharing firms should be generally more willing than
fixed-wage firms to hire workers, so that the employment response to a posi
tive shock in a time of unemployment may even be stronger for a profit-shar
ing firm. Determining what conditions apply to the hiring decision—whether
the profit-sharing firm has an "excess demand for labor" at that point—is
fraught with conceptual and empirical problems.
A simpler approach, as used in most previous research, is employed for the
other regression results presented in this chapter: comparing the overall
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employment responses to positive and negative demand shocks between non
profit-sharing and profit-sharing firms. This uses the following specification:
(10) 8ln(L) = 00 + ew*8ln(w) + 6^+ *(Dpos) + 0
0ps+*a>pos)*PS + 0ps.*(Dneg)*PS

Dpos = change in demand for firm's products, if the change is positive, and
0 otherwise
Dneg = change in demand for firm's products, if the change is negative, and
0 otherwise
Other variables and coefficients as defined above.
The estimated responses of NPS firms to positive and negative demand
shocks are, respectively, 0^+ and 0^_ (both estimated as positive, since
employment is expected to move in the same direction as the demand shock),
while the estimated responses of PS firms include the interaction coefficients
(0^+ + 0pj.+ for positive shocks, and 0^. + 0^. for negative ones). Profitsharing firms are theorized to have generally smaller employment responses to
negative demand shocks (implying that the interaction coefficient 0^. is neg
ative), and to have roughly similar responses to positive demand shocks (with
smaller responses if recovering from a previous negative shock, but stronger
responses if unemployment exists and workers are available, so that the sign
of 0ps+ is ambiguous). Since the prediction is clearer with respect to negative
shocks, more attention is paid to negative shocks.
As described in the main text, there are potentially important differences
between old profit-sharing firms and new adopters in whether the profit share
is substituting for, or adding onto, fixed compensation. Therefore separate
0ps+ and 0ps. coefficients are estimated for the old profit-sharing firms and for
the adopters both pre- and postadoption, which has the advantage that pre- and
postadoption responses can be compared.
NOTES
1. The seven relationships should be interpreted not as full equations of labor demand, but as
the relationship between demand shocks and employment changes, ceteris paribus.
2. Estimated with change in In(employment) as the dependent variable, separate coefficients
on change in In(sales) for increases and decreases, instrumented change in average pay, year dum
mies, and 25 industry dummies and time trends as independent variables.

Table A4.1

Compensation Levels and Growth Regressions

Company compensation/industry average compensation
Firstdifferences,
full period Means (s.d.) Means (s.d.) Means (s.d.)
1991 levels
1991 levels 1991 levels
Dependent variable
(4)
(2)
(3)
(1)
for (4)
for (3)
for (1) & (2)
0.107
0.146
0.164
-0.001
0.133
0.129
0.026
Presence of pre-1975 PS
(0.074)
(0.071)
(0.373)
(0.003)
(0.341)
(0.092)
(0.353)
Presence of post- 1975 PS
0.007
-0.074
-0.156
-0.097
0.108
0.236
0.253
(0.007)
(0.126)
(0.176)
(0.122)
(0.310)
(0.429)
(0.437)
-0.003
PS adoption
0.015
(0.123)
(0.011)
Year following PS adoption
0.014
0.017
(0.119)
(0.012)
-0.013
-0.021
DB plan presence
0.855
0.805
0.843
-0.121
0.001
(0.067)
(0.067)
(0.358)
(0.396)
(0.366)
(0.095)
(0.003)
-0.051*
DB plan adoption
0.002
(0.045)
(0.026)
0.551
0.029
0.017
-0.001
0.566
ESOP presence
0.031
0.582
(0.498)
(0.498)
(0.050)
(0.066)
(0.002)
(0.499)
(0.050)
-0.014
ESOP adoption
0.026
(0.159)
(0.007)
0.235**
0.216**
0.350
0.379
0.365
0.174
-0.003
Union proportion
(0.282)
(0.275)
(0.281)
(0.097)
(0.132)
(0.005)
(0.094)
-0.066*
0.120
Majority of union members
(0.328)
(0.083)
in PS (dummy)

Professional/admin, share
Production/service share
Intercept
Dependent variable
mean
R-squared
N

Cash/combo plan presence
Cash/combo plan adoption
Year following cash adoption
Deferred plan presence
Deferred plan adoption

1.530***
(0.150)

1.187***
(0.120)

0.057
(0.365)
0.007
(0.213)
1.731***
(0.245)

0.276
(0.122)
0.502
(0.203)
0.011*
(0.006)
1.018
(0.220)

0.207
83

0.119
83

0.007
0.271
83
1960
55
Company nonpension compensation/
industry average compensation
Firstdifferences
full period
1991 levels
1991 levels
(7)
(6)
(5)
0.005
0.025
0.059
(0.004)
(0.057)
(0.067)
-0.019
(0.013)
0.002
(0.012)
-0.002
0.047
-0.046
(0.004)
(0.073)
(0.073)
-0.015
(0.019)

1.037
(0.234)

0.003
(0.052)

55

1960

Means (s.d.)
for (5) & (6)
0.241
(0.430)

0.133
(0.341)

Means (s.d.)
for (7)
0.109
(0.311)
0.009
(0.095)
0.009
(0.095)
0.126
(0.332)
0.004
(0.064)

Year following deferred adoption
DB plan presence

-0.020
(0.064)

-0.011
(0.065)

0.024
(0.049)

0.020
(0.049)

0.132
(0.087)

0.153
(0.090)
-0.087
(0.087)
1.473***
(0.138)

DB plan adoption
ESOP presence
ESOP adoption
Union proportion
Majority of union members in PS (dummy)
Intercept
Dependent variable
mean
R-squared
N

1.493***
(0.137)

-0.003
(0.02")
0.002
(0.003)
-0.045*
(0.025)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.015
(0.007)
-0.001
(0.004)

0.843
(0.366)

0.566
(0.499)

0.365
(0.281)
0.120
(0.328)

0.011
(0.006)
0.995
(0.212)

0.192
83

0.203
83

0.004
(0.060)
0.804
(0.397)
0.004
(0.064)
0.550
(0.498)
0.026
(0.159)
0.350
(0.282)

0.008
1963

83

0.005
(0.050)
1963

NOTES: tandard errors in parentheses in regression columns.
PS = profit sharing; DB = defined benefit; ESOP = Employee Stock Ownership Plan.
Dependent variable for regressions 1 to 3 is the company's average compensation (total labor expenses/employees) divided by the industry average com
pensation per employee (calculated from National Income and Product Accounts data). Dependent variable in regression 4 is the difference in this ratio
between the current and preceding year. The dependent variables in regressions 5 to 7 are based on the same denominator, but the numerator is based on
(total labor expenses minus total pension expenses)/employees.
*Statistically significant at p<. 10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.

Table A4.2 Labor Demand Elasticities

Means (s.d.)

Sample definition

Dependent variable
Base compensation
change
PS contribution
change
Output change
Time trend

Reported
comp. &
PScont
(1)
-0.478
(0.742)
1.485
(2.299)
0.502***
(0.082)
-0.001
(0.004)
Yes
0.474
79

All
reporting
PScont.
(2)
0.236
(0.470)
1.796
(1.736)
0.592***
(0.047)
0.002
(0.003)
Yes
0.503
190

PS firms
reporting
comp.
(3)
-0.319
(0.256)
0.229
(0.817)
0.505***
(0.024)
-0.002
(0.001)
Yes
0.510
522

All PS
All firms
firms
(5)
(4)
-0.620*** -0.720***
(0.137)
(0.190)
0.529
0.875
(0.560)
(0.776)
0.532*** 0.520***
(0.011)
(0.015)
-0.002
-0.002
(0.001)
(0.001)
Yes
Yes
0.394
0.422
3838
1880

(la)
0.070
(0.022)
4.3E-04
(0.005)
0.083
(0.105)

(2a)
0.066
(0.023)
2.0E-04
(0.004)
0.097
(0.113)

(3a)
0.071
(0.024)
1.2E-03
(0.004)
0.088
(0.126)

(4a)
0.068
(0.023)
4.2E-04
(0.000)
0.091
(0.146)

(5a)
0.068
(0.023)
4.2E-04
(0.004)
0.088
(0.145)

8 industry dummies
R-squared
3838
1880
522
190
79
N
0.015
0.020
0.009
0.026
0.013
Dependent
(0.121)
(0.122)
(0.092)
(0.097)
(0.086)
variable
P-value for equality of
base compensation and
0.014
0.034
0.436
0.340
0.316
PS coefficients
deviations in la to 5a.
standard
and
1-5
columns
in
errors
standard
NOTES: Numbers in parentheses are
Sample definitions: Column 1: Only firms which reported both compensation and PS contribution in a given year; Column 2: Only firms which reported
PS contribution in a given year; Column 3: C 'y PS firms which reported compensation in a given year; Column 4: All PS firms; Column 5: All firms.
In columnns 2 to 5, compensation and PS contribution were imputed from instruments.
Variable definitions: Base compensation change: change in ln(total compensation per employee, minus profit share), from t - 1 to t.
PS contribution change: change in profit-sharing contribution as percentage of compensation from t - 1 to t.
Output change: change in ln(sales + inventory) from t - llot.
Change in base compensation and PS contribution were instrumented as described in text.
PS = profit sharing; Cont = contribution; Comp. = compensation.
*Statistically significant at p<. 10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.

Table A4.3 Demand Shock Measures and Descriptive Statistics for Employment Change Regressions

Unemployment rate = change in ln(l - civilian unemployment rate) from t - 1 to t (positive value represents decrease in unemployment)
GNP = change in ln(deflated Gross National Product) relative to time trend, from t - 1 to t
Company sales = change in ln(deflated company sales) from t - 1 to / (deflated by GNP deflator)
"Positive shock" is defined as decrease in unemployment rate, increase in GNP, and increase in sales
Unemployment rate
GNP
Company sales8
Na
Year
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.0008
Across all years
-0.0005
0.0324
(0.133)
Negative shocks
-0.013
-0.027
-0.099
(0.098)
Positive shocks
0.006
0.015
0.103
(0.087)
1971
-0.011
0.002
0.024
(0.108)
320
1972
0.003
0.022
0.078
(0.099)
329
1973
0.007
0.025
0.096
(0.111)
330
1974
-0.007
-0.032
0.097
(0.138)
328
1975
-0.030
-0.039
-0.024
(0.141)
337
1976
0.008
0.022
0.053
(0.117)
343
1977
0.008
0.020
0.061
(0.110)
344
1978
0.010
0.025
0.074
(0.104)
344
1979
0.002
-0.002
0.092
(0.118)
344
1980
-0.013
-0.027
0.047
(0.129)
345
1981
-0.005
-0.007
0.016
348
(0.121)
1982
-0.022
-0.052
-0.052
(0.146)
346
1983
0.000
0.009
0.003
(0.154)
344
1984
0.023
0.039
0.077
(0.116)
350

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Year
Across all years
Negative shocks
Positive shocks
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

349
(0.129)
-0.022
0.007
336
(0.159)
-0.010
0.001
340
(0.136)
0.033
0.007
347
(0.126)
0.056
0.020
338
(0.118)
0.021
0.000
326
(0.107)
-0.017
0.003
321
(-0.115)
-0.043
-0.038
Breakdowns of changes in company sales:8
Percent
If sales
If sales
w/sales
New PS,
New PS,
decrease
increase
postadoption increase
preadoption
Old PS
(10)
(6)
(5)
(9)
(8)
(7)
65
0.042 (0.13) 0.034 (0.15) 0.020 (0.15)
-0.099 (0.098)
-0.097 (0.10) -0.117 (0.11) -0.100 (0.10)
(0.087)
0.103
(0.10)
0.108 (0.09) 0.115 (0.09) 0.114
0.076 (0.07) -0.087 (0.09)
68
0.040 (0.09) 0.046 (0.11)
0.103 (0.08) -0.070 (0.08)
85
0.102 (0.10) 0.084 (0.11)
87
0.122 (0.09) -0.077 (0.07)
0.127 (0.11) 0.112 (0.13)
0.137 (0.11) -0.098 (0.09)
83
0.098 (0.13) 0.096 (0.14)
47
0.089 (0.07) -0.125 (0.11)
-0.030 (0.15) -0.043 (0.17)
0.105 (0.07) -0.088 (0.10)
73
0.071 (0.09) 0.045 (0.15) -0.009 (0.15)
0.099 (0.07) -0.087 (0.10)
80
0.078 (0.10) 0.063 (0.10) 0.040 (0.21)
84
0.103 (0.08) -0.078 (0.08)
0.101 (0.10) 0.056 (0.10) 0.102 (0.15)
0.123 (0.10) -0.058 (0.07)
83
0.110 (0.13) 0.071 (0.11) 0.121 (0.15)
0.110 (0.09) -0.096 (0.09)
69
0.041 (0.12) 0.016 (0.14) 0.057 (0.13)

0.003
0.002
0.009
0.007
0.002
-0.002
-0.013

Non-PS
(4)
0.030 (0.13)
-0.096 (0.10)
0.099 (0.09)
0.014 (0.11)
0.069 (0.10)
0.082 (0.11)
0.096 (0.14)
-0.017 (0.13)
0.051 (0.12)
0.056 (0.11)
0.067 (0.10)
0.088 (0.11)
0.054 (0.13)

Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Non-PS
(4)
0.023 (0.12)
-0.044 (0.14)
0.011 (0.14)
0.071 (0.11)
-0.026 (0.13)
-0.025 (0.17)
0.024 (0.13)
0.056 (0.11)
0.019 (0.12)
0.000 (0.11)
-0.044 (0.12)

Breakdowns of changes in company sales:8
Percent
New PS,
New PS,
w/sales
Old PS
preadoption
postadoption increase
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
-0.006 (0.12) 0.004 (0.13) 0.054 (0.15)
56
-0.077 (0.14) -0.063 (0.17) -0.022 (0.15)
38
0.003 (0.16) -0.057 (0.22) 0.028 (0.15)
55
0.077 (0.12) 0.079 (0.11) 0.112 (0.13)
77
-0.010 (0.14) -0.002 (0.13) -0.034 (0.13)
44
0.017 (0.15) 0.007 (0.15) 0.007 (0.12)
52
0.047 (0.13) 0.042 (0.18) 0.050 (0.16)
63
0.083 (0.13) -0.012 (0.11) 0.032 (0.18)
74
0.023 (0.10) -0.043 (0.22) 0.037 (0.13)
59
0.026 (0.09)
-0.014 (0.10)
53
-0.035 (0.10)
37
-0.050 (0.13)

If sales
increase
(9)
0.093 (0.09)
0.091 (0.08)
0.102 (0.10)
0.118 (0.10)
0.082 (0.08)
0.100 (0.10)
0.110 (0.09)
0.108 (0.09)
0.088 (0.09)
0.076 (0.08)
0.063 (0.06)

If sales
decrease
(10)
-0.080 (0.08)
-0.138 (0.11)
-0.117 (0.12)
-0.063 (0.05)
-0.103 (0.10)
-0.128 (0.12)
-0.096 (0.10)
-0.087 (0.09)
-0.073 (0.09)
-0.078 (0.07)
-0.107 (0.09)

NOTE: All figures represent means, with standard deviations in parentheses, except for 1971-1990 values in columns (1) and (2), which represent actual
values.
a. Changes in company sales have had upper 1 percent and lower 1 percent, across full sample, of values removed.

Table A4.4 Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for Employment Change Regressions

Demand shock definitions and descriptive statistics are given in appendix table A4.3. Below are descriptive statistics of variables which
are interacted with demand shocks.
Sample
New PS,
New PS,
Brief definition
size8
Old PS preadoption postadoption
NPS
Means (s.d.)
Table A4 .5
0.074
6308 Profit-sharing status in year t (dummy)
0.095
0.181
0.650
PS status
Table A4.7
Proportion of company workforce covered by
0.206
0.141
0.281
0.264
Unionized proportion
6300 union contract in 1991
(0.253)
(0.293)
(0.250) (0.244)
Majority of union members participating in
Majority of union
PS in 1991 (dummy)
0.347
0.454
0.271
0.000
members in PS
Table A4.8
2625
0.724
Column 1
PS "substitutes" for
See bottom of table A4.8
0.023
0.114
0.028
fixed pay
PS "added on" to fixed
See bottom of table A4.8
0.034
0.027
0.050
pay
2802
0.755
Column 2
PS "substitutes" for
See bottom of table A4.8
0.018
0.021
0.080
fixed pay
PS "added on" to fixed
See bottom of table A4.8
0.025
0.021
0.080
pay
Column 3
Compensation not
2681 Co. compensation not reported
0.079
0.207
0.100
0.614
reported

Sample
New PS,
size8
postadoption

NPS

Old PS

New PS,
preadoption

0.000

0.055

0.028

0.061

Deferred plan
Table A4.ll

0.000

0.095

0.055

0.037

Clerical/technical
Proportion in PS
Production/service
Proportion in PS
Professional/admin.
Proportion in PS
Table A4.10
Profit-sharing formulas
Percent-of-profits
Discretionary
Percent-of-pay
Other

0.210
0.000
0.509
0.000
0.280
0.000

0.249
0.947
0.489
0.914
0.261
0.949

0.189
0.975
0.523
0.921
0.289
0.970

0.248
0.961
0.450
0.847
0.302
0.946

NPS
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

PS
0.046
0.022
0.036
0.068

Means (s.d.)
Table A4.9
Cash or combo plan

5146

3728
4057
3933

4592

Brief definition
PS contribution paid as cash or to cash/
deferred plan (dummy)
PS contribution put in pension trust (dummy)
1991 proportion of employees who are:
Clerical/technical (nonexempt)
Covered by PS if clerical/technical
Production/service (nonexempt)
Covered by PS if production/service
Professional/administrative (exempt)
Covered by PS if professional/admin.
Employer's PS contributions tied to:
Percent of profits (dummy)
Wholly discretionary (dummy)
Percent of participant's pay (dummy)
Other formula (dummy)

NOTES: PS = profit sharing; NPS = non-profit-sharing.
a. Descriptive statistics based on samples for regressions 1 and 3 in indicated tables (except appendix table A4.8 which uses all regressions). Old PS = PS
adopted prior to 1975; New PS = PS adopted 1975 or later. PS companies are restricted to those with more than 90 percent of employees covered.

Table A4.5

Profit Sharing and Employment Changes

Dependent variable: change in In(employment)
Unemployment rate
Paired
(2)
Demand measure
(1)
2.688***
Positive demand shock
(0.713)
2.396***
Negative demand shock
(0.478)
Profit-sharing interactions:
Old (pre-1975) PS
-0.514
-2.139
Positive demand shock
(1.094)
(1.355)
0.747
0.945
Negative demand shock
(0.724)
(0.894)
New (post-1975) PS
Preadoption:
0.602
0.199
Positive demand shock
(2.082)
(1.490)
-0.327
0.434
Negative demand shock
(1.100)
(0.853)
Postadoption:
1.196
1.691
Positive demand shock
(1.540)
(2.071)
-3.176**
-1.129
Negative demand shock
(1.367)
(1.910)

GNP
(3)
1.265***
(0.360)
1.246***
(0.251)

Paired
(4)

Company sales
Paired
(5)
(6)
0.532***
0.576***
(0.060)
(0.033)
0.573***
0.638***
(0.075)
(0.041)

-0.259
(0.574)
0.268
(0.395)

-0.396
(0.685)
-0.104
(0.480)

0.084
(0.056)
-0.095
(0.066)

0.036
(0.086)
-0.115
(0.105)

-0.486
(0.770)
0.926
(0.536)

-0.385
(0.956)
0.627
(0.658)

-0.104
(0.072)
-0.076
(0.071)

-0.098
(0.104)
-0.026
(0.103)

0.112
(0.819)
-1.225**
(0.575)

0.140
(1.107)
-0.051
(0.781)

-0.042
(0.077)
0.001
(0.084)

0.094
(0.121)
-0.106
(0.131)

Demand measure
Defined benefit plan
Positive demand shock
Negative demand shock
Old PS presence
Old PS • year
New PS, preadoption
New PS • year, preadoption
New PS presence, postadoption
New PS • year, postadoption
R-squared
N
Dependent variable mean
(s.d.)

Unemployment rate
Paired
(1)
(2)
0.821*
(0.451)
-1.551**
(0.646)
0.045
(0.090)
-2E-04
(0.001)
0.089
(0.136)
-IE - 03
(0.002)
-0.124
(0.178)
IE -03
(0.002)
0.059
6308
0.009
(0.167)

-2.712***
(1.038)
2.557***
(0.723)
0.067
(0.095)
-5E-04
(0.001)
0.007
(0.152)
-4E-05
(0.002)
-0.082
(0.241)
7E-04
(0.003)
0.026
2003
0.014
(0.218)

GNP
(3)
-0.879***
(0.310)
0.196
(0.229)
0.036
(0.093)
-IE -04
(0.001)
0.180
(0.146)
-2E - 03
(0.002)
-0.006
(0.181)
-8E-05
(0.002)
0.056
6308
0.009
(0.167)

Paired
(4)
-1.199**
(0.477)
1.120***
(0.373)
0.056
(0.097)
-5E-04
(0.001)
0.033
(0.154)
-2E-04
(0.002)
-0.031
(0.245)
2E-04
(0.003)
0.022
2003
0.014
(0.218)

Company sales
Paired
(5)
(6)
-0.046
(0.032)
0.110***
(0.042)
-0.025
(0.073)
3E-04
(0.001)
-0.106
(0.111)
IE -03
(0.001)
0.061
(0.140)
-7E-04
(0.002)
0.268
6188
0.010
(0.149)

-0.079
(0.053)
0.142**
(0.069)
0.023
(0.077)
-2E-04
(0.001)
-0.074
(0.125)
IE -03
(0.002)
0.008
(0.192)
-3E-04
(0.002)
0.246
1937
0.010
(0.197)

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions 1,3, and 5 include (instrumented) wage change, dummies and time trends for 25 industries. Defini
tions and descriptive statistics in appendix tables A4.3 and A4.4.
*Statistically significant at p <.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.

Table A4.6 Discontinuous Measures of Sales Demand Shocks
Dependent variable: Change in In(employment). Demand measure: Change in ln(cmpany sales). See appendix 4 text for discussion.
Full sample, assuming EDL = 1.8 percent
of workforce
Theoretical
expectation of
coefficient sign
(1)
NPS
PS
Not recovering from a prior negative shock:
positive
positive
1. Positive shock

(2)
PS

0.623***
(0.051)
positive 0.601***
2. Big negative shock (continuous) positive
(0.100)
0.030*
0
positive
3. Big negative shock (dummy)
(0.016)
(size =EDL)
positive 0.176
0
4. Small negative shock
(0.954)
Recovering from a prior negative shock:
positive 0.409***
positive
5. Negative shock
(0.069)
0.540***
positive
positive
6. Big positive shock (continuous)
(0.017)
0.021
0
negative
7. Big positive shock (dummy)
(0.017)
(size=EDL)

NPS

Paired
(3)
NPS
PS

Restricted sample, with separate EDL
by firm

(4)
PS

NPS

Paired
(5)
NPS
PS

0.480***
(0.034)
0.643***
(0.062)
0.019*
(0.009)
0.209
(0.560)

0.692***
(0.082)
0.626***
(0.159)
0.045*
(0.025)
-1.414
(1.489)

0.497***
(0.065)
0.653***
(0.118)
-0.001
(0.019)
0.378
(1.128)

0.886***
(0.084)
0.559***
(0.173)
0.038
(0.025)
-1.256
(0.855)

0.438***
(0.042)
0.670***
(0.074)
0.021*
(0.011)
-0.155
(0.483)

0.823***
(0.162)
0.498
(0.315)
0.015
(0.046)
-1.898
(1.498)

0.660***
(0.139)
0.854**
(0.218)
0.023
(0.039)
-0.758
(1.892)

0.581***
(0.045)
0.723***
(0.061)
-0.037***
(0.009)

0.404***
(0.111)
0.477***
(0.168)
0.033
(0.025)

0.680***
(0.087)
0.480***
(0.115)
-0.006
(0.019)

0.180
(0.140)
0.730***
(0.208)
0.007
(0.029)

0.552***
(0.054)
0.730***
(0.087)
-0.040***
(0.012)

0.263
(0.240)
0.959**
(0.405)
-0.039
(0.052)

0.635***
(0.176)
0.480*
(0.275)
-0.005
(0.042)

Full sample, assuming EDL = 1.8 percent
of workforce
Theoretical
expectation of
coefficient sign
(1)
NPS
PS
positive
0

Restricted sample, with separate EDL
by firm

Paired
Paired
(5)
(4)
(3)
PS
NPS
PS
NPS
NPS
PS
NPS
PS
1.996
4.668** -0.089
-0.801
-0.578
4.409
8. Small positive shock
-0.498
0.123
(0.527)
(1.891)
(1.303)
(1.801)
(0.668)
(1.177)
(2.264)
(3.063)
0.255
0.241
0.270
0.267
R-squared
4120
1770
6188
537
N
NOTES: All regressions also include dummies and time trends for 25 industries, dummies and time trends for profit sharing, and defined benefit plans
interacted with demand shocks. Standard errors in parentheses.
PS = profit sharing; NFS = nonprofit sharing;EDL = theorized positive excess demand for labor by profit-sharing firm. Calculated as (labor demand
elasticity * mean profit share/payroll) = (0.5* .036) for columns 2 and 3 (since .036 is median profit share/payroll), and (0.5* within-co. mean) for col
umns 4 and 5. See appendix 4 text.
^Statistically significant at p <.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.
Proportion experiencing shock in column:
NPS
PS
NPS
PS
NPS
PS
NPS
PS
Brief definitions: (see appendix table A4.3 for demand
(5)
(4)
(3)
shock descriptive statistics)
(2)
Not recovering from negative shock (product demand
increased last period):
0.480
0.385
0.409
0.061
0.518
0.351
0.345
0.120
1. Positive shock: increase in product demand
2. Big negative shock (continuous): decrease in demand
0.160
0.091
0.105
0.015
0.160
0.092
0.097
0.033
which is predicted to exhaust EDL
3. Big negative shock (dummy): dummy for decrease in
0.160
0.091
0.105
0.015
0.160
0.092
0.097
0.033
demand which is predicted to exhaust EDL
(2)

4. Small negative shock: decrease in demand, if not
predicted to exhaust EDL
Recovering from negative shock (product demand
decreased last period):
5. Negative shock: decrease in product demand
6. Big positive shock (continuous): increase in demand
which is predicted to reestablish EDL
7. Big positive shock (dummy): dummy for increase in
demand which is predicted to reestablish EDL
8. Small positive shock: increase in demand which is not
predicted to reestablish EDL

0.014

0.038

0.040

0.060

0.006

0.057

0.037

0.071

0.045

0.133

0.130

0.208

0.017

0.148

0.108

0.186

0.032

0.098

0.088

0.159

0.014

0.102

0.082

0.166

0.032

0.098

0.088

0.159

0.015

0.102

0.082

0.166

0.025

0.025

0.038

0.005

0.039

0.028

0.009
N

6188

1770

4120

0.050
537

Table A4.7 Profit Sharing, Unions, and Employment Changes
Dependent variable: change in In(employment)
Unemployment rate
Paired
Demand measure
(1)
(2)
2.730***
1. Positive demand shock
(0.726)
1.739***
2. Negative demand shock
(0.481)
Unionized proportion times:
3. Positive demand shock
-2.041
0.589
(1.699)
(3.776)
4. Negative demand shock
1.372
2.502
(1.111)
(2.618)
Majority of union members in PS:
Old (pre-1975) PS
5. Positive demand shock
-1.805
-2.164
(1.566)
(2.413)
6. Negative demand shock
1.440
1.894
(1.101)
(1.837)
New (post-1975) PS
Pre-adoption:
7. Positive demand shock
-0.659
-1.123
(1.708)
(2.743)

GNP
(3)
1.271***
(0.367)
0.935***
(0.256)

Paired
(4)

Company sales
Paired
(5)
(6)
0.543***
0.570***
(0.033)
(0.059)
0.526***
0.626***
(0.044)
(0.080)

-1.408
(0.864)
0.812
(0.604)

-1.421
(1.918)
2.236
(1.452)

-0.006
(0.091)
0.064**
(0.100)

0.026
(0.182)
-0.111
(0.193)

-1.239
(0.761)
0.842
(0.557)

-0.408
(1.147)
1.013
(0.958)

-0.008
(0.083)
-0.096
(0.094)

-0.135
(0.137)
-0.155
(0.150)

-0.435
(0.794)

-0.453
(1.164)

-0.151
(0.093)

-0.213
(0.139)

8. Negative demand shock
Postadoption:
9. Positive demand shock
10. Negative demand shock
1 1 . Unionized proportion
R-squared
N
Dependent variable mean
(s.d.)

0.590
(1.052)

-0.454
(1.600)

0.612
(0.584)

-0.389
(0.870)

-0.180*
(0.109)

-0.296*
(0.160)

0.667
(2.112)
-0.987
(2.271)
0.000
(0.000)
0.056
6300
0.008
(0.174)

0.402
(2.880)
-2.060
(4.490)
0.000
(0.000)
0.028
1700
0.012
(0.222)

-0.852
(1.152)
-0.545
(0.840)
0.000
(0.000)
0.054
6300
0.008
(0.174)

0.991
(1.650)
-0.777
(1.723)
0.000
(0.000)
0.028
1626
0.012
(0.222)

0.306**
(0.119)
-0.288*
(0.150)
0.000
(0.000)
0.267
5670
0.011
(0.150)

-0.241
(0.180)
-0.391
(0.253)
0.000
(0.000)
0.252
1639
0.010
(0.201)

NOTES: All regressions include demand shocks interacted with presence of defined benefit plan, plus dummies and year trends for old PS, preadoption
new PS, and postadoption new PS. Regressions 1, 3, and 5 also include dummies and time trends for 25 industries and pay changes. Definitions and
descriptive statistics in appendix tables A4.3 and A4.4. Standard errors in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at p <.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.

Table A4.8 Compensation Levels and Employment Changes
Dependent variable: Change in In(employment).

1 . Positive demand
shock
2. Negative demand
shock
Profit-sharing
interactions
Old (pre-1975) PS
3. Positive demand
shock
4. Negative demand
shock
New (post-1975) PS
Preadoption
5. Positive demand
shock
6. Negative demand
shock
Postadoption
7. Positive demand
shock

Demand measure: Change in ln(company sales).

(2)
(1)
Looking at levels of pay in relation to output
Looking at levels of pay
(3)
PS "added on" Compensation
PS "substitutes" for
PS "added on"
PS "substitutes" for
to regular pay"
regular pay8
to regular pay6 not reported
regular payb
0.543***
0.563***
0.509***
(0.042)
(0.041)
(0.044)
0.749***
0.645***
0.691***
(0.048)
(0.064)
(0.059)

0.317***
(0.072)
0.041
(0.095)

0.005
(0.127)
-0.272*
(0.164)

0.387***
(0.075)
-0.112
(0.106)

0.184
(0.112)
0.107
(0.142)

-0.033
(0.091)
-0.098
(0.105)

-0.234
(0.155)
-0.352*
(0.206)

-0.207
(0.139)
0.053
(0.176)

-0.217
(0.182)
0.188
(0.240)

-0.156
(0.178)
-0.264
(0.193)

0.183
(0.110)
-0.243
(0.107)

-0.268
(0.211)

-0.340**
(0.170)

-0.137
(0.179)

-0.466**
(0.224)

-0.090
(0.118)

0.080
-0.063
-0.568**
0.143
-0.675***
8. Negative demand
(0.120)
(0.257)
(0.259)
(0.241)
(0.232)
shock
0.291
0.315
0.327
R-squared
2681
2802
2625
N
Dependent variable
0.009
0.010
0.009
mean
(s.d.)_____________________(0.107)______________________(0.110)______________(0.175)
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions also include dummies and time trends for 25 industries, dummies and dme trends for old PS and
pre- and postadoption new PS (instrumented) average wage change, and defined benefit plans interacted with sales changes.
a. Profit sharing assumed to "substitute" for regular pay if average compensation in old PS firms is less than 102 percent of industry average, or if average
compensation in new PS firm went up by less than 2 percent. Profit sharing assumed to "add on" to regular pay if these conditions do not hold.
b. Profit sharing assumed to "substitute" for regular pay if average unit labor costs in old PS firm are less than industry average, or if average unit labor
costs in new PS firm, relative to industry, declined. Profit sharing assumed to "add on" to regular pay if these conditions do not hold.
Definitions and descriptive statistics in appendix tables A4.3 and A4.4. See text and bottom of table 4.7 for further discussion.
*Statistically significant at p <.10 **p <.05 ***p <.01.

Table A4.9 Cash vs. Deferred Profit Sharing and Employment Changes
Dependent variable: Change in In(employment)
Unemployment rate
Paired
(2)
Demand measure
(1)
2.723***
1 . Positive demand shock
(0.679)
2.779***
2. Negative demand shock
(0.456)
Cash or combo plan
Old (pre-1975)
-5.713**
0.081
3. Positive demand shock
(2.707)
(1.797)
-1.222
1.043
4. Negative demand shock
(1.833)
(1.215)
New (post- 1974), preadoption
0.269
0.875
5. Positive demand shock
(2.470)
(1.741)
-1.233
0.113
6. Negative demand shock
(1.418)
(1.042)
New (post- 1974), postadoption
2.263
3.826
7. Positive demand shock
(3.707)
(2.460)
1.143
-2.544
8. Negative demand shock
(3.425)
(2.173)

GNP
(3)
1.228***
(0.343)
1.473***
(0.240)

Paired
(4)

Company sales
Paired
(6)
(5)
0.537***
0.525***
(0.055)
(0.031)
0.626***
0.550***
(0.067)
(0.038)

-0.096
(0.946)
0.472
(0.655)

-0.938
(1.376)
-2.445**
(0.989)

0.100
(0.094)
-0.041
(0.128)

-0.280*
(0.150)
0.339
(0.254)

-0.361
(0.910)
0.499
(0.644)

-1.236
(1.168)
0.140
(0.819)

0.107
(0.086)
•0.067
(0.084)

0.122
(0.126)
-0.010
(0.116)

0.476
(1.309)
-0.722
(0.889)

-1.331
(1.960)
1.610
(1.326)

-0.008
(0.120)
0.091
(0.131)

-0.019
(0.188)
-0.010
(0.192)

Deferred plan
Old (pre-1975)
9. Positive demand shock
10. Negative demand shock
New (post- 1974), preadoption
11. Positive demand shock
12. Negative demand shock
New (post-1974), postadoption
13. Positive demand shock
14. Negative demand shock
R-squared
N

-1.159
(1.419)
0.101
(0.933)

0.031
(1.776)
0.417
(1.158)

-0.016
(0.744)
-0.367
(0.511)

0.136
(0.886)
0.006
(0.619)

0.065
(0.075)
0.019
(0.087)

0.250**
(0.101)
-0.136
(0.123)

0.692
(1.826)
-0.810
(1.081)

0.373
(2.349)
0.416
(1.327)

0.373
(0.964)
-0.046
(0.687)

0.569
(1.116)
0.708
(0.789)

-0.151*
(0.078)
0.022
(0.087)

-0.139
(0.104)
0.058
(0.117)

1.016
(2.117)
-4.534**
(1.835)
0.062
6419

2.639
(3.323)
0.066
(3.284)
0.030
2169

-0.418
(1.115)
-1.789**
(0.766)
0.059
6419

1.295
(1.441)
-1.230
(0.993)
0.030
2169

-0.063
(0.100)
0.081
(0.111)
0.276
6338

0.159
(0.144)
-0.105
(0.158)
0.264
2097

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include demand shocks interacted with presence of defined benefit plan, and separate time trends
for old and new cash and deferred plans. Regressions 1,3, and 5 also include dummies and time trends for 25 industries, and average wage change. Def
initions and descriptive statistics in appendix tables A4.3 and A4.4.
*Statistically significant at p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.

Table A4.10 Profit-Sharing Formulas and Employment Changes
Dependent variable: Change in In(employment)
Unemployment rate
Paired
(2)
Demand measure
(1)
2.846***
1 . Positive demand shock
(0.824)
2.581***
2. Negative demand shock
(0.551)
Percent-of-profits plan
1.466
2.050
3. Positive demand shock
(3.512)
(2.423)
-0.074
-0.619
4. Negative demand shock
(2.452)
(1.675)
Discretionary plan
-18.005***
-1.357
5. Positive demand shock
(4.851)
(3.168)
-1.852
-2.080
6. Negative demand shock
(3.593)
(2.569)
Percent-of-pay plan
-3.250
-0.131
7. Positive demand shock
(2.532)
(3.525)
0.688
-0.201
8. Negative demand shock
(2.745)
(1.933)

GNP
(3)
1.187***
(0.414)
1.411***
(0.289)

Paired
(4)

Company sales
Paired
(6)
(5)
0.582***
0.473***
(0.080)
(0.037)
0.749***
0.607***
(0.045)
(0.099)

0.399
(1.274)
-0.587
(0.869)

0.580
(1.792)
-0.360
(1.241)

0.058
(0.126)
-0.031
(0.126)

0.112
(0.197)
-0.342*
(0.188)

-1.022
(1.718)
-1.187
(1.214)

-8.463***
(2.497)
-2.074
(1.722)

0.358**
(0.181)
-0.146
(0.190)

-0.556**
(0.259)
0.335
(0.277)

0.254
(1.361)
0.034
(0.971)

-1.052
(1.866)
0.096
(1.353)

0.251**
(0.124)
-0.165
(0.185)

0.299
(0.195)
0.005
(0.304)

Other formula
9. Positive demand shock
10. Negative demand shock
R-squared
N
Dependent variable mean
(s.d.)

-1.486
(1.994)
1.396
(1.382)
0.057
4592
0.003
(0.173)

-1.450
(2.685)
1.516
(1.904)
0.054
1084
0.014
(0.235)

-0.694
(1.047)
0.200
(0.704)
0.053
4592
0.003
(0.173)

-0.392
(1.373)
0.540
(0.964)
0.053
1084
0.014
(0.235)

0.046
(0.102)
0.041
(0.128)
0.262
4499
0.006
(0.156)

0.186
(0.167)
-0.194
(0.207)
0.284
1046
0.010
(0.216)

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include demand shocks interacted with presence of defined benefit plan, and separate dummies
and dme trends for each plan formula. Regressions 1, 3, and 5 also include dummies and time trends for 25 industries, and instrumented wage change.
Definitions and descriptive statistics in appendix tables A4.3 and A4.4.
"Statistically significant at p <.10 **p <.05 ***p <.01.

Table A4.ll

t*

Profit Sharing, Occupation, and Employment Changes

ON

Dependent variable: Change in In(employment)
Clerical/
technical
(1)
Demand measure
Interaction of occupation proportion with:
2.396**
1. Positive demand shock
(1.020)
4.777***
2. Negative demand shock
(0.723)
Interaction of occupation proportion , times
percent of occupation in PS, with:
Old PS
-0.965
3. Positive demand shock
(2.094)
-1.616
4. Negative demand shock
(1.478)
New PS, preadoption
2.731
5. Positive demand shock
(3.665)
0.704
6. Negative demand shock
(2.394)
New PS, postadoption
-1.923
7. Positive demand shock
(2.941)

Company sales
Production/ Professional/
administrative
service
(6)
(5)

GNP
Production/
service
(2)

Professional/
administrative
(3)

Clerical/
technical
(4)

1.445***
(0.516)
2.258***
(0.353)

0.669
(0.845)
3.327***
(0.582)

1.687***
(0.122)
1.911***
(0.122)

0.811***
(0.056)
1.163***
(0.071)

1.160***
(0.105)
1.772***
(0.118)

-1.191
(1.180)
0.525
(0.830)

-0.630
(2.087)
1.765
(1.466)

-0.827***
(0.270)
0.561
(0.395)

0.077
(0.128)
-0.253
(0.147)

0.243
(0.254)
0.477
(0.350)

-0.584
(1.469)
1.955
(1.036)

0.965
(2.212)
2.015
(1.592)

-0.316
(0.463)
0.578
(0.416)

0.028
(0.186)
-0.056
(0.161)

0.087
(0.231)
-0.709***
(0.237)

2.235
(1.815)

2.230
(2.742)

-0.497
(0.361)

-0.210
(0.208)

-0.380
(0.262)

8. Negative demand shock
R-squared
N
Dependent variable mean
(s.d.)

-4.249
(2.309)
0.061
3728
0.008
(0.158)

-1.364
(1.412)
0.065
4057
0.008
(0.158)

-4.123**
(1.933)
0.055
3933
0.008
(0.158)

-0.457
(0.308)
0.209
3728
0.008
(0.158)

-0.245
(0.234)
0.231
4057
0.008
(0.158)

-0.048
(0.410)
0.190
3933
0.008
(0.158)

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions were run separately for each occupation group to reduce multicollinearity. Regressions also include
dummies and time trends for 25 industries and (instrumented) average wage change. Definitions and descriptive statistics in appendix tables A4.3 and
A4.4.
*Statistically significant at p<. 10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.
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